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On the 26th of March 2011 a Libyan postgraduate law student Iman al-Obeidi 
received worldwide attention by walking into a hotel in Tripoli filled with western 
journalists covering the Libyan conflict. Al-Obeidi burst into tears in front of the 
journalists, claiming loudly that she had been held against her will for two days while 
being severely beaten and raped by 15 men serving in Colonel Gaddafi’s troops. The 
Libyan security service members present at the hotel were quick to intervene in the 
situation. They rushed Al-Obeidi out of the public eye, violently taking her with 
them to an unknown destination. Immediately after the incident, a representative of 
the government was quick to vilify Al-Obeidi as ‘drunk’, ‘mentally ill’, ‘prostitute’, 
and a ‘thief’. The government was aware of the worldwide publicity she had 
received, and that journalists were following closely any further developments in the 
situation. Al-Obeidi having already become a symbol of resistance against Gaddafi, 
the government released her from detention. Fearing for her life and safety, she 
escaped Libya shortly after her release with the assistance of the rebel forces, and 
ended up seeking asylum in Qatar. However, the government of Qatar deported her 
quickly by force, and she ended up flying back to Libya in a Qatari military plane. 
She went into hiding in Libya, until she was eventually granted asylum in the United 

1 UNHCR, ‘World Refugee Day: UNHCR report finds 80 per cent of world's refugees in developing 
countries’. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4dfb66ef9.html (accessed 19.07.11). 
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States in early June 2011, allegedly with the help of Foreign Secretary Hillary 
Clinton. 
 
While Al-Obeidi faced extremely harsh treatment in her home country, all things 
considered she was lucky. She received the close attention of many in the Western 
world who were in a position of power. Her fate was directly linked to the 
propaganda war against the Gaddafi regime, and this may have been one of the 
reasons why she received fast-track asylum in a Western country. When the war 
broke out there were many other Libyans who were not as lucky as Al-Obeidi. Many 
attempted to escape from violence unsuccessfully, and ended up facing a gruesome 
fate. There were also thousands who managed to flee to the borders of the 
neighbouring states in their search for shelter. But the voices of these persons were 
not heard as loudly in the Western countries as the voice of Al-Obeidi. Some of these 
‘voiceless’ decided to try to get across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe with 
unfortunate consequences.2 In the early months of the war, it is estimated that more 
than a million people fled across the border from Libya to Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, 
Niger, and Chad. Facing political turmoil of their own, some of the neighbouring 
countries were understandably not in the best position to assist the fleeing persons 
when the conflict broke out. Many of those fleeing from Libya aimed to seek asylum 
in Italy, France, and Britain. But the immediate European response to persons fleeing 
the turmoil of the ‘Arab spring’ was a grudging one. The leaders of European 
countries were primarily interested in how to keep out people who were trying to 
seek shelter.3  
 
The reaction of European countries to the Libyan crisis is not a surprising one. When 
faced with humanitarian crises that are pushing people to flee their home countries, 
the response of developed Western countries has often been slow and small-scale to 
say the least. The limited response is backed by public opinion in many countries. In 

2 The Telegraph reported that in the first two months of the war, at least 800 persons drowned in the 
Mediterranean Sea attempting to flee the Gaddafi regime to Europe. Available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8505936/Libya-800-
refugees-drowned-trying-to-escape-Gaddafi.html (accessed 19.07.11).  




several developed countries there is a strong sentiment that the welfare system, 
cultural ethos, and societal peace are under a threat from incoming migratory 
movement, including the accommodation of those escaping their home countries due 
to violence and other forms of harm.4 It is true that in many countries there has been 
a noticeable rise in the number of incoming asylum seekers. For example, in 1972 
the number of asylum applications lodged in the whole of Europe was 13,000. In 
1980, the number was 180,000 and by 1991 there were 0.5 million applicants 
entering Europe.5 But in some developed countries the domestic population is also 
under the impression that the level of arriving asylum seekers is much higher than it 
is in reality.6 Right-wing parties have capitalised substantially on the current anti-
immigration and anti-asylum public sentiment, advocating, among other things, ‘sane 
policies’ that more effectively deter the entry of asylum seekers. In many European 
countries the message of abandoning the existing ‘unreasonably benevolent’ asylum 
policies has been victorious in recent elections.7 
 
The burdens of accommodating persons who are fleeing their home countries should, 
of course, be taken into consideration when drafting asylum policies. While some 
persons in need of protection may be ‘desirable’ migrants who would benefit the 
recipient country, this is not necessarily always the case. The persons in need of 
protection may also be members of noticeably different cultures, they may be 
elderly, they may not have any formal education, or they may not have a 

4 According to the Transatlantic Trends Immigration Survey, 66% of the British, 58% of the Spanish, 
54% of the Americans, 49% of the Italians, and 45% of the Dutch considered that immigration is 
‘more of a problem than an opportunity’. According to the same survey, 57% of the Spanish, 44% of 
the Americans, and 44% of the Dutch also considered that immigration is ‘the most important issue 
facing the country today’. See Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2009 Survey, 5-6. Available online:  
http://trends.gmfus.org/immigration/doc/TTI_2009_Key.pdf (accessed 19.07.2011).  
5 Nadine El-Enany, ’Who is the New European Refugee?’, European Law Review, 33 (2008), 319.  
6 Nearly a quarter of the population of the UK, for example, wrongly believe that every year there are 
100,000 asylum applicants entering the UK – a figure which is more than four times the actual 
number (25,670 in 2008). The average figure given by those taking the survey was 58,000, more than 




7 On the rise of the right-wing populism in European countries, and especially in France, see Mabel 
Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe 




comprehensive general understanding of the functioning of the civil and political 
institutions of the recipient country. In such cases successful accommodation can be 
a burdensome effort requiring plenty of resources from the citizens of the recipient 
country. But while the burdens to the domestic population are often appealed to 
when advocating limited asylum policies, the normative dimensions of asylum are 
rarely considered. What exactly – if anything – does justice require from asylum 
policies set by the affluent states? Put differently, do some asylum seekers have a 
moral claim for protection in states capable of protecting them? 
 
While considerations of justice are often appealed to in public debates on societal 
political issues, it is less common to hear arguments on the justification of denying 
protection to the destitute. But this is exactly what states are obligated to explain 
when rejecting an entry from non-citizens seeking protection. All things considered 
states owe not only a legal explanation but also a moral explanation to asylum 
seekers as to why their plea for protection has been rejected. The framing of the 
issues strictly in terms of legal arguments and in terms of possible burdens resulting 
from protection fails to show whether chosen actions of a state with regard to a 
particular group of asylum seekers are morally permissible. Are states acting in a 
morally permissible way when turning back asylum seekers at sea in order to prevent 
them from claiming asylum? Are states acting in a morally permissible way when 
depriving asylum seekers of food in order to persuade them to repatriate? Are states 
acting in a morally permissible way when protecting their citizens’ non-fundamental 
needs over non-citizens’ fundamental needs?  
 
1.1 Setting the frame 
The topic of the current thesis is ‘justice and asylum’. In general terms, political 
philosophers have been approaching the idea of justice in two centrally different 
ways. Firstly, philosophers have examined justice in a restricted sense by focusing on 
isolated political communities, i.e., how exactly should a bounded political 
community be organised in order for it to be a just community? The most famous of 
such endeavours is John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which sets to examine the way 
in which the ‘basic structure of society’ should be organised, or more precisely ‘the 
 =
way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the divisions of advantages from social cooperation’.8 Apart from 
these isolated enquiries of justice, philosophers have engaged in examining issues of 
‘global justice’. Studies on global justice examine questions such as the extent to 
which the possible existence of bounded political communities, states, nationalities, 
cultures, and religious affiliations should be accepted as relevant factors when 
considering the distribution of goods and services.  
 
The current thesis is an enquiry on global justice. The word asylum refers to a 
‘sanctuary’, ‘refuge’, or a ‘place of safety’, and in the Middle Ages it was used to 
refer to protective practices churches engaged in. In the modern political use the 
word asylum has centrally referred to interstate protection of persons with a well-
founded fear of persecution. Both of these uses of the term asylum suggest that when 
a person is granted asylum, the person is provided access to some form of delineated 
protective zone in which the person receives either a temporary or a permanent 
shelter from certain harms and threats of harm to which he or she would be 
vulnerable outside the zone. In the current study I will focus on asylum in the context 
of a world occupied by states that have jurisdiction over a delineated territory.9 More 
specifically, I will focus on the circumstances under which citizens of a state can 
have a claim to be provided access to the territories under the jurisdiction of other 
states and to be protected by these recipient states from certain harms and threats of 
harm to which they would be vulnerable outside the state.  
 

8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999a), 6. 
9 This framing of the enquiry is not, in the end, a conservative one. As John Rawls rightly points out, 
when the boundaries between political communities are viewed in isolation it is surely the case that 
they seem arbitrary and ‘depend to some degree on historical circumstances’, but ‘in the absence of a 
world-state there must be boundaries of some kind’. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1999b), 39. Many political theorists from Kant onwards have been 
critical of the idea of world-state. This has been also the case with many theorists who accept the 
starting-position of moral cosmopolitanism, i.e., the claim that ‘individual is the ultimate unit of moral 
worth and concern’. Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and 
Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 94. See also Charles R. Beitz, Political 
Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 181-183. For a 
defence of the world government, see Kai Nielsen, ‘World Government, Security, and Global Justice’, 
in Stephen Luper-Foy (ed.), Problems of International Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 
 >
Accessing asylum entails in many cases cross-border movement, but it is important 
to recognise that this does not necessarily have to be the case. Alternatively, access 
to asylum may be provided by extending the jurisdiction of a state or a group of 
states beyond their territorial borders and by creating a limited safety zone in the 
asylum seekers’ home state. This method of providing access to asylum is mainly 
used in cases of substantial humanitarian crises requiring urgent response from the 
international community.10 To keep the analysis from drifting too far to the complex 
issues of territorial rights and humanitarian intervention in the current enquiry I will 
focus strictly on ’access to asylum’ in the first sense. In other words, in the study 
asylum denotes a safe haven that is located on the jurisdictional territories of states 
other than the home state of the asylum seeker.  
 
It should also be pointed out right away that in the study I will stop short of 
examining ‘the ethics of migration’11 in more general terms, i.e., the study does not 
offer an answer to the question of how open borders between states should be all 
things considered.12 In enquiries on the ethics of migration, so far philosophers have 

10 It should be pointed out that although often the intention behind the creation of safety zones is 
temporary protection, the sad reality in the current world is that there are thousands of persons around 
the world for whom this temporary solution has become a permanent one. 
11 For excellent introductory texts on the ethics of migration, see James L. Hudson, ‘The Philosophy 
of Immigration’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 8 (1986), 51-62; Robert E. Goodin, ‘If People Were 
Money…’, in Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin (eds.), Free Movement – Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and of Money (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Terry 
Nardin, ‘Alternative Perspectives on Transnational Migration’, in Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin 
(eds.), Free Movement – Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Veit Bader, ‘The Ethics of Immigration’, Constellations, 12 
(2005), 331-361; Jonathan Seglow, ‘The Ethics of Immigration’, Political Studies Review, 3 (2005), 
317-334. 
12 The question of the right of states to limit migration has been approached from many different 
perspectives. For a seminal philosophical work on open borders see Joseph Carens, ‘Aliens and 
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, The Review of Politics, 49 (1987), 251-273. For libertarian 
enquiries on the right of states to limit migration, see Hillel Steiner, ‘Libertarianism and the 
Transnational Migration of People’, in Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin (eds.), Free Movement – 
Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992); John Hospers, ‘A Libertarian Argument against Open Borders’, Journal of 
Libertarian Studies, 13 (1998), 153-165; Jesús Huerta de Soto, ‘A Libertarian Theory of Free 
Immigration’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 13 (1998), 187-197; Chandran Kukathas, ‘The Case for 
Open Immigration’, in Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary 
Debates in Applied Ethics (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005); Jan Krepelka, ‘A Pure Libertarian 
Theory of Immigration’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 22 (2010), 35-52.  For liberal egalitarian 
enquiries on the right to limit migration see for example Veit Bader, ‘Fairly Open Borders’, in Veit 
Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997); Phillip Cole, Philosophies of 
Exclusion – Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2000); Tan, Justice without Borders, 123-131; Eric Cavallero, ‘An Immigration-Pressure Model of 
 ?
not focused much on ‘the refugee problem’ and ‘the right to asylum’. Much more 
time and effort has been dedicated to the general question of how open the migration 
policies of states should be. Several philosophers have outlined accounts claiming 
that fully open borders between territorial states are a requirement of ideal justice. 
There are many different ways to defend fully open borders, and probably the most 
famous philosophical enquiry on open borders is outlined by Joseph Carens. Carens 
argues that exclusive ‘citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern 
equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life 
chances’.13  Carens approaches the phenomenon of migration by examining three 
famous contemporary accounts of political theory, John Rawls’ egalitarian theory of 
justice, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism, and utilitarianism. He observes that all three 
theoretical frameworks start with some kind of assumption on the equal moral worth 
of individuals, and that in one way or another each of them holds the individual as 
prior to the community. Carens argues that this starting-position provides little basis 
for drawing a distinction between citizens and aliens who seek to become citizens. 
On his view, each of the aforementioned theoretical frameworks provides support for 
open borders if followed obediently to logical conclusion.14   
  
But the claim that borders between states should be fully open is a controversial one, 
and there are plenty of philosophers who remain sceptical of the idea of open 
borders. Restrictions on migration have been defended on many different grounds, 
including communitarian and liberal egalitarian grounds. Michael Walzer, for 
example, argues from a communitarian perspective that without the right to control 
admission and exclusion ‘there could not be communities of character, historically 
stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to 
one another and some special sense of their common life’.15 David Miller outlines a 
similar argument claiming that ‘the public culture of their country is something that 

Global Distributive Justice’, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 5 (2006), 97-127. For an enquiry 
on the ethics of migration from the perspective of the capability approach, see Mathias Risse, 
‘Immigration, Ethics and the Capabilities Approach’, Human Development Research Paper Series, 34 
(2009a), 1-58. 
13 Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, 252.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983), 62. 
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people have an interest in controlling’ and they want to be able to shape the values 
that are contained in the public culture. Miller argues that in general terms 
immigrants who enter a particular public culture have cultural and political values 
‘that are more or less different from the public culture of the community they enter’. 
As a consequence, the presence of immigrants will ‘change the public culture in 
various ways’.16 This, on Miller’s view, provides a justification for limiting flows of 
migrants between countries.17 
 
Matthew Gibney, among others, holds that even if we accepted liberal egalitarian 
principles as universally valid, it does not directly validate a case for open 
immigration. He argues that liberal egalitarian principles require solidarity and trust 
among citizens, and that these relations ‘are often sustained by a shared culture and 
can be jeopardized by large, short-term changes in membership’.18 Miller argues 
along similar lines that ‘social justice will always be easier to achieve in states with 
strong national identities and without internal communal divisions’. He contends that 
countries like Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland can maintain social cooperation 
‘partly because they are not simply multinational, but have cultivated common 
national identities alongside communal ones’.19 Thomas Christiano approaches the 
issue of migration from the perspective of democratic institutions. He argues that 
immigration can be justifiably restricted if it undermines ‘the trust, identification, or 
mutual understanding necessary to sustain the proper functioning of democratic 
institutions’. 20  Finally, some theorists have interpreted that states constitute 
associations, and have defended limitations on migration on the grounds of freedom 
of association. One such theorist is Brian Barry, who argues that there is a 
‘presumption in favour of asymmetry’ in migration, and that ‘it is a general 

16 David Miller, ‘Immigration: The Case for Limits’, in Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath 
Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 199-200.  
17 Ibid. 
18  Matthew Gibney, ‘Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees’, The American 
Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 174. 
19 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 96. 
20 Thomas Christiano, ‘Immigration, Political Community, and Cosmopolitanism’, San Diego Law 
Review, 45 (2008), 958. 
 A
characteristic of associations that people are free to leave them but not free to join 
them’.21  
 
In the current study, I will not offer a conclusive argument on how open borders 
should be all things considered. The current study provides only a limited argument 
on ‘the moral right to asylum’, and further controversies regarding open migration 
remain beyond its scope.22 The study focuses on examining how exactly the right to 
asylum can be grounded in morality, the scope of the persons with the right to 
asylum, questions regarding the institutionalisation of the right to asylum, and 
obligations in its protection.23 For our current purposes it is enough to note that even 
if a conclusive case can be made for open borders a limited normative enquiry on 
asylum is not redundant. It can still be considered as outlining a ‘non-ideal account’ 
of justice. To accept this type of approach is to say that to be merely concerned with 
open borders is to ‘aim too high’ in terms of solutions and guidelines for reforming 
the existing global migration regime. Following Joseph Carens, it may be argued that 
this type of enquiry on the ethics of migration is ‘attentive to the constraints which 

21 Brian Barry, ‘Quest for Consistency: A Sceptical View’, in Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin (eds.), 
Free Movement – Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 284. See also Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom 
of Association’, Ethics, 119 (2008), 109-141.  
22 This type of approach follows closely Amartya Sen’s arguments on enquiries of justice. Amartya 
Sen claims, I believe rightly, that there is no need to establish a ‘transcendental approach to justice’ 
for the possibility of a moral enquiry that is concerned with ‘more just’ and ‘less just’ institutional 
arrangements. He claims that different ways of advancing justice or reducing existing manifest 
injustices demands only ‘comparative judgments about justice’, and for this the identification of fully 
just institutional arrangements ‘is neither necessary nor sufficient’. Amartya Sen, ‘What do We Want 
from a Theory of Justice’, The Journal of Philosophy, 103 (2006), 216-217. Put differently, in order 
for us to be able to examine the existing ‘refugee problem’ as a question of justice it is not necessary 
to answer conclusively to the question whether open borders constitute a valid ideal or not. Instead, it 
is sufficient to consider whether a genuine moral right to asylum may be said to exist. 
23 Previously, the ethics of asylum policies have been considered in Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 45-51; 
Peter and Renata Singer, ‘The Ethics of Refugee Policy’, in Mark Gibney (ed.), Open Borders? 
Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Joseph 
Carens, ‘States and Refugees: A Normative Analysis’, in Howard Adelman (ed.), Refugee Policy: 
Canada and the United States (Toronto: York Lanes Press Ltd., 1991); ‘Refugees and the Limits of 
Obligations’, Public Affairs Quarterly, 6 (1992), 31-44; ‘Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the 
Ethics of Migration’, International Migration Review, 30 (1996), 156-170; ‘Who should get in? The 
Ethics of Immigration Admissions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 17 (2003), 95-110; Matthew 
Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum – Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Michael Dummett, On Migration and Refugees 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Christina Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005); David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 224-227. Yet, so far there is no whole philosophical book 
fully dedicated to an enquiry on the moral right to asylum and its protection. 
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must be accepted if morality is to serve as an effective guide to action in the world in 
which we currently live’.24  
 
Of course, what is ‘feasible’ and what moral guidelines can constitute ‘effective 
guide to action’ in the current world is controversial.25 But the intuitive difference 
between an enquiry on asylum and an enquiry on open borders should be clear 
enough. As Carens points out, ‘no one would suppose that open borders (between all 
states, not just those of the affluent West) is a realistic policy option’, so it may be 
asked why we should be ‘wasting time on evaluating the hypothetical moral merits of 
such an approach’.26 If it is correct that in the near future open borders amount to an 
unreachable ideal, it is meaningful to focus on a more restricted examination of 
justice and asylum. This type of approach to justice essentially outlines normative 
improvements to the current world. It focuses on ‘moderate’ advancements of justice, 
and the eradication of the most urgent injustices. Of course, if the ideal of open 
borders can be conclusively shown to be valid and to be realisable in the near future, 
so much the better for those seeking asylum. In the current study, however, the 
validity of the ideal remains bracketed.  
 
The examination of the right to asylum is meaningful also for another reason. The 
right to asylum is formulated in one form in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) Article 14 (1), which states that ‘everyone has the right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. It is well known that this right 
is a ‘hollow’ right with little practical weight, as no state has the legal obligation to 
grant asylum to any persons. It is meaningful to examine whether underlying this 
hollow manifesto right there can be argued to be a genuine moral right that can 
ground binding obligations of justice, and whether the possible underlying moral 
right has the same scope as the formulation outlined in the UDHR.27 In more general 

24 Carens, ‘Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration’, 156. 
25 For a thorough enquiry on the questions of feasibility in theories of global justice, see Dominik 
Zahrnt, An Enquiry into The Effectiveness and Feasibility of Theories of Global Justice (PhD Thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 2010). Available online: 
http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/4112/1/Zahrnt2010.pdf (accessed 19.07.2011). 
26 Carens, ‘Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration’, 159.  
27 Following James Griffin, this type of approach to human rights may also be called the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach. On Griffin’s view, a theorist taking the bottom-up approach examines the position that 
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terms, an enquiry on the moral right to asylum offers us one way to scrutinise 
critically the interstate framework of protection founded on the principle of 
sovereignty, and the existing practices that states engage in when they are attempting 
to avoid assisting destitute non-citizens who are seeking protection. The moral 
vindication of the existing state practices towards asylum seekers is dependent on 
what kind of claims asylum seekers have for protection. If it can be concluded that 
persons regardless of their background have a genuine moral right to asylum in 
certain circumstances, then we are in a better position to evaluate which state 
practices towards asylum seekers are condemnable and which practices are not. The 
right to asylum – if shown to be a genuine right – can generate binding obligations to 
treat the right-bearers in a particular way, and state practices that are not in 
congruence with these binding obligations are unjust and objectionable, and they 
should be revised. 
 
It is important to recognise, however, that there is more than one way to conduct an 
enquiry on the moral right to asylum. This is centrally because the term ‘moral right’ 
can be understood in different ways. One way to examine the claims to asylum that 
persons have under certain circumstances of deprivation is by focusing on what may 
be called the ‘remedial right to asylum’, i.e., the right to asylum as a ‘special right’.28  
This approach examines the special claims to asylum that persons have due to 
failures of other agents to respect the negative duty not to harm.29 The negative duty 
not to harm is often considered as the strongest kind of moral duty, and failure to 
comply with it can entail responsibilities of remedy.30 An enquiry on the special 

human rights have within the contextual political narrative, and ‘sees what higher principles one must 
resort to in order to explain their moral weight, when one thinks they have it, and to resolve conflicts 
between them’. See James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 29.  
28 According to H.L.A. Hart, ‘special rights’ may be understood as rights that ‘arise out of special 
transactions between individuals or out of some special relationship in which they stand to each 
other’. H.L.A Hart, ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’, in Paul Kelly (ed.), British Political Theory in 
the Twentieth Century (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 161.  
29 On causality and responsibility in more general terms, see Miller, National Responsibility and 
Global Justice, ch. 4; H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), esp. ch. 3. 
30 Apart from past injustice, special claims can come into existence due to benefits agents receive 
from past injustice committed by other agents. On this issue more closely, see Norbert Anwander, 
‘Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of Injustice, Ethics and 
International Affairs, 19 (2005), 39-45; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 102-103; 
Daniel Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37 (2007), 129-152. 
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righto asylum focuses on examining the chain of events that has led to an outcome X 
as well as the moral blame of agents in causing the outcome X. If agent A has caused 
a chain of events that leads outcome X to unfold, A may also have an obligation to 
remedy X if it constitutes harm to agent B.  
 
In the context of individual remedial liability, it is often argued that the assignment 
of remedial responsibility does not necessarily require that harm be caused with 
intentional acts or omissions. Rather, on the liability view it is enough to show that 
when acting the agent ‘should have known better’. Often cited examples are cases 
where a person sets a fire, and the fire eventually gets out of control and damages 
other person’s property. Instead of intentional acts or omissions, the liability 
approach requires only that the agent should have been able to foresee the 
prospective destructive outcomes, and that the agent acted voluntarily.31  
 
In the context of asylum, it might be examined for example whether certain deprived 
persons have a remedial right to be provided asylum in other states due to the fact 
that agents outside their home countries are imposing an oppressive global economic 
order on them.32 It might also be examined whether certain persons have a remedial 
right to asylum due to the fact that some states are selling weapons technology that is 
eventually used by the government of the persons’ home state in persecution. As 
well, it might be examined whether some persons can have a remedial right to 
asylum due to the fact they are losing their livelihood because of pollution or climate 
change that can be traced back to other countries.  
 
An enquiry on the remedial right to asylum is an important topic, as those who 
violate the negative duty of non-interference can have strong remedial 
responsibilities. In an enquiry on the remedial right to asylum, there are plenty of 
philosophical issues that require careful consideration. In the examination of the 
special right to asylum the causal links need to be clarified. In the end, the 
clarification of the causal links is not always an uncomplicated task. Often the causal 

31 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 96. 
32 See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 118-122. 
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chains of events that have led to a particular outcome are extremely complex, and the 
strength of causal roles agents have in causing a particular harmful outcome may be 
hard to establish accurately. 
 
In the examination of the special right to asylum it also needs to be shown what kind 
of moral responsibility the causally linked have to remedy a harmful outcome. This 
task can be a complex one especially when there are multiple agents causally linked 
to a harmful outcome. The initiating roles of agents and their relative authority, the 
strength of causal links, the effects of acts and omissions, the profits deriving to the 
causally linked agents, and the forms of profit derived need to be examined more 
closely when considering remedial responsibilities.33 It needs to be shown how we 
should ‘rank’ different effects contributing to an outcome from the perspective of 
moral responsibility, i.e., what kind of responsibilities different agents have in 
remedying a harmful outcome they have contributed to when there are others who 
have also contributed to the same outcome in some other ways. To recognise these 
complexities is not to say that a comprehensive account of the special remedial right 
to asylum cannot be outlined. Instead, it is only to say that the task of outlining one is 
harder than it might appear at first sight. 
 
An alternative way to approach the right to asylum is by examining whether all 
persons may be said to have a ‘general right’ to asylum, i.e., a right that persons have 
irrespective of their standing in the political communities they belong to.34 On this 
approach, the right to asylum may be understood as a universal welfare claim that 
each person can have under certain circumstances of deprivation against the 
international community at large.35 In the current enquiry, I will focus strictly on the 
vindication of the general right to asylum. More specifically, I will focus on the 
general right to asylum and on the corresponding duties of those with the capacity to 

33 See for example Joel Feinberg, ‘Collective Responsibility’, The Journal of Philosophy, 65 (1968), 
684-685. 
34 On H.L.A. Hart’s account, ‘general rights’ do not arise out of special relationships, but instead are 
‘rights which all men capable of choice have in the absence of those special conditions which give rise 
to special rights’. Hart, ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’, 164. 
35  Apart from the two approaches recognised here, Carens outlines also a third possible line of 
enquiry. This approach suggests that states can have an obligation to protect needy foreigners 
‘because the moral legitimacy of the state system depends on the provisions of some safe state 
membership to everyone’. Carens, ‘States and Refugees: A Normative Analysis’, 20. 
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assist the right-bearers. In the study I will not examine the remedial responsibilities 
of those agents who have contributed to a harmful outcome. There are two primary 
reasons for this framing. 
 
Firstly, in many cases persons cannot rely on the protection of those particular agents 
who have remedial responsibilities due to the fact that they are violating their 
negative duty of non-interference. If asylum seekers are fully dependent on these 
agents’ assistance, this means that many persons in need of asylum may be left fully 
without protection. For example, during the Second World War it would have been 
absurd for Polish Jews to attempt to seek asylum in Germany against the Nazi 
persecution of Jews. Those bearing moral responsibility for the assistance of asylum 
seekers due to their wrongdoings can be ‘hostile actors’ with little or no concern over 
the requirements of justice. Put differently, the agents primarily responsible can fail 
to comply with the remedial requirements of justice, and not always it can be 
possible to hold the non-compliers accountable. 
 
Secondly, not in every case where a person faces severe harms can remedial liability 
be traced to an agent outside the person’s home state. If members of one state have 
an obligation of justice to provide asylum to non-members only due to those 
members’ past wrongdoings, persons facing strictly intra-communal severe harms 
will be fully dependent on the non-enforceable charitable actions of members in 
other states. For example, persons facing threats to their lives and liberty due to 
natural disasters or fully internal ideological conflicts to which no agents from 
outside are contributing remain outside the scope of persons with a special remedial 
claim to asylum. 
 
1.2 The structure of the thesis and the central arguments 
I will proceed with the enquiry in the following way. In chapters two and three I will 
focus on the theory of the moral right to asylum. In chapter two I will examine how 
the right to asylum can be grounded in morality. Firstly, I will examine an 
entitlement of justice to a minimally decent life in which basic needs are met 
regardless of the person’s background community, i.e., a universal right to 
 9=
necessities. Then, I will turn to examine the right to asylum more closely. The 
universal moral right to asylum is essentially a derivative right, and it derives its 
moral weight from the more fundamental right to necessities. More specifically, the 
right to asylum can be understood essentially as a claim for the protection of the right 
to necessities in other states when the right to necessities is not sufficiently protected 
in a person’s home state.  
 
What about the scope of persons with the right to asylum? Do all persons whose right 
to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home states have the right to asylum? 
I believe this is not the case. In the chapter I will claim that the scope of persons with 
the moral right to asylum is context-dependent, and that insufficient protection of the 
right to necessities does not directly entail that a person has the right to be granted 
asylum in other states. Whether a person has the right to asylum depends on the 
availability of instruments with which the person may be assisted by the international 
community when facing insufficient protection of the right to necessities in his or her 
home country. I will conclude that all persons whose right to necessities is 
insufficiently protected in their home countries have the right to asylum against the 
international community when they cannot be assisted with any other remedial 
instrument within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
The claim that there is a general right to be assisted by the international community 
with the means of asylum is a controversial one to make. Some philosophers have 
strongly resisted the view that general rights to assistance that are against no agent in 
particular are genuine rights. Onora O’Neill is probably the most famous philosopher 
to outline this criticism against general rights to assistance. She contends that 
universal rights to assistance, which correspond to imperfect instead of perfect 
duties, are essentially ‘manifesto rights against unspecified others’, and they seem 
‘bitter mockery to the poor and needy, for whom these rights matter most’.36  
 

36 Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 132-
133; Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 125.  
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As the right to asylum is a general welfare right of citizens of all states against the 
international community at large, i.e., against no agent in particular, the validity of 
O’Neill’s criticism needs to be considered. Is it the case that the right to asylum does 
not constitute a genuine right due to the fact that by its generic form it is a general 
welfare right? Chapter three will be dedicated to the vindication of the right to 
asylum from O’Neill’s criticism. In the chapter I will suggest that there are several 
reasons why the criticism fails to undermine the right to asylum. To mention one, the 
right to asylum may be understood to function as a justificatory foundation for 
obligations to establish mediating institutions that distribute the responsibilities of 
protection in such a way that each right-bearer will eventually have a sufficiently 
secure access to the content of their right. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I will turn to examine the existing refugee protective 
institutions and their moral dimension on the grounds of the theory outlined in 
chapters two and three. I will examine how the currently existing refugee protective 
institutions have emerged, what are their central characteristics, and by using the 
moral right to asylum as the standard of evaluation I will consider whether they 
should be restructured. Within the Westphalian framework of states there has 
emerged an international ‘global refugee regime’ that focuses on addressing the 
deprivations of a certain group of persons fleeing their home countries. The 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and The Protocol may be said to 
constitute the central foundation of the global refugee regime. The Convention 
recognises that persons in certain circumstances are entitled to the status of refugee, 
and this status makes persons eligible for asylum. The Convention definition of 
refugee has not, however, been accepted unquestionably. There remains a vigorous 
debate on who exactly should be considered as refugees eligible for asylum, and 
many regional treaties have formulated broader definitions than the one outlined in 
the Convention. In the chapter I will claim that the ‘prescriptive status of refugee’, 
which renders a person eligible for asylum, should be established on the grounds of 
the moral right to asylum. Put differently, a global refugee regime is morally 
unsatisfactory unless it recognises that all persons with the right to asylum are 
eligible for asylum in other countries. 
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Another central element of the existing global refugee regime is that it recognises no 
binding obligation on states to grant asylum to any persons. In other words, the 
principle of sovereignty is overriding in the existing global refugee regime. The 
central mechanism of refugee protection in the global refugee regime is the non-
refoulement principle, which sets certain minimum requirements on states against the 
expulsion of persons to the frontiers of other territories. I will argue that there are 
two central problems with maintaining the non-refoulement principle as the central 
mechanism of protection in a global refugee regime. Firstly, the non-refoulement 
principle does not recognise adequately that the moral right to asylum can ground 
binding positive duties of protection and the establishment of protective institutions 
that aim to guarantee a sufficiently secure access to the content of the right to asylum 
for each right-bearer. Secondly, it distributes burdens in the protection of the right to 
asylum centrally in accordance to proximity to humanitarian crises instead of 
considerations of justice. 
 
In chapter five, I will examine the institutionalisation of the right to asylum in more 
specific terms. If the existing global institutional framework is morally 
unsatisfactory, what should be done with it? What kind of institutions should be 
established to replace the existing institutions? In the chapter, I will focus on 
vindicating a particular institutional proposal from moral criticism that has been 
outlined against it. The policy proposal examined more closely is called the tradable 
quota scheme. The tradable quota scheme is a policy proposal suggesting that each 
state capable of protecting bearers of the right to asylum is assigned a proportional 
accommodation quota which can be traded in an assigned market place with other 
states after the initial allocation.  
 
Three separate lines of moral criticism have been outlined against the tradable quota 
scheme. These criticisms suggest that the tradable quota scheme includes internal 
components that are morally objectionable, and that it should be abandoned for other 
forms of burden-sharing schemes. The first claim is that the tradable quota scheme is 
inconsiderate of the desires of those right-bearers who are accommodated into a 
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particular country, the second claim is that the scheme should be abandoned as it 
violates the dignity of those who are traded between countries, and the last that the 
scheme leads to exploitation of the developing countries by the more developed 
countries. I will examine these moral objections more closely, and claim that either 
the objections fail or the more specific implemented scheme may be structured in 
such a way that it accommodates the concerns that are raised in the objections. In 
other words, the tradable quota scheme may be vindicated from the moral criticism 
that has been outlined against it. 
 
In chapter six, I will turn to examine the obligations of protecting the right to asylum 
in circumstances of partial compliance. Citizens of all states with the capacity to 
assist bearers of the right to asylum may be said to share the responsibility in 
protecting the right-bearers. But what should states do in their efforts to discharge 
their citizens’ duties when some states wrongfully decide against bearing their ‘fair 
share’ of the collective burden? Are the complying states obligated to ‘take up the 
slack’ and assist the right-bearers the non-complying states fail to assist? It surely 
constitutes an injustice that the complying states will have to bear the non-complying 
states’ burdens. Yet, I will offer several reasons why the injustice should not be 
passed on to the right-bearers. Finally, I will conclude the study by examining the 
stringency of obligations in the protection of the right to asylum. I will suggest that 
we should consider the obligations of assistance on the complying states to be at the 












2. Grounding the right to asylum in morality 
 
In the current chapter, I will outline an account of the moral right to asylum. The 
chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I will focus on examining a 
universal entitlement of justice to a minimally decent life, i.e., a life in which basic 
needs are met. This entitlement, which I will call the universal right to necessities, 
constitutes a moral foundation for the right to asylum. In the second section, I 
examine the possibility of circumstances under which the right to necessities remains 
insufficiently protected in persons’ home countries. As I will point out, states can fail 
to protect their citizens’ right to necessities sufficiently either due to non-compliance 
or unfavourable conditions. In the third section, I will link the right to asylum to the 
more fundamental right to necessities. I will suggest that the moral right to asylum 
should be understood as a derivative right, and that it is essentially a right for the 
protection of the right to necessities in other states. More specifically, I will conclude 
that all persons whose right to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home 
states due to non-compliance or unfavourable conditions have the right to asylum 
when they cannot be assisted with other remedial instruments by the international 
community within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
2.1 The right to necessities 
In the current section, I will outline a moral foundation for the right to asylum. The 
foundation presented here will be called ‘the universal right to necessities’. The right 
to necessities can be understood as an entitlement of each person to a decent life in 
which basic needs are met. The concept of basic needs has been prominently present 
in debates on the measuring unit of human development. It has been introduced as a 
candidate to replace the problematic GNP.37 The concept of basic needs has also 
received close attention from a broad range of theorists who work on human rights 
and global justice. Among others, for example David Miller, Peter Jones, Gillian 
Brock, James Nickel, Frances Stewart, David Wiggins, Paul Streeten, Bill Wringe 

37 See for example Frances Stewart ‘Basic Needs, Capabilities, and Human Development, in Avner 
Offer (ed.), In Pursuit of the Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).    
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and Len Doyal have seen a close justificatory relationship between basic needs and 
basic human rights.38 
 
But as philosophers working on the idea of basic needs have noticed, the task of 
outlining a universal moral entitlement to the satisfaction of basic needs is not an 
uncomplicated one. Apart from having to forge a bridge between naturalistic 
characteristics of humanity and morality, for such a task to be successful there is a 
requirement to clarify the nature of basic needs, i.e., it needs to be shown what 
exactly are basic needs, and why they are morally weighty considerations. Brian 
Barry criticises need-based justifications of distributive policies, claiming that ‘need’ 
is not by itself a justificatory principle at all. He claims that whenever someone says 
‘x is needed’ it can always be asked about the purpose it is needed for. On Barry’s 
view, ‘no statement to the effect that x is necessary in order to produce y provides a 
reason for doing x. Before it can provide such a reason y must be shown to be (or 
taken to be) a desirable end to pursue.’ He concludes that ‘’need’ can be used in 
conjunction with justifications of any kind, but not by itself’.39  
 
David Miller, among others, argues against this conclusion, and suggests that 
‘intrinsic needs’, which are separable from needs that are strictly instrumental, do in 
fact provide an independent justificatory foundation for distributive policies. He 
argues that while logically speaking intrinsic needs are still similar to statements 
regarding instrumental needs in that they are in the form ‘A needs x in order to do y’, 
what is needed is not merely a means to an end, but rather what appears means is 

38 See David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), ch. 7; Peter Jones, Rights (London: MacMillan, 1994), ch. 7; Gillian Brock, Global Justice – A 
Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 63-72. James Nickel, ‘Poverty and 
Rights’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (2005), 386-402; Frances Stewart, ‘Basic Needs Strategies, 
Human Rights, and the Right to Development’, Human Rights Quarterly, 11 (1989), 347-374; David 
Wiggins, ‘What is the Force of the Claim That One Needs Something?’, in Gillian Brock (ed.), 
Necessary Goods – Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefied, 
1998), 44-46; Paul Streeten, ‘Basic Needs and Human Rights’, World Development, 8 (1980), 107-
111; Bill Wringe, ‘Needs, Rights, and Collective Obligation’, in Soran Reader (ed. ), The Philosophy 
of Need (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 191-192; Len Doyal, ‘A Theory of Human 
Need’, in Gillian Brock (ed.), Necessary Goods – Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefied, 1998), 164-168. 
39 Brian Barry, Political Argument (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 
47-49.  
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really a central part of an end.40 On Miller’s view, needing ‘is not a psychological 
state, but rather a condition which is ascribed “objectively” to the person who is its 
subject’.41 This aspect of objectivity in needs is recognised also by David Wiggins: 
‘what I need depends not on thought or the workings of my mind (or not only on 
these) but on the way the world is. Again, if someone wants something because it is 
F, one believes or suspects that it is F. But if one needs something because it is F, it 
must really be F, whether or not one believes that it is.’42 
 
But are there grounds to support the conclusion that it is possible to outline an 
objective account of basic needs? What exactly does it mean to have a ‘need’ that is 
culture-independent and fundamental? If it is the case that needs are fully dependent 
on their cultural understanding, this proves to be detrimental to a universal account 
of basic needs as well as to our attempt to ground the right to asylum on it. In the 
end, an enquiry on needs does not have to accept cultural objections at face value.43 
It can take a critical view on cultures, and it can examine them not only through the 
lens of cultural anthropology, but also through the lenses of human physiology, 
psychology, and the philosophy of good life.  
 
As for example some writers on women’s rights have rightly argued, we should be 
strongly sceptical of fully culturally relative understandings of needs. Martha 
Nussbaum gives an example of how deprived women have adapted their conceptions 
of needs to the surrounding circumstances. She cites a poll on widowers and widows 
in India, which suggests that while the widowers, on the one hand, were full of 
complaints about their health status, the widows, on the other hand, ranked in most 
cases their health status as ‘good’. But this explicated perception on health, 
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40 David Miller, Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 128.  
41 Miller, Social Justice, 129. 
42  David Wiggins ‘Claims of Need’, in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity (London: 
Routledge, 1985), 152-153. Very similar argument is outlined for example by Barbara Schmitz, 
according to whom basic needs are of an objective nature, and they can be distinguished from wants, 
desires, and preferences, all of which she considers to be essentially subjective states of the mind. 
Barbara Schmitz, ‘How to Derive Claims of Justice from Needs’ (unpublished). Available online: 
http://www.hd-ca.org/pubs/5_2_schmitz.pdf. (accessed 11.08.2011), 3. 
43  See for example Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of 
Aristotelian Essentialism’, Political Theory, 20 (1992), 202-246; Susan Okin, ‘Mistresses of Their 
Own Destiny: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit’, Ethics, 112 (2002), 218-219. 
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according to Nussbaum, hid a crude reality. The eventual medical examination 
showed that the widows were in fact suffering far more than the widowers from 
diseases associated with nutritional deficiency. Nussbaum suggests that as the 
women had lived all their lives expecting that women will eat less, the weakened 
health status produced in this way was second nature to them. She concludes that ‘the 
poor and deprived frequently adjust their expectations and aspirations to the low 
level of life they have known’.44  
 
This rejection of cultural objections has merit. As dominant groups in a culture may 
effectively repress the voices of the worst-off and can resort to cultural repression 
and manipulation, many of the weaker members of cultures can adapt their 
expectations to their surroundings and disregard their actual needs. Cultures may be 
structured in such a way that they systematically require great sacrifice from some 
members (for example women) for the community’s ‘collective causes’, and those 
members bearing the burdens of the sacrifice can be pressured into accepting cultural 
roles and denying that they have a genuine objectively definable need that is 
contradicting the collectively desired aim. Cultures are powerful collective forces, 
and they can lead persons to deny that they need things that actually are necessary for 
basic human functioning, e.g., the need for certain minimum amount of daily 
calories, water, and non-toxic environment. Individuals’ personal opinions regarding 
their needs are malleable, and victims can develop perverse sympathy and 
understanding towards their oppressors. 
 
A cross-cultural approach to basic needs can focus on what is universally necessary 
for humans to lead minimally adequate lives. Some things may be argued to be of 
universal value in that they are fundamental for the pursuit of goals altogether. When 
persons are lacking these fundamentally important things, they may be said to be 
suffering severe harm. It is a culturally independent fact that men and women need to 
be able to use certain capacities to achieve whatever comprehensive moral doctrines 
or life plans they set for themselves and aim to pursue.45 Put differently, the basic 
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44 Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice’, 230.  
45  David Miller, ’Justice and Global Inequality’, in Andew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds.), 
Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 198. 
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needs approach may be understood as being close to Alan Gewirth’s arguments 
according to which freedom and well-being are essential for any purposive human 
agency. 46  There are some fundamental human needs the satisfaction of which 
constitute precondition for the very possibility of moral agency, and not meeting 
them can be considered to constitute universally severe harms to any life plan.47 
 
But where exactly is the more specific threshold of basic needs? In circumstances of 
abundant resources and peaceful coexistence it seems fairly unproblematic to 
conclude whether or not basic human needs are sufficiently satisfied. If a society has 
an accessible effective health care system and a free education system for all, its 
members are not only adequately nourished but are also enjoying gourmet foods, and 
they are able to live extensively in accordance with their inner beliefs, it seems fairly 
evident that basic needs in that society are met.48 Conversely, basic needs are clearly 
not met for many in a poor society where a high proportion of the people face violent 
untimely death or die at early age from easily curable diseases. To give a practical 
example, it might be said that while the basic needs of the Swedish are generally met, 
the basic needs of the people in Angola clearly are not. Swedish currently have an 
average life expectancy of 78 years, policing institutions that effectively provide 
security to the general population, broad freedom of religion, and extensive welfare 
system that provides a safety net throughout the citizens’ lives. In turn, Angolans 
have a life expectancy of 38 years, no safety net to speak of, and a dysfunctional civil 
society that has been severely damaged by conflicts. 
 
What can clarify the threshold of basic needs further is that with basic needs we are 
not concerned with the ability to live a ‘full life’, or a ‘good life’, or a ‘flourishing 
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46 On the connection between Gewirth’s philosophy and needs, see Raymond Plant, Modern Political 
Thought (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1991), 203-213.  
47 To have a basic need for X is to suffer severe harm when lacking X. According to Garret Thomson, 
‘a fundamental need for X is itself inescapable in the sense that the fact that X is causally necessary 
for not suffering serious harm cannot be altered. The causal link is inescapable.’ Garrett Thomson, 
‘Fundamental Needs’, in Soran Reader (ed.), The Philosophy of Need (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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bear severe harm as a consequence. The link between severe harm to a person and desire-satisfaction 
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48 Stewart, ‘Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right to Development’, 351. 
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life’ in any particular society. A person living a flourishing life is living a life in 
which she can develop and exercise those capacities that are for her the most 
important ones. To flourish is to thrive within a certain specific conception of human 
excellence. The satisfaction of basic needs, in turn, constitutes only a minimal 
foundation for the pursuit of a flourishing human life and does not guarantee it.49  
 
More specifically, there are two general categories of basic needs that may be 
recognised. The first category includes bodily needs that constitute a necessary 
requirement for human existence. These needs are tied to physical necessities. To be 
human is to have a human body, and to have a human body is to be vulnerable to 
certain things existing in the world.50 At the very least the lack of clean water, food, 
sanitation, shelter, and basic health are each by their general characteristics such that 
they can, if sufficiently severe, infringe upon tolerable human existence independent 
of one’s background culture.51 But maintaining bodily functions is not all there is to 
human existence. In addition to physical necessities, there are also other necessities 
that may be recognised to be of fundamental importance independently of a person’s 
background culture. In order for a person to be living a minimally decent life a 
person requires at least such things as freedom from torture and physical and mental 
violence, physical security, basic education, and an adequate measure of freedom of 
movement, freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression.52  
 
Accounts of global justice that defend a universal human entitlement of justice to 
circumstances where persons have sufficiently secure access to the satisfaction of 
basic needs have been outlined by cosmopolitan theorists like Gillian Brock as well 
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49 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 181. 
50 Gillian Brock suggests that to assess physical health we can use for example measures of life 
expectancy, mortality rates at specific ages, the prevalence of developmental deficiencies among 
children, and calorific consumption compared to WHO requirements. In turn, to assess for example 
physical security it is possible to use such indicators as statistical data on homicide rates, and the 
percentages of people who are victims of war or state violence. Brock, Global Justice, 67. See also 
Miller, Global Justice and National Responsibility, 184. 
51 Each of these sources of deprivation is also recognised by UNHCR as a reason due to which an 
individual may be ‘forcibly displaced’. UNHCR, Global Trends 2008, 3. Available online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html (accessed 19.07.11). 
52 It should be pointed out that even if one endorses a broader or narrower account of basic needs than 
the account outlined here, one can still appreciate the following argument regarding the right to 
asylum in a formal sense. 
 :=
as liberal nationalists such as David Miller.53 Brock argues that all persons would 
endorse a universal entitlement to basic needs behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, and 
claims that ‘whatever governing structures we endorse would (at a minimum) have 
as the central part of their mandate to ensure that people are so positioned that 
meeting their basic needs is within their reach […]’.54 In turn, Miller claims that 
‘basic needs appear to have the kind of moral urgency that we look for in a 
justification of human rights’.55 Basic needs are of universal value due to the fact that 
these needs are not directly tied to any comprehensive doctrines, and morally 
weighty because their satisfaction is a central precondition for existence of a moral 
agent.56 In other words, basic needs are universally morally urgent things that can 
reasonably be argued to ground duties of justice in other agents.57 These duties can 
be duties of respect, duties of assistance, or indirect duties, which can be understood 
as positive ‘duties to create, maintain, and enhance institutions that directly fulfil 
rights’.58 Following Jeremy Waldron, it may be argued that basic needs amount to ‘a 
normative resource base from which a whole array of moral requirements can be 
developed’.59 In the current work I will call this normative resource base ‘the right to 
necessities’. 
 
Before turning to examine more closely how the right to asylum is linked to the 
universal right to necessities, there are four issues regarding the universal right to 
necessities I wish to consider more closely. Firstly, the range of human rights 
included in the right to necessities is, in the end, narrower than the lists of rights 
outlined in the central international human rights conventions. The basic needs 
approach offers an account of ‘basic human rights’, and some of the human rights 
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53 Brock, Global Justice, ch. 3; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, ch. 7.  
54 Brock, Global Justice, 53. On the veil of ignorance see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1999a), 118-123. 
55 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 185. 
56 In the words of David Miller: ’my recognition of others as human beings like myself implies that I 
have a duty to safeguard them against conditions which would unavoidably blight their lives’. I have a 
duty to ’refrain from disabling X or to feed X when he is starving, because I must recognise 
disablement and starvation as conditions that impair any human life I can conceive of’. Miller, ’Justice 
and Global Inequality’, 200.   
57 Schmitz, ‘How to Derive Claims of Justice from Needs’, 3.  
58 On indirect duties see Henry Shue, ‘Mediating Duties’, Ethics, 98 (1988), 696. 
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Press, 1993), 213. 
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recognised in the international human rights documents do not have a sufficiently 
close connection to basic needs to qualify to the final list of basic human rights. To 
give an example, aspirational human rights that aim to promote well-being beyond 
basic human needs are excluded from the right to necessities. Among these are 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
which outlines a right to ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health’, UDHR Article 24 outlining a right to ‘periodic holidays with 
pay’, and Article 27 on the right ‘to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits’.60 In short, while the basic needs approach offers a 
justificatory foundation for a range of basic human rights it does not provide a 
justification to ‘non-basic human rights’ and ‘aspirational human rights’. 
 
Secondly, it needs to be pointed out that the universal right to necessities I have 
outlined here is a controversial one. The universal right to necessities is effectively a 
bundle of more specific human rights comprising not only claims to non-interference 
(universal liberty rights), but also claims to certain goods that may be necessary for 
the satisfaction of a person’s basic needs (universal welfare rights). But not all 
philosophers have accepted that there can be general rights such as the right to 
necessities due to the fact that it imposes more than strict requirements of 
forbearance on other human agents. Onora O’Neill, for example, argues that 
universal rights to goods and services that are against unspecified others do not 
constitute genuine rights. On her view, a right cannot be a genuine right unless it is 
possible to identify who exactly is to blame when a right-bearer does not receive 
what he or she is due.61  For the time being, I will refrain from examining this 
controversy regarding the universal right to necessities more closely. This is centrally 
because I will focus on O’Neill’s criticism in the next chapter where I examine it in 
the context of the right to asylum. As the right to asylum may be considered as a 
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kind of universal moral force. The possibility of aspirational entitlements beyond the right to 
necessities is bracketed in the current enquiry. The argument here strictly suggests that the basic needs 
approach does not offer a justificatory foundation for all human rights outlined in the central human 
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61 See Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
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universal right to assistance, not only the right to necessities but also the right to 
asylum needs to be vindicated from O’Neill’s criticism.  
 
Thirdly, the real capacities of humans to assist others do, of course, fluctuate, and 
this fluctuation can provide an excuse for a particular duty-bearer’s omission in the 
protection of the right to necessities. But as Jeremy Waldron rightly points out, the 
shortage of resources to protect a right does not by itself make the right disappear.62 
More precisely, it does not make the general relationship of obligations between 
duty-bearers and those with valid claims to disappear. Scarcity is an issue of 
discharging duties, and it is separable from the recognition of claims that are 
sufficiently weighty to ground obligations of justice in others. 
 
Finally, a person having basic need X does not directly mean that the person has a 
human right to the satisfaction of that need. There are two central reasons why this is 
not the case. Firstly, there cannot be obligations of justice to satisfy a person’s basic 
need if the efforts require harming the basic needs of other agents. In other words, 
separateness of persons has to be taken into account when establishing the final 
scope of basic needs that matter from the perspective of justice. In the words of 
David Miller, ‘before a need can ground a right, we have to know that the proposed 
right would not impose obligations on others that would necessarily violate their own 
human rights’.63 Secondly, persons may only have a claim to the satisfaction of those 
basic needs that can possibly be satisfied by other humans. If severe harm that a 
person is facing is of such nature that there exists no remedy, there cannot be duties 
of justice on any agent to provide that particular remedy to the person.64 
 
2.2 Insufficient protection of the right to necessities 
So far I have examined the universal right to necessities. In this section, I will turn to 
examine the protection of the right to necessities, or rather its failure, more closely. A 
closer examination of the institutional arrangements dedicated to the protection of the 
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universal right to necessities is important for our current purposes, as it allows us to 
understand better the nature of the right to asylum.  
 
States may be considered as jurisdictional institutional units that have a central 
instrumental role in the protection of the right to necessities. More precisely, states 
constitute political institutions that, among other things, aim to ensure that their 
members have secure access to the content of the right to necessities. As Simon 
Caney points out, it is meaningful to speak about the state within the framework of 
cosmopolitan moral theory. He contends that ‘an egalitarian cosmopolitan can, and 
should, recognise the instrumental importance of political institutions, including the 
state’. A cosmopolitan theory of justice that focuses on persons’ universal 
entitlements and duties can recognise that ‘the state has normative significance for 
people’s duties to uphold these rights’. Caney notes that ‘one might adhere to 
cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice, including perhaps fairly egalitarian 
ones, but also hold that as a member of the state one is under a special duty to uphold 
the cosmopolitan entitlements of one’s fellow citizens.’65 Put differently, the state 
may be seen as an institutional scheme of cooperation between its members, and as a 
member of this institutional scheme a person can have ‘special duties’ of justice 
towards other members of the scheme to ensure that they receive their cosmopolitan 
entitlements and ‘general duties’ of justice to ensure that members of other states 
receive their cosmopolitan entitlements.66  
 
Miller outlines a similar argument regarding the protection of basic human rights.67 
He contends that ‘the members of each political community bear a special 
responsibility to ensure that rights are secured within the community’. Miller notes 
that ‘there is nothing mysterious in the idea that rights which are universally held 
should generate obligations that fall in the first instance on particular people: every 
child has a right to a secure home, but it is the child’s parents that bear primary 

65 Simon Caney, ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State’, Political Studies, 56 (2008a), 511. 
66 Caney, ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State’, 512. 
67 It should be pointed out that Miller holds there to be more than instrumental reasons for why the 
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responsibility for securing this right’. He concludes that ‘it is only when the parents 
are unable to meet their obligation are third parties required to step in to fill the 
breach’.68 
 
The sad reality is, of course, that we do not have to move far away from the domain 
of ideal theory to recognise the genuine possibility that not all states will protect 
sufficiently their citizens’ right to necessities.69 In other words, the very institution 
that is supposed to protect persons’ universal entitlement to basic needs can be 
incapable of functioning in an adequate way. In fact, a look around the existing 
reality allows us to conclude fairly quickly that a world in which all members of all 
states have their right to necessities sufficiently protected in their home states is a 
distant utopian dream. There are, of course, countless more specific reasons why a 
person’s right to necessities may be insufficiently protected in a person’s home state. 
Two general categories of reasons can be distinguished here. Following John Rawls’ 
argument in The Law of Peoples, it can be claimed that circumstances of rights 
protection may fall short of the ideal either due to non-compliance or due to 
unfavourable conditions.70 Let us consider each of these possible scenarios, starting 
with non-compliance.  
 
A particular government of a state can be non-compliant with the requirements of 
justice in two centrally different ways. The paradigmatic state failure to protect 
citizens’ universal entitlements is active violation of these entitlements. A 
government can either draft unjust laws that authorise the violations of persons’ 
universal entitlements, or it can draft laws requiring official respect of entitlements 
but nevertheless in practice fail to comply with the existing laws. The government of 
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70 See also Rawls’ account of full compliance and partial compliance in A Theory of Justice. Rawls 
suggests that his theory concerns the structuring of a ‘well-ordered society’, i.e., it focuses on how a 
society should organise its basic structure under the conditions of full compliance. Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 7-8. 
 ;B
a state can be corrupt and malevolent, and regardless of the existing laws it can 
actively use the state apparatus for example to persecute a particular group of 
citizens.  
 
Thomas Pogge rightly notes that there is something especially hideous, outrageous, 
and sinister about a government actively violating citizens’ fundamental rights. 
When a government is actively violating citizens’ rights, ‘such wrongs do not merely 
deprive their victims of the objects of their rights but attack those very rights 
themselves: they do not merely subvert what is right, but the very idea of right and 
justice’.71  In some states active government violations of the right to necessities 
constitutes a real problem for minority groups. In the existing world states are not 
ethnically or religiously homogenous, and a particular group governing the state can 
be hostile to other groups within the state. The actions of Iraq’s government against 
the Kurd minority in the 1980’s and early 1990’s provide a clear example of this 
form of harm that can occur in non-ideal circumstances. In the case of the Kurds, the 
government of Iraq engaged in the persecution of ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq and 
deprived many of them of their basic needs and violated their right to necessities. 
 
Apart from directly depriving citizens of their basic needs, a government can also fail 
to comply with the requirements of justice by intentionally not protecting the right to 
necessities when it has sufficient capacities to do so. In other words, a government 
may stop short of actively using state institutions to harm the citizens, but it may 
nevertheless be unwilling to sufficiently protect them against deprivations of basic 
needs by non-state agents. For example, a government that does not actively 
persecute homosexuals can still have an institutionalised discriminatory bias against 
homosexuals in the protective institutions of the state. The protective institutions of 
the state may turn a blind eye when other citizens of the state or foreign nationals 
with hostile attitudes deprive homosexual citizens of their basic needs, and these 
institutions can also fail to hold the rights violators accountable for their actions. 
When the protective institutions of a state systematically fail to intervene in 
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deprivations of some of its citizens’ basic need, and when the state institutions 
systematically fail to hold accountable the violations of the citizens’ right to 
necessities, the state may no longer be said to represent the victims. 
  
The second broader set of reasons why a state may fail to satisfactorily function as 
the political institution primarily responsible for the protection of the right to 
necessities is unfavourable conditions. While a government of a state may not be 
unwilling to protect its citizens’ right to necessities, it can still be unable to provide 
protection. This type of failure to protect the right to necessities is distinctly different 
from the set of reasons examined above. When a government actively violates its 
citizens’ right to necessities or condones right violations by non-state agents, the 
‘protective bond’ between the state and the right-bearing citizens subjected to severe 
harms is severed. In such cases the government is behaving malevolently against the 
citizens by failing to do morally required things that are within the limits of its 
capacities. In turn, in unfavourable conditions the protective bond between the state 
and the right-bearers still remains intact. The government remains well-intentioned 
towards the right-bearing citizens, but regardless of its best efforts it is simply 
incapable of sufficiently protecting some of the citizens’ right to necessities.  
 
There are, of course, a myriad of reasons why a state may be faced with social and 
economic circumstances under which it is extremely difficult if not impossible to 
sufficiently protect the right to necessities. One possible reason is that the territory on 
which the state is located has inadequate natural resources to maintain well-
functioning state institutions.72 But even if we leave aside the issue of distribution of 
natural resources between territorial states, there are still several other reasons due to 
which unfavourable conditions can emerge within a state. A state can, for example, 
face extreme natural disasters, and as a consequence the government of the state can 
lose its effective capacity to protect the citizens’ rights. Natural disasters can destroy 
state infrastructure, manufacturing capacities, and they can hinder food production 
below critical levels. As well, a state can have such a political culture, political 
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virtues, and civil society that they paralyse the state and lead to some of the citizens 
being deprived of their basic needs. 73  In the words of Rawls, states facing 
unfavourable conditions can ‘lack the political and cultural traditions, the human 
capital and know-how, and often the material and technological resources needed to 
be well-ordered’. 74  Under unfavourable conditions it can be impossible for a 
government to maintain well-functioning state institutions, and the state can become 
effectively paralysed.75 The state may attempt to do everything in its power to protect 
its citizens, but the surrounding conditions can be such that even the best attempts 
prove to be insufficient.  
 
2.3 What does it mean to have the right to asylum? 
When a citizen of one state does not have a sufficiently secure access to the content 
of the right to necessities in his or her home state, it does not follow that the right 
ceases to exist as a consequence. Universal entitlements do not disappear 
immediately when one institutional arrangement dedicated to their protection fails to 
function adequately.76 On the contrary, the insufficiently secure access to the content 
of the right to necessities suggests centrally that the existing political institutions 
dedicated to the protection of the right to necessities should be restructured and/or 
additional supportive institutions should be established where reasonably practicable. 
All agents with the capacity to assist share a responsibility in protecting the right to 
necessities, and the failure of one state to protect right-bearers can entail that citizens 
in other states with capacity to assist are obligated by justice to step in and assist. Put 
differently, the right to necessities is a universal entitlement which can ground duties 
of justice not only in compatriots (who are primarily responsible for the protection of 
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each others’ right to necessities), but also in the citizens of other states (who are 
secondarily responsible for the protection of other states’ citizens’ right to 
necessities).77 
 
All things considered the political structuring of the world should be such that it can 
provide all bearers of the right to necessities a sufficiently secure access to the right’s 
content when reasonably practicable. If the state-based division of labour fails to 
adequately realise the right to necessities to all persons, there is a need to establish 
additional interstate arrangements that advance this aim. The ‘asylum’ system can be 
understood as a secondary institutional system that is dedicated to protecting those 
whose right to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home states. Obviously 
there would be no need to establish and maintain a comprehensive interstate 
institutional regime dedicated to offer persons asylum in states other than their home 
state were we living in a world in which the requirements of ideal justice were 
realised in each person’s home state, and were we to be living in such a world for the 
foreseeable future. Such circumstances would render the interstate asylum system 
redundant.78 Put differently, an interstate regime dedicated to offering asylum may be 
understood as a back-up system for protecting the right to necessities, and it serves to 
complement the primary institutional system of protection, i.e., the system where 
states protect their citizens’ rights. 
 
The right to asylum can be understood as a claim to be provided with protection of 
basic need in states other than a person’s home state, and it receives its normative 
force from the more fundamental right to necessities. Put differently, the right to 
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77  Many philosophers have outlined a distinction between primarily responsible and secondarily 
responsible duty-bearers. For example, Robert E. Goodin argues that those who are secondarily 
responsible can retain responsibilities when agents who are primarily responsible fail to discharge 
their duties sufficiently. He gives an example of a father who fails to act in saving his own child from 
drowning, and argues that ‘onlookers cannot excuse their own failure to do so with the plea that it was 
his job, not theirs’. Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable – A Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 134-135. On the distinction, see 
also Leif Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty 
as a Human Right – Who Owes what to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 263-
266. 
78 As Joseph Carens rightly points out, once we are looking at the issue of asylum we are concerned 
about ‘exceptional’ cases, i.e., ones ‘that cannot be handled by the normal institutional arrangements 
under which each state looks out for its own’. Joseph Carens, ‘Refugees and the Limits of 
Obligations’, Public Affairs Quarterly, 6 (1992), 37. 
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asylum is effectively a right to be provided access to the jurisdictional territory of 
states other than a person’s home state and to have one’s right to necessities 
protected by these states. The right to asylum is not self-standing in terms of its 
moral grounding, but instead it is a derivative right that relies on underlying 
normative concepts. It is only because the right to necessities has universal normative 
force that there can be a universal right to asylum. If it were the case that the right to 
necessities was not by its scope a universal right but instead a societal right, we could 
not speak of a universal moral right to asylum. The right to asylum becomes relevant 
strictly when a state serving as a mediating institution in the protection of the right to 
necessities fails to function satisfactorily. To seek asylum is essentially to assert that 
the state primarily responsible has failed – for one reason or another – to adequately 
fulfil its responsibilities in protecting the right to necessities. In other words, the right 
to asylum may be considered as something akin to an international version of the 
UDHR Article 8 stating that ‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law’.79 
 
At this point it may be asked why exactly should we be considering the right to 
asylum and the establishment of a secondary institutional system of protecting the 
right to necessities at all? After all, asylum may be understood to constitute a second-
best mechanism for protecting the right to necessities.80 Accessing asylum involves 
physical relocation of persons to territories under the jurisdiction of states other than 
the persons’ home state, and admittedly it would be better if bearers of the right to 
necessities would not have to relocate in order to gain a sufficiently secure access to 
the content of their right. Put differently, the circumstances under which persons gain 
access to the content of the right to necessities with the help of the right to asylum 
are in themselves something that should be avoided with institutional arrangements 
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79  James Hathaway suggests that a ‘refugee regime’ should not be understood primarily as ‘an 
immigration system; it rather establishes a situation-specific human rights remedy’. James C. 
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 1000. 
80 The theory of the second-best has its roots in welfare economics. In welfare economics approach to 
the theory of second-best, ‘there is admitted at least one constraint additional to the ones existing in 
Paretian optimum theory and it is in the nature of this constraint that it prevents the satisfaction of at 
least one of the Paretian optimum conditions’. See Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, ‘The 
General Theory of Second Best’, The Review of Economic Studies, 24 (1956), 12.  
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when reasonably practicable. But the recognition of asylum as the second-best 
solution to the protection of the right to necessities does not entails that it is not 
meaningful to focus on the right to asylum and secondary institutional arrangements. 
The rationale for focusing on the second-best mechanism is twofold.   
 
Firstly, we are far from a world in which we could concern ourselves strictly with 
best possible solutions with regard to the protection of the right to necessities. The 
real world does not only produce expectable outcomes; on the contrary, our world 
often surprises us with unexpected circumstances. To be concerned about the right to 
asylum and about setting up a global asylum system that functions between states is 
to accept the real foreseeable possibility that the right to necessities will not be 
sufficiently protected for every person by their home state, and that in some 
circumstances it is only the second-best mechanism of protection that can offer 
meaningful access to the content of fundamental rights. While a system where 
persons’ home states are the only institutions from which they can seek protection for 
their right to necessities may be sufficient for ideal circumstances, we do not have to 
move far from ideal circumstances to recognise that states do not necessarily 
function as they should. Not all states necessarily comply adequately with the 
requirements of justice, and even if they do unfavourable conditions can still emerge 
unexpectedly. 
 
Secondly, the establishment of a global asylum system is important due to the 
urgency of the needs in question. Real persons are faced with real deprivations of 
their basic needs. While for a philosopher whose basic needs are not at stake the 
second-best mechanism for protecting the right to necessities may be only of 
secondary importance, it is far from evident that this is the case also for those who 
are genuinely faced with severe harms and have no meaningful opportunity to pursue 
a decent life.81 Those persons who do not have a sufficiently secure access to the 
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81 While from a philosophical standpoint it may be true that the questions regarding the satisfaction of 
basic needs with mechanisms other than second-best remedial mechanisms are ‘prior’ questions of 
justice, it is not evident that they necessarily constitute ‘primary’ questions of justice. The question 
regarding the right to asylum can be understood to constitute an additional element of a more 
comprehensive theory of justice that takes into consideration the contingency of circumstances. Put 
differently, an account of justice that includes an analysis of the right to asylum and the global refugee 
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content of the right to necessities are primarily interested in gaining it, and only 
secondarily interested in whether the secured access constitutes the best or the 
second-best solution. 
 
What about the scope of persons with the right to asylum? Do all persons whose right 
to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home states have the right to asylum 
against the international community? I believe in the end this is not the case. The 
right to asylum may be understood as an instance of a more general right to be 
assisted by the international community. In other words, only a specific subgroup of 
persons who have the claim to be assisted by the international community when their 
right to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home states has the right to 
asylum. Whether a person has the right to asylum or the more general right to be 
assisted by the international community depends on the specific context in which the 
state has failed to protect its citizens’ right to necessities sufficiently. On this 
approach, the form of the claim to assistance against the international community is 
dependent on the range of remedial instruments available. The international 
community has a broad range of remedial instruments with which it can attempt to 
address the insufficient protection of the right to necessities. Apart from securing 
access to asylum, the international community may attempt to provide remedy to the 
insufficient protection of the right to necessities in a person’s home state for example 
by engaging in a military campaign to dismiss a malevolent government from power, 
by imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions on a government of the state, or by 
offering economic aid.82 If the insufficient protection of the right to necessities can 
be addressed effectively by the international community with remedial instruments 
other than asylum within a reasonable timeframe in the right bearer’s home state, 
then it seems unreasonable for the right-bearer to claim that he or she has the right to 
be granted asylum in other states. 
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regime recognises the principled possibility of non-ideal circumstances, and it integrates this 
possibility into the broader theory of justice. 
82 For an excellent recent enquiry on the justification of humanitarian intervention see James Pattison, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect - Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. ch. 1. and ch. 3. For a thorough philosophical analysis on 
humanitarian aid, see Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), ch. 3.   
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To give an example, a country may be facing unfavourable conditions due to an 
earthquake, and there can be many citizens who do not have sufficiently secure 
access to the content of their right to necessities for the foreseeable future regardless 
of the remedial measures taken by the government. In this type of scenario the 
government has systematically failed to protect the right to necessities despite its best 
efforts, i.e., due to unfavourable conditions. Once the government has failed to fulfil 
its responsibilities, the international community has the obligation of justice to assist 
the victims of the earthquake. But if the international community can provide remedy 
to the insufficient protection of the right to necessities effectively and within a 
reasonable timeframe with economic and other forms of aid, the victims of the 
earthquake cannot claim that they have the right to asylum in other countries. In the 
current case, the earthquake victims should rather be considered to have a more 
general right to be assisted by the international community with one of the available 
remedial instruments. This is not to say that the international community is not 
allowed to offer remedy to the bearers of the right to necessities in the form of 
asylum. Instead, it is only to say that the persons whose right to necessities is 
insufficiently protected in their home state do not in the current case have a claim to 
asylum against the international community. 
 
In some circumstances, however, there may be only one remedial instrument that can 
satisfactorily address the insufficient protection of the right to necessities within a 
reasonable timeframe. For example, diplomatic and economic sanctions can be 
ineffective in assisting members of a minority group who are facing an urgent threat 
of persecution from the government of their home state, and there may not be a 
justification for humanitarian intervention due to the fact that the campaign’s 
prospect of success is relatively low and due to the fact that the possibility of 
actively-caused severe harm to other citizens of the state is relatively high. In these 
kinds of circumstances it seems reasonable to suggest that the deprived bearers of the 
right to necessities have a claim for the use of specific remedial instrument. Put 
differently, under circumstances where asylum constitutes the only remedial 
instrument that can address the insufficient protection of the right to necessities in 
such a manner that desirable results are reached within a reasonable timeframe it 
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may be argued that the deprived bearers of the right to necessities have the right to 
asylum against the international community rather than the more general right to be 
assisted.  
 
The availability of alternative remedial instruments is a central factor in determining 
the final scope of persons with the right to asylum, and for establishing what 
remedial instruments are available for the use of the international community the 
contextual circumstances of deprivation need to be considered more closely. In other 
words, when considering the range of persons who have the right to asylum we 
should be focusing on the need for asylum rather than on the reasons why a person’s 
right to necessities is insufficiently protected in the person’s home state. So where 
exactly does this observation leave us regarding the scope of persons with the right 
to asylum? Is it the case that nothing can be said about the persons with the right to 
asylum in more general terms? The fact that the eligibility of persons for asylum is 
determined contextually does not mean that a general conclusion remains fully 
beyond our reach. In the end, the following can be concluded regarding the scope of 
persons with the right to asylum: all persons whose right to necessities is 
insufficiently protected in their home state have the right to asylum – rather than the 
more general right to be assisted – when they cannot be assisted with other remedial 
instruments by the international community within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
Then the question becomes, what can we make of this general conclusion? If the 
above conclusion is correct, it entails that the scope of persons with the right to 
asylum is on the one hand narrower than on David Miller’s and Michael Dummett’s 
accounts, and on the other hand broader than the scope of persons recognised in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 14 outlining a human right 
to asylum.83 Let us start with Miller’s and Dummett’s accounts. In his account of 
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83 The scope of persons with the right to asylum is also narrower than the scope of persons recognised 
in Andrew Shacknove’s famous descriptive account of the concept of refugee. Shacknove suggests 
that we should consider as refugees ‘persons whose basic needs are unprotected by their country of 
origin, who have no remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of their needs, and 
who are so situated that international assistance is possible’. Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’, 277. 
The fact that persons’ basic needs are unprotected by their home country and that they do not have any 
other remaining recourse than to seek international restitution does not necessarily entail that the 
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refugee protection Miller holds, similarly to the current view, that there is a direct 
link between the idea of basic needs and the moral right to asylum. Miller essentially 
suggests that the right to asylum is a derivative right for the protection of basic needs 
in other countries, and argues that citizens of other states have an obligation to 
protect persons whose basic human rights are being violated or threatened in their 
current place of residence. Miller expands from the traditional view of refugee 
protection, as he argues that a person can have the right to be protected in other 
states not only in cases of well-founded fear of persecution, but also in cases where 
they are being deprived for example of their right to subsistence or right to basic 
health care. According to Miller, when a person whose basic human rights are 
threatened ‘applies to be admitted to a state that is able to guarantee her such rights, 
then prima facie the state in question has an obligation to let her in’. Those with a 
claim to asylum are owed by other states the opportunity for a decent life.84 
 
In turn, Michael Dummett claims in his criticism of existing asylum practices, which 
recognise only persons with a well-founded fear of persecution to be eligible for 
asylum, that ‘all conditions that deny someone the ability to live where he is in 
minimal conditions for a decent human life ought to be grounds for claiming refuge 
elsewhere’.85 But if the previous conclusion is correct, and the scope of the persons 
with the right to asylum is context-dependent, i.e., it depends centrally on whether 
persons can be effectively assisted in their home countries with other remedial 
instruments than asylum within a reasonable timeframe, then the accounts of the 
right to asylum outlined by Miller and Dummett are both excessively broad. Both 
accounts suggest that once a person’s basic human rights are insufficiently protected 
in his or her home state, the person immediately has the right to asylum. This 
interpretation excessively stretches the scope of persons with the right to asylum, and 
overlooks the fact that in some circumstances the international community can have 
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international community does not have several means available for addressing the insufficient 
protection of basic needs. 
84 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
225-227. It should be noted, however, that in his recent unpublished writings Miller has moved away 
from the formulation he outlines in National Responsibility and Global justice, and he seems to have 
outlined an account of the right to asylum that is fairly similar to the one presented in the current 
study. 
85 Michael Dummett, On Migration and Refugees (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 37.  
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a choice over the remedial instrument it applies when remedying the occurring 
deprivations. Once it becomes obvious that there are multiple remedial instruments 
available to the international community each of which can effectively address the 
occurring deprivations within a reasonable timeframe, the bearers of basic human 
rights cannot respond with moral indignation when they are provided assistance with 
means other than asylum. Their claim is not for the choice of remedial instruments 
with which they are assisted, but rather for ‘a’ sufficiently secure access to the 
content of their rights under circumstances which their home state has failed to offer 
them adequate protection. 
 
Article 14 (1) of the UDHR, in turn, states that all persons have ‘the right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. In other words, Article 14 
recognises ‘persecution’ as a necessary condition for a person to be eligible for 
asylum. The concept of persecution may be understood to comprise a set of reasons 
due to which a person faces deprivations. In the 14th Century usage, the term 
persecution referred to ‘oppression for the holding of a belief or opinion’, and the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines persecution as ‘hostility and ill-treatment, 
especially because of race or political or religious beliefs’. The treatment of early 
Christians in the Roman Empire is often offered as a categorical example of 
persecution, and the same term is often used to describe the treatment of Mennonites, 
Hutterites, and Huguenots in early modern Europe.  
 
The term persecution clearly denotes something that is harmful to a person. More 
precisely, the term denotes relationships between persons in which at least one of the 
persons is subjected to harm. When A persecutes B, there may be said to exist a 
relationship of harm between the two. In the relationship A is the persecutor and B is 
the persecuted. Persecution essentially denotes an extreme concept, and comprises 
treatment of a person that goes beyond unfair treatment.86 The threshold of severity 
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86 As for example David A. Martin notes, while abuse such as the violation of the right to live in the 
city one prefers thoroughly deserves a condemnation, by itself it is not severe enough to constitute 
persecution. David A. Martin, ‘The Refugee Concept’, in Howard Adelman (ed.), Refugee Policy – 
Canada and the United States (Toronto: York Lanes Press Ltd, 1991), 41. Satvinder Singh Juss points 
out similarly that an important prerequisite for a violation of a person’s human rights to amount to 
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may be understood as being located ‘somewhere between ‘threats to life or freedom’ 
on the one hand, and ‘mere harassment and annoyance’ on the other hand’.87 One 
way to understand the circumstances of persecution better is through the idea of basic 
needs. On this approach to persecution, it is a necessary condition for persecution to 
occur that a person faces deprivations of his or her basic needs. When a person does 
not face harm that targets his or her basic needs, but instead only harm that targets 
desires, wants, or societal needs, there may be discrimination or intimidation 
involved, but no persecution.88 
 
Another important element of a persecutory relationship is the commitment of the 
persecutors to cause a drastic change in their victims’ lives. 89  Nazis were not 
indifferent about whether or not their victims faced severe harms or not, and the 
same was the case with the Roman authorities during the so-called ‘Diocletian 
persecution’ of Christians. For the Nazis the aim was to systematically eradicate 
certain ‘inferior’ groups altogether, and for the Roman emperors the aim was to 
punish Christians for practicing an outlaw religion. Persecutors are especially 
committed and devoted in their efforts towards the persecuted. There can, of course, 
be a broad range of reasons why a person may be persecuted. It may be due to their 
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persecution is that the violation ‘must reach a certain degree of severity’. Satvinder Singh Juss, 
International Migration and Global Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 204. 
87 See Matthew E. Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 107. 
88 For example, a neighbour walking past a person’s house every morning and giving the middle 
finger surely constitutes a nuisance and can even intimidate, but it seems excessive to claim that the 
occurring harm is sufficiently severe for it amounts to persecution. 
89 But is it a necessary condition of persecution that there is an intention to inflict severe harm? I 
believe this does not have to be the case. It seems enough for persecution to occur that there is a 
strong commitment on the part of the persecutor to have a profound impact on the victims’ lives. 
Persecutors may be under the false belief that they are doing the right thing, and that instead of 
causing severe harm they are actually helping or saving their victims. Historically many persecutors 
have considered that they are assisting their victims rather than inflicting severe harms on them. 
According to Ronald Christenson, even Augustine outlines in his writings an account suggesting that 
it is in the best interest of some persons to be persecuted. Augustine suggests that ‘fear will not change 
a man from evil, but it will serve as a warning and compel him to examine the truth’ that is the word 
of God. For Augustine, there is such a thing as ‘righteous persecution’. This form of persecution aims 
to religious conversion, and is something that should be ‘undertaken only reluctantly, and pursued in a 
spirit of love, like a parent who finds that he must punish a child’. Augustine’s idea of righteous 
persecution may be understood as paternalistic acts of persons that aim through punishment to make 
persons realise what is in their best interest all things considered. The aim of righteous persecution is 
not death and eradication of persons, but rather to deliver the persons in unity with the Church with 
the help of terror. Ronald Christenson, ‘The Political Theory of Persecution: Augustine and Hobbes’, 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (1968), 425-426. 
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political opinions such as secessionist ideas, or it may be due to their ethic 
background, religious beliefs, gender, or sexual orientation. It may be because they 
hold vital information, or even because of the shape of their noses. The more specific 
reasons for persecution are countless. But persecutors are not indifferent about 
whether or not they have an impact on the person’s live they are subjecting to severe 
harm.90 On the contrary, they take close interest in their victims and have a strong 
will to cause a drastic change in the victims’ lives. 
 
In short, persecution may be understood as a ‘special harm’ that certain persons face. 
There are intentional agents who are deeply dedicated to systematically inflicting 
severe harm to their victims. The persecuted are ‘haunted’ by others with devotion, 
and they are in urgent need of assistance. The persecuted may be said to be like ‘The 
Hounded Woman’ in Joseph Raz’s example escaping a fierce carnivorous animal. 
‘Her mental stamina, her intellectual ingenuity, her will power and her physical 
resources are taxed to their limits by her struggle to remain alive. She never has a 
chance to do or even to think of anything other than how to escape from the beast.’91 
 
But even if we accept the claim that persecution constitutes a ‘special harm’ 
requiring urgent response from the international community, it is still not the case 
that only the persecuted can have the moral right to asylum. We can imagine drastic 
conditions within a state which are not the result of persecution, and which cannot be 
remedied effectively within a reasonable timeframe by the international community 
with any other means than asylum. Civil war, generalised violence, natural disaster, 
and famine are non-persecution related reasons for insufficient protection of the right 
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90 One additional element of persecution is discrimination. A government of a state can, for example, 
systematically deprive its citizenry of basic needs by resorting to what might be called ‘kleptocratic 
economic policies’. But while many deprivations of the citizenry can amount to violations of the right 
to necessities, it is questionable that all such actions by the government can be called persecution. The 
government may, for example, systematically stop short of using the incoming tax revenue to protect 
the right to basic health care, and instead allocate the revenue to fund the leaders’ luxurious lifestyles 
and to further solidify their position in power. While in the process the government may be said to 
violate the citizens’ basic rights, it seems questionable whether these violations can be called 
persecution. The central reason why I believe in the current example we should not call the 
government actions persecution is because the government does not single out any persons or groups 
for mistreatment; it mistreats the citizenry with more or less ‘equal concern’. See Price, Rethinking 
Asylum, 133-134. 
91 Joseph Raz, Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 374. 
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to necessities that can in certain circumstances be addressed effectively only with 
relocation to other countries.  
 
Climate change offers one real-world example of non-persecution related 
circumstances in which asylum offers the only effective means of remedying the 
occurring deprivations of basic needs. Climate change subjects millions of citizens in 
poor countries to severe harms.92 The harms that are inflicted through climate change 
may be in some cases so severe and prolonged that the governments of countries 
become systematically unable to fulfil the basic duties of protection owed to their 
citizens.93 Such threat exists for example for the island states of Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
These states are currently facing rising sea levels that threaten their very existence 
and therefore their citizens’ right to necessities. 94  The examples of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati represent cases where persons can be considered to have the right to asylum 
against the international community rather than the more general right to be assisted. 
Sanctions, development assistance, or humanitarian intervention each may have a 
remedial function in certain circumstances, but in the current context they are 
useless. The only meaningful instrument with which the occurring harms can be 
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92 As Simon Caney points out, it is the poor in developing countries who will predominantly feel the 
ill effects of global climate change. He argues that the global poor tend to earn their living in ways 
that are more exposed to the ill effects of global climate change, and they are also more at risk from 
such diseases as malaria and cholera. As well, the global poor are not as able as the citizens of the 
wealthy countries to adapt to the health-threatening and life-threatening effects of global climate 
change. Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change’, Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence, 19 (2006), 257-258. 
93 Here, I will bracket the question regarding the cause of climate change. As the question here is 
about a general right against those with capacities to assist, there is no need to argue in defence of 
anthropogenic climate change. It can be pointed out, however, that even if we accepted the argument 
that the occurring climate change is anthropogenic, and that some human agents on the other side of 
the world are violating the right to necessities of the citizens of these island states and continue to 
refuse to reduce their carbon emissions to a level that is morally required, these actions hardly amount 
to persecution. One reason why this is the case is because most persons contributing to climate 
change have no intention to affect others’ lives. For a defence of the claim that anthropogenic climate 
change can violate persons’ human rights, see Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global 
Climate Change’, 259-264; ‘Human Rights, Climate Change, and Discounting’, Environmental 
Politics, 17 (2008b), 538-539; ‘Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change’, in Charles R. 
Beitz & Robert E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 229-
233.  
94 Jon Barnett & Neil Adger argue that the increased extreme weather events are severe enough to 
potentially undermine the atoll countries’ national sovereignty and make the islands uninhabitable. 
See Jon Barnett and Neil W. Adger, ‘Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries’, Climate Change, 61 
(2003), 328. See also Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change’, 260. 
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remedied is asylum.95  Rising sea levels threaten the existence of the states, and 
migration to territories of other states is necessary for addressing the occurring 
threat.  
 
The UDHR formulation of the right to asylum is unsatisfactory because it recognises 
an excessively narrow range of reasons due to which a person may have a claim to 
be provided asylum by the international community. Rather than accepting as 
necessary conditions a predetermined range of reasons why deprivations occur, we 
should look at the need for assistance and the available remedial instruments when 
considering who exactly are the persons who have the claim to asylum against the 
international community. Climate change as well as many other non-persecution 
related reasons can lead to the occurrence of circumstances where asylum in other 
states offers the only meaningful remedy persons whose right to necessities is 
insufficiently protected in their home countries. Of course, it might be easier to 
distinguish bearers of the right to asylum from other prospective migrants if there 
was a clear predetermined range of reasons due to which a person may be considered 
to have the right to asylum. But this reason does not provide sufficient grounds for 
settling for a ‘reason-based account’ of the moral right to asylum. To settle for a 
reason-based account of the moral right to asylum is to overlook the possibility of 
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the accepted range of reasons due to which a 
bearer of the right to necessities can be in need of asylum. While accepting this 
possibility may be inconvenient from the more practical perspective of protecting the 





95 There are, of course, questions about whether the citizens of Kiribati and Tuvalu are entitled to 
more than simply asylum in other states, i.e., do the citizens of the island states have the right to a 
delineated exclusive territory on which they can be self-determinate? For our current purposes, it is 
enough to note that they have ‘at the very least’ the right to asylum. On the moral dimensions of the 
relocation of the island nations such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, see Mathias Risse, ‘The Right to 
Relocation: Disappearing Island Nations and Common Ownership of the Earth’, Ethics and 
International Affairs, 23 (2009b), 281-300; Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir Cella Rajan, ’The Ethical 
Implications of Sea-Level Rise due to Climate Change’, Ethics & International Affairs, 24 (2010), 
239-260; Cara Nine, ‘Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the Lockean Proviso’, Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, 27 (2010), 359-375. 
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Conclusion 
In the current chapter, I have outlined an account of the right to asylum. I claimed 
that the right to asylum has normative force because of the universal scope of the 
right to necessities. The right to asylum is effectively a right to secondary protection 
of the right to necessities by the international community in states other than a 
person’s home state. States, which constitute the political institutions that are 
primarily responsible for protecting their members’ right to necessities, do not 
always function adequately, and there can be a need for the international community 
to assist a state in the protection of the right to necessities or take over the protection 
efforts altogether. The right to asylum is a right to a specific form of assistance 
against the international community, and it differs from the more general right to be 
assisted. I concluded the chapter by examining the scope of persons with the right to 
asylum, and claimed that all persons whose right to necessities is insufficiently 
protected in their home states have the right to asylum when they cannot be assisted 



















3. Is the moral right to asylum a genuine right? 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the moral right to asylum, and argued that by its 
generic form the right to asylum is a welfare right against the international 
community at large. But if this is so, it entails that the right to asylum is against no 
agent in particular. Then the question becomes, if the right to asylum is against no 
agent in particular, can it be said to be a meaningful right in the first place? Some 
philosophers, such as Onora O’Neill, hold that universal rights to assistance, i.e., 
general welfare rights that are against no agent in particular cannot constitute 
genuine rights. In the current chapter, I will focus on examining the validity of this 
objection. I will proceed with the enquiry in the following way. I start by examining 
the distinction between imperfect and perfect duties, as it constitutes the central 
foundation for the criticism outlined by O’Neill. Next, I will examine O’Neill’s 
criticism in more detail, and suggest three separate ways to respond to it. Finally, I 
will consider whether there are guidelines that can assist us in the institutionalisation 
of the right to asylum. 
 
3.1 Perfect and imperfect duties 
Let us start with the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. The distinction 
emerged in the writings of early modern natural law theorists, and the first known 
theorist to refer to it is Hugo Grotius.96 In the following centuries many philosophers, 
including John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, have used the distinction to explain 
how there can be duties that differ from each other. In the last chapter of 
Utilitarianism Mill argues that ‘duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue 
of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect 
obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right’.97 While 
Mill’s account clarifies how the distinction is often used in moral enquiries, it does 

96 Grotius makes a distinction between ‘perfect right’ and ‘imperfect obligation of charity’. He writes 
in the following way of the latter: ‘As the imperfect obligation of charity, and other virtues of the 
same kind are not cognizable in a court of justice, so neither can the performance of them be 
compelled by force of arms. For it is not the moral nature of a duty that can enforce its fulfilment, but 
there must be some legal right in one of the parties to exact the obligation. For the moral obligation 
receives an additional weight from such a right.’ Hugo Grotius, On the Law of war and Peace 
(Whitefish: Kessinger publishing, 2004), 214 (II.XXII.xvi) 
97 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867), 74.  
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not tell the whole story. Many philosophers have set forth more as well as less 
stringent overlapping accounts of perfect and imperfect duties. To exemplify the 
plurality of interpretations, George Rainbolt outlines eight different formulations of 
the distinction, including Kant’s, Pufendorf’s, and Mill’s. He notes that Kant alone 
articulates three formulations of the distinction, and Mill two formulations.98 While 
there is no general consensus on what exactly the distinction is supposed to 
represent, there nevertheless seem to be some distinguishable core characteristics that 
can be said to constitute the general structure of each category. Next, I will outline 
preliminary accounts of the structure of both perfect and imperfect duties. 
 
3.1.1 Perfect duties: a preliminary account 
Two core characteristics may be recognised in universal perfect duties, the first being 
specified performance. Perfect duties include an identification of a specified 
performance, either action or forbearance, which is required to successfully 
discharge the duty. A common example of a universal perfect duty is the duty not to 
interfere with others’ physical integrity. The duty not to interfere with others’ 
physical integrity identifies a specified performance required from each duty-bearer: 
non-interference. The universal duty not to interfere with others’ physical integrity 
also specifies the time when the performance should take place; the duty binds 
regardless of time and place.99 Apart from universal perfect duties there can also be 
special perfect duties. By their form, special perfect duties may be either negative 
duties or positive duties. Keeping a promise is often given as an example of a special 
perfect duty. The act of promising, which follows the universal maxim ‘one should 
always keep one’s promises’, constitutes a special relationship between specified 
agents. In the case of special perfect duties, a specified performance is required to 
discharge the duty, and the content of the duty specifies also when the performance is 
required. This action may be positive or negative by its form. In short, regardless of 
whether perfect duties take the form of universal or special duties, perfect duties 
specify the required performances by the duty-bearers.  
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98 George Rainbolt, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Obligations’, Philosophical Studies, 98 (2000), 233. 
99 On how determinate duties specify the required action and occasion, see for example Violetta 
Igneski, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Duties of Aid’, Social Theory and Practice, 32 (2006), 447-450.  
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The second characteristic of perfect duties is the identification of a specified 
recipient. Perfect duties not only require specific performances from a duty-bearer, 
but also that the duties are discharged by the duty-bearer to specified recipients. Put 
differently, a perfect duty intrinsically identifies the agents to whom the duty-bearers 
are obligated to discharge their duties. The duties of non-interference are discharged 
by each duty-bearer simultaneously to all existing recipients. If I have a duty not to 
violate all other persons’ physical integrity, what is required from me is that I 
simultaneously refrain from interfering the physical integrity of every single person. 
In a similar fashion, the duties of keeping a promise are discharged to the particular 
recipient(s) specified in the content of the promise. To sum up our short enquiry, the 
two characteristics of universal perfect duties suggest the following formulation: 
universal perfect duties bind all individuals at all times, and all recipients can 
simultaneously enjoy the output when a particular agent discharges his or her 
universal perfect duties. In turn, special perfect duties come into existence with 
special relationships, they bind all agents in the existing special relationships, and the 
content of the duty specifies how, to whom, when, and where the duty should be 
discharged. 
 
3.1.2 Imperfect duties: a preliminary account 
Imperfect duties are more complex by their generic structure than perfect duties in 
either of its two senses. These duties are often considered as universal duties, 
although some theorists note that there can also be imperfect special duties.100 I will 
leave this category of duties unexamined, as it is not relevant for the purposes of the 
present enquiry. There are many formulations of universal imperfect duties, and it is 
not evident that all principles of imperfect duty can be subsumed under the same core 
characteristics. Kant, for example, recognises imperfect duties of self-improvement 
towards oneself, and duties of love, respect, and beneficence towards others.101 Here, 
I will focus solely on imperfect duties to assist others. 
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100 Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 152. 
101 For an interpretation of Kant’s account of perfect and imperfect duties, see Thomas E. Hill Jr., 
‘Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation’, Kant-Studien, 62 (1971), 55-76. For an insightful 
analysis of Kant’s imperfect duties of beneficence in the context of global justice debate, see Kok-
Chor Tan, ‘Kantian Ethics and Global Justice’, Social Theory and Practice, 23 (1997), 54-58. 
 <A
Imperfect duties constitute a moral category that is separable from ‘non-duties’ in 
that these duties require agents to make binding moral commitments. Imperfect 
duties are, after all, duties and therefore stand apart from supererogatory acts. Unlike 
supererogation, imperfect duties do not require that we behave like saints and heroes 
and engage in abnormally risky meritorious actions.102 Supererogatory acts may be 
considered to ‘extend beyond duties’, and a failure to engage in supererogatory acts 
does not result in moral condemnation. But a failure to discharge imperfect duties 
does bring about moral condemnation. While imperfect duties differ from 
supererogatory acts, they are also separable from perfect duties in that intrinsically 
their binding is looser in many senses than the binding in perfect duties. While a 
universal perfect duty requires individuals to comply with the duty everywhere and 
at all times, the intrinsic requirements in universal imperfect duties are not specific to 
the same degree. As the word ‘imperfect’ suggests, by their form these duties are 
somehow ‘incomplete’. 
 
While there is no general consensus among philosophers on the idea of 
incompleteness in the context of imperfect duties, the idea of ‘latitude’ may 
nevertheless be said to be a close approximation of it. Latitude in imperfect duties 
can be understood to consist of 1) indeterminate action, 2) indeterminate occasion, 
and 3) indeterminate recipient. One of the ways in which imperfect duties are 
incomplete is that they give leeway to the duty-bearer on the actions with which the 
duty is eventually discharged. Contrary to the universal duty of non-interference, 
which specifies the exact required act, the general duty to assist others does not 
intrinsically specify the particular actions that ought to be performed to successfully 
discharge the duty. There is a broad range of ways to satisfy the requirements of 
positive duties to aid the needy.  
 
This does not mean, however, that agents fully lack guidelines on how to discharge 
their imperfect duties. Firstly, the scope of ways in which imperfect duties may be 
discharged is intrinsically limited by perfect duties. For example, the universal duty 
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102  Joel Feinberg, ‘The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan’, Criminal Justice 
Ethics, 3 (1984), 64. 
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of non-interference constitutes limitations on the way in which the duty of 
beneficence may be discharged. Secondly, given that imperfect duties of beneficence 
correspond to a range of morally desirable outcomes, some actions advance the 
desirable outcomes whereas other actions are harmful for their realisation. Giving 
food to a hungry person or giving her farming equipment surely helps her with 
countering a food shortage, whereas pouring liquid mercury into her farmland does 
nothing to help her with her well-being. But what imperfect duties lack are more 
specific guidelines. Imperfect duties do not intrinsically specify the required action 
as does the universal duty of non-interference. 
 
The second characteristic of latitude is the indeterminate occasion on which each 
duty-bearer is obligated to discharge his or her duties of assistance. Imperfect duties 
do not intrinsically specify whether I should discharge my duties tomorrow or next 
week. Kant’s account of the duty of beneficence provides an example. On Kant’s 
understanding, it is our ‘duty to promote the happiness of others sometimes and that, 
accordingly, one may avoid doing so at any time (though not at all times) that one 
feels inclined’.103 The latitude of occasion should not, however, be understood as 
releasing the duty-bearer fully from discharging the duty. As was noted already, 
unlike supererogation, imperfect duties morally bind individuals to discharge their 
duties towards the needy. If I never give aid to the needy, I am surely violating my 
imperfect duties. Finally, imperfect duties do not include a specification of the exact 
agents to whom the duties should be discharged. While universal perfect duties can 
be discharged simultaneously to all agents, this is not the case with imperfect duties. 
There can be more needy persons than a duty-bearer has capacities to assist, and for a 
duty-bearer to discharge imperfect duties of assistance it is only a requirement that 
the person assists some of the needy. Discharging imperfect duties is tied to limited 
capacities of positive action and the physical reality of being in one place at a time, 
and there is nothing in the structure of the imperfect duty that identifies a special 
relationship between a particular duty-bearer and a particular recipient. In other 
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103 Liam Murphy points out that if we accept Kant’s maxim of beneficence, this essentially entails that 
it is forbidden for a person ‘to adopt a maxim of indifference to the welfare of others […] but few 
minor acts of beneficence from time to time would seem to be enough to re-establish her good name’. 
Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 71-72. 
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words, the internal structure of imperfect duties leaves the following question 
unanswered: to which particular recipient duty-bearers should discharge their duties? 
To sum up, the generic structure of imperfect duties of assistance suggests that duty-
bearers ought to discharge their duties in accordance with the following maxim: 
discharge duties of assistance to some needy, somehow, and sometimes. 
 
3.2 O’Neill on the genuineness of moral rights 
Now, let us turn to O’Neill’s criticism which, if valid, may be said to undermine not 
only the idea of the right to necessities but also the general right to asylum. O’Neill 
argues that there exists an asymmetry between ‘universal welfare rights’ and 
‘universal liberty rights’. On her view, universal welfare rights are rights to 
assistance, and universal liberty rights are rights that require only omission from 
duty-bearers. O’Neill claims that there exists an asymmetry between the two 
categories of rights because only universal liberty rights are ‘claimable’. She argues 
that there are two central conditions for claimability: 1) it is possible to identify the 
responsible duty-bearers when a right is violated or is not fulfilled, and 2) the right 
must constitute a claim for a particular determinate performance. If these two 
conditions are not met, the right in question may not be considered claimable. 
 
O’Neill argues that as by their form universal liberty rights correspond to perfect 
duties, they satisfy the conditions of claimability whether or not specific institutions 
for protecting rights have been established. 104  The duties corresponding to a 
universal liberty right can be discharged by a duty-bearer simultaneously to all right-
bearers, as there are no positive actions of assistance required from the duty-bearer. 
For example, a duty-bearer can at least in principle abstain from interfering 
simultaneously with all bearers of the right not to be subjected to bodily harm in the 
world. Then, O’Neill argues, if a duty-bearer fails to discharge his or her duties to a 
bearer of a universal liberty right, the right-bearer has a clear understanding of the 
specific duty-bearer against whom the right constitutes a claim and of the particular 
performance required for the right-bearer to have access to the substance of the right. 
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O’Neill also argues that universal welfare rights do not intrinsically include 
components that specify the particular duty-bearers against whom these rights 
constitute claims. Put differently, by their form universal welfare rights may be said 
to correspond to imperfect duties. O’Neill contends that when we talk about 
universal welfare rights ‘it may be possible to state what ought to be provided or 
delivered, but it will be impossible to state who ought to do the providing or 
delivering […] unless there are established institutions and well-defined special 
relationships’.105 Only when the structure of a specific mediating scheme is fixed ‘an 
account of the content as well as the services will take on a definite shape’. She 
claims that ‘all that could be known in advance is that, should a (just) scheme be 
devised, somebody or other will need to bear yet-to-be specified obligations’.106 In 
other words, unless there are institutions in place that form special relationships 
between right-bearers and duty-bearers, the duties corresponding to a welfare right 
are imperfect duties instead of special perfect duties. If these perfecting mechanisms 
exist, then a welfare right is a claimable ‘special welfare right’ instead of an 
‘unclaimable’ universal welfare right. 
 
 O’Neill argues that claimability is a necessary existence condition for a genuine 
right, and suggests that unless ‘obligation-bearers are identifiable by right-holders, 
claims to have rights amount only to rhetoric’.107 She concludes that while universal 
liberty rights and special welfare rights can satisfy the necessary conditions of 
claimability, universal welfare rights amount only to ‘manifesto rights against 
unspecified others’, and they seem ‘bitter mockery to the poor and needy, for whom 
these rights matter most’.108 
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105 Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 105. 
106 O’Neill 1996, 134. 
107 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 129. This position is close to Mill’s argument. Mill argues 
that ‘no one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to 
practise those virtues towards any given individual’. See Mill, Utilitarianism, 75. 
108 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 132-133; Bounds of Justice, 125. For the concept ‘manifesto 
right’, see Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 94-95. According to 
Feinberg, universal social rights in UDHR articles 22-27 are ‘rights in an unusual new “manifesto 
sense”, for, unlike all other claim-rights, they are not necessarily correlated with the duties of any 
assignable persons’.  
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O’Neill’s criticism of universal welfare rights is applicable to the right to asylum. As 
the right to asylum is a welfare right against no agent in particular, there remains the 
same issue of claimability as with other welfare rights. There would be no need to 
vindicate the right to asylum from O’Neill’s criticism if it was considered to be a 
special welfare right. But this would require the existence of a global institutional 
system of protection with similar mechanisms of allocating responsibilities between 
duty-bearers as there are for special welfare rights in welfare states. While in the 
current world there are some institutions dedicated to the protection of persons who 
are fleeing their home countries, we are far from circumstances under which the 
moral right to asylum could be considered as a special right. In the current world 
there are no comparable perfecting mechanisms for imperfect duties corresponding 
to the moral right to asylum as exist in welfare states protecting special welfare 
rights. Then the question becomes, how detrimental is O’Neill’s criticism to the right 
to asylum? Does the language of the right to asylum mock the poor and needy 
asylum seekers? Should we give up on the idea of the right to asylum because there 
are no global mediating institutions in place that would have perfected the imperfect 
duties corresponding to it? Next, I will turn to examine three separate lines of 
argument each of which suggests that we should not too hastily give up on the right 
to asylum. 
 
3.3 Why we should not give up on the right to asylum? 
 
3.3.1 Objection 1: As liberty rights do not correspond strictly to perfect 
duties, they face the same issue of claimability as the right to asylum  
One way to respond to O’Neill’s argument is by showing that her claim according to 
which only universal welfare rights correspond to imperfect duties is not valid. An 
attempt to vindicate the right to asylum this way may be considered as a ‘negative 
strategy’. If it is the case that universal liberty rights do not correspond strictly to 
perfect duties, then both categories of rights face the same dilemma regarding 
claimability: these rights are against unspecified others and for unspecified actions. If 
this is shown to be the case, then it may be reasonably asked whether O’Neill’s 
criterion for the genuineness of rights can be correct.  
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There are two different ways in which the validity of O’Neill’s claim that universal 
liberty rights correspond strictly to perfect duties might be questioned. The first 
argument appeals to the distinction between ‘having’ a right and ‘enjoying secure 
access’ to the substance of a right. O’Neill’s argument relies on a utopian pre-
institutional understanding of having rights, and she is not concerned with the range 
of performances required from others for a right-bearer to enjoy sufficiently secure 
access to the substance of a right. Only in utopian circumstances where we are not 
concerned with the protection of rights do liberty rights correspond strictly to perfect 
duties. In the non-ideal world, however, it is to be expected that not everyone will 
respect each others’ rights. Thus, a meaningful opportunity to have access to the 
substance of liberty rights is attached not only to perfect duties. 
 
As Henry Shue has famously argued, to have rights in any meaningful sense, i.e., to 
enjoy secure access to their substance, requires the establishment of protective 
institutions. 109  Once we move our focus from the utopian pre-institutional 
circumstances of having rights to the more realistic circumstances of enjoying rights 
and the establishment of protective institutions, the distinction between welfare rights 
and liberty rights is no longer obvious. If we are concerned with the protection of 
rights, both categories of rights will correspond to several kinds of duties. Jeremy 
Waldron makes this point eloquently. He contends that when we focus on the 
protection of rights, each right regardless of its form might be ‘best thought of not 
correlative to one particular duty […] but as generating waves of duties, some of 
them duties of omission, some of them duties of commission, some of them too 
complicated to fit easily under either heading’.110 When the question is about the 
protection of rights, it is not directly evident which specific duty-bearers should do 
what and towards whom. On these grounds it may be argued that universal liberty 
rights too correspond to imperfect duties.  
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109 Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 39. 
110 Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights – Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 25.  
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There is, however, an obvious response available to this line of argument: we should 
not be concerned with the institutional protection of rights when analysing the 
genuineness of rights. Isn’t the question regarding the existence of a right prior to the 
question regarding the institutionalisation of a right and its protection? This is surely 
one way to understand the conditions under which we should be examining the 
genuineness of rights, but the response of the critic should not be accepted without an 
explanation. If we are really concerned about rights, then shouldn’t we also be 
committed to their protection?111 To give an example, while in our current world the 
UDHR Article 14 remains far from sufficiently protected, millions around the world 
have come to enjoy its substance with the help of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), active national governments and many 
NGOs. At the end of 2009, more than 26 million people – 10.4 million persons that 
are eligible for asylum under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and 15.6 million internally displaced persons – were receiving protection or 
assistance from the UNHCR. 112  During 2009 alone, 19 countries reported the 
admission of 112,400 resettled Convention refugees.113 Also, the UNHCR estimates 
that during 2008-2009 around 2 million stateless individuals were granted a 
citizenship in a state other than the state of their origin.114 For each of these persons, 
Article 14 may be argued to amount to something more than ‘mockery’ and 
‘rhetoric’. 
 
Conversely, many of the so-called universal liberty rights may be said to constitute 
mockery and amount only to rhetoric for those millions around the world who are not 
currently enjoying the substances of these rights. For example, places like Iraq, Iran, 
North Korea, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia are not well known for 
their respect for such universal liberty rights as freedom of speech, freedom of 
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111 As Waldron asks: ’why on earth would it be worth fighting for this person’s liberty (say, his liberty 
to choose between A and B) if he were left in a situation in which the choice between A and B meant 
nothing to him, or in which his choosing one rather than the other would have no impact on his life?’ 
Waldron, Liberal Rights, 7. 
112  UNHCR, Global trends 2009, 4-5. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html 
(accessed 19.07.11). 
113 UNHCR, Global trends 2009, 3. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html (accessed 
19.07.11). 
114  UNHCR Global Report 2009, ‘The Year in Review’, 4. Available online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4c08f2ee9.pdf (accessed 19.07.11). 
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assembly, and the right not to be subjected to bodily harm. For those millions of 
persons who are not enjoying the substances of these liberty rights it is not much of a 
consolation that these rights may be claimed in principle from particular identifiable 
duty-bearers. When a theorist makes a distinction between pre-institutional and 
institutional circumstances of rights, it can be easily forgotten that what is at stake 
with rights is not simply abstract normative claims, but rather genuine human needs 
and meaningful opportunities for their fulfilment. The strict focus on pre-institutional 
circumstances in the evaluation of genuine rights has to be explained by the theorist 
wishing to defend this position, and it is not enough to conveniently insist that only 
pre-institutional circumstances matter. 
 
For the sake of argument, however, let us accept that the response of the critic is 
correct, and that we should be strictly focusing our enquiry on the pre-institutional 
circumstances of having rights instead of protection of rights. There is no need to 
rely on the success of the previous argument, as there is an alternative way to 
question O’Neill’s claim that universal liberty rights correspond strictly to perfect 
duties. Even if we examine universal liberty rights in pre-institutional circumstances, 
it is still not the case that they correspond always and only to perfect duties. 
Elizabeth Ashford outlines this line of argument in her response to O’Neill. Ashford 
argues forcefully that O’Neill’s claim essentially refers to relationships between a 
small group of agents, and it no longer applies when we broaden our focus and 
attempt to accommodate a more complex set of human relations and social 
institutions (the aim of which is not the protection of rights).115  
 
In our current world, systems of social interaction are extremely complex, and it has 
become not only extremely hard to avoid harming distant others, but also to trace 
moral responsibilities for specific violations of liberty rights back to particular 
identifiable agents. 116  Even when moral responsibility may be traced back to 
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115 Elizabeth Ashford, ‘Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’, in Thomas Pogge 
(ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195-198 
116 As Judith Lichtenberg rightly points out, the account of harm in the classic formulation of the harm 
principle, which essentially denotes ‘discrete, individual actions with observable and measurable 
consequences for particular individuals’, can no longer in the era of globalisation sufficiently explain 
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particular agents, the group of agents can be extremely large e.g., all persons in the 
Western countries. When the question is about actively caused harms that are the 
result of complex social systems, the picture of claimability of universal liberty rights 
seems to be more in line with universal welfare rights: there is a large group of duty-
bearers who are morally responsible for the right-bearer not having access to the 
substance of the right.  
 
At this point it might still be argued that the content of the duties corresponding to 
universal liberty rights nevertheless specify the particular performances required 
from each duty-bearer even when the question is about large groups of duty-bearers: 
each duty-bearer should stop actively harming the right-bearer. Therefore, it is still 
the case that universal liberty rights correspond strictly to perfect duties. But this 
response is unsatisfactory. It may also be the case that participation in an unjust 
social institution actively harming a bearer of a universal liberty right is not 
reasonably avoidable to a duty-bearer. In these circumstances the primary obligation 
of the duty-bearer is to reform the unjust institution actively harming the right-bearer. 
This requires positive action, and it is not directly clear what specific acts are 
required from the duty-bearer.117  
 
What can further complicate the situation is that the collective organisation of duty-
bearers may be a necessary condition for any meaningful reformation of the social 
institution actively harming some persons’ universal liberty rights. When respecting 
a universal liberty right requires positive action from duty-bearers, there can remain 
the same issue of (un)claimability as with universal welfare rights: duty-bearers are 
required to do unspecific positive acts. If we follow O’Neill’s argument to its logical 
conclusion, it means that there cannot be genuine liberty rights not to be deprived by 
unjust social institutions in which particular duty-bearers cannot be reasonably 
expected to fully avoid participating.118 If this is correct, there are strong reasons to 
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how our behaviour impinges on the interests of other people. Judith Lichtenberg, ‘Negative Duties, 
Positive Duties, and the New Harms’, Ethics, 120 (2010), 558-559.  
117 Ashford, ‘Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’, 201. 
118 Ashford, ‘Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’, 215. 
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be sceptical of O’Neill’s argument that a right has to correspond strictly to perfect 
duties in pre-institutional circumstances for it to constitute a genuine right. 
 
The two lines of argument I have presented provide reasons to question the validity 
of O’Neill’s criterion on the genuineness of rights. The first argument suggested that 
we should be concerned with rights in the sense of protecting secure access to their 
substance rather than in the pre-institutional sense of having them. When we turn our 
focus to the protection of rights, it is no longer the case that universal liberty rights 
correspond strictly to perfect duties. The critic’s response that we should focus 
strictly on pre-institutional understandings of rights should not be accepted without 
further justification. The onus is on the critic to explain why we should resist the 
move to more realistic circumstances of rights protection. The second argument 
suggested that many universal liberty rights are similar to universal welfare rights 
under complex circumstances of human interaction. When respecting liberty rights 
requires positive action and social coordination from duty-bearers, it is not directly 
clear what the duty-bearers are obligated to do. This conclusion suggests that 
O’Neill’s criterion for evaluating the final set of genuine rights is excessively strict. 
It leads not only to the rejection of all universal welfare rights, but also to the 
rejection of a broad range of important liberty rights not to be harmed by others. 
 
3.3.2 Objection 2: The existence of global mediating institutions is not a 
necessary condition for the right to asylum to be claimable 
The second reason why we should reject the conclusion that the right to asylum 
cannot be a genuine right is that contrary to what O’Neill is arguing, the claimability 
of the right to asylum does not require the existence of global mediating institutions 
comparable to those existing in welfare states. This is essentially because the 
establishment of global mediating institutions is not a necessary condition for the 
imperfect duties corresponding to the right to asylum to become perfected. By its 
structure the concept of imperfect duty refers essentially to indeterminateness 
regarding time, place, specific action, and the particular recipient. The welfare state 
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perfects imperfect duties by functioning as a ‘clearinghouse’.119 It takes from each 
bearer of imperfect duties an amount of resources which is sufficient to discharge the 
duty-bearers’ obligations, but not necessarily enough to cover all the needy. The 
welfare state then distributes the resources to the needy, therefore constituting a 
mediating link, i.e., a special relationship, between bearers of imperfect duties and 
the recipients. Within the modern welfare states, a common way of perfecting 
imperfect duties has been the establishment of a system of taxation.120 
 
But while the existence of a welfare state is one way in which imperfect duties may 
be perfected, it is not the only way. Put differently, the existence of mediating 
mechanisms that constitute special relationships may be a sufficient condition for the 
imperfect duties to become perfected, but it is not a necessary condition. Also 
circumstances can constitute special relationships that perfect imperfect duties. 
Special relationships that occur in the absence of mediating institutions can specify 
which particular duty-bearer should discharge duties to which particular recipient, 
how, and when. If this conclusion is correct, and a special relationship can come into 
existence due to the occurrence of particular circumstances, it is possible that a right 
corresponding to imperfect duties can become claimable in the absence of global 
mediating institutions. 
 
One common example of a scenario in which imperfect duties can become perfected 
by circumstances is a situation of easy rescue. Circumstances may single out one 
particular duty-bearer to rescue a needy person because there are no other duty-
bearers who would be in a similarly situated position to assist. But even if we 
expanded the picture from an isolated easy rescue to the assistance of the bearers of 
the right to asylum, there seems to be no principled reasons why the imperfect duties 
could not be perfected by circumstances. Duties to assist are imperfect if there are 
more right-bearers than a duty-bearer may be reasonably expected to assist, or when 
within a large group of potential duty-bearers it is not directly clear who should do 
what.  
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119 This characterisation of the welfare state as a mediating institution is outlined in Waldron, Liberal 
Rights, 17. 
120 See Feinberg, ‘The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan’, 66. 
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But as for example Zofia Stemplowska rightly points out, from this indeterminacy it 
does not directly follow that the rights corresponding to imperfect duties are not 
claimable. She argues that we could just as well allow all those whose universal 
welfare rights generate imperfect duties to claim assistance from anyone ‘who has 
not taken reasonable steps to fulfil her or his duty (to whomever and in whatever 
reasonable way she or he might choose)’.121 In this type of a system of claimability, a 
special relationship may be considered to come into existence when a right-bearer 
singles out a duty-bearer and the duty-bearer has not already taken steps to commit to 
assist some other right-bearers. The choice of a particular action, the choice of the 
particular recipient, and the choice of the particular time has in this type of a scenario 
been decided by the right-bearer on the duty-bearer’s behalf.122 
 
While this type of a system of claimability is surely complex and differs noticeably 
from a welfare state that contains effective mediating institutions, it nevertheless 
does constitute an imaginable system of claimability. When we consider the system 
in the context of the right to asylum, the idea seems less absurd than if implemented 
as a system of claimability for many other welfare rights. As was suggested earlier, 
there currently exist no systematic global mechanisms to allocate responsibilities to 
protect the right to asylum. But the absence of systematic mediating institutions at 
the global level does not mean that special relationships cannot be formed at all. 
Special relationships can be said to come into existence when a bearer of the right to 
asylum enters the jurisdictional territory of a particular state capable of offering 
protection. In fact, when a person currently seeks asylum in a particular state, he or 
she is generally said to ‘claim asylum’. For a person to claim asylum is to single out 
a state comprising bearers of imperfect duties to assist her. Then, it may be 
reasonably asked whether a state that has not already taken reasonable steps to 
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121 Zofia Stemplowska, ‘On the Real World Duties Imposed on Us by Human Rights', Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 40 (2009), 482. 
122 Stemplowska recognises that in such a scheme of claimability there would be a ‘need to work out 
the essential building blocks of this scheme, including, among other things, standards for assessing 
what counts as taking reasonable steps to fulfil one’s duties, how to set the scheme up in the absence 
of a centralized system resembling a world state, how to finance it, what standards of proof to use, and 
how to allow people an adequate chance to fulfil their duties voluntarily’. Stemplowska, ‘On the Real 
World Duties Imposed on Us by Human Rights', 482. 
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discharge its members’ imperfect duties to bearers of the right to asylum may reject 
the claim of a right-bearer entering the state’s jurisdictional territory by appealing to 
the idea of imperfect duties. When a state argues that it wishes to deport a particular 
right-bearer claiming asylum in order to assist some other non-identified group of 
right-bearers on some later occasion, the right-bearer who is already claiming asylum 
may rightly respond with moral indignation. 
 
In the current world, the protection of the UDHR Article 14 is fairly close to this idea 
of claimability. Therefore, the system of claimability for the right to asylum sketched 
above is not far-fetched. Currently, the binding non-refoulement123 obligation entails 
that states can find themselves under de facto obligation to provide asylum to persons 
that have entered their jurisdiction and claimed asylum. First-asylum states may not 
find other states willing to share the burdens, and they cannot deport the asylum 
seekers back to their home countries. The current system could be restructured to a 
form that recognises for each state a positive obligation backed with legal sanctions 
to provide asylum to right-bearers entering the state to claim asylum.124 The central 
reason why the non-refoulement obligation has not been revised into a form of 
positive obligation is centrally because there is a lack of political will to do so, not 
because to do so would be excessively problematic in practical terms. 
 
3.3.3 Objection 3: The right to asylum can constitute a justificatory 
ground for the establishment of mediating institutions 
The final objection focuses on O’Neill’s account of claimability as an existence 
condition of a right. It may be reasonably asked why is it exactly that claimability in 

123 The non-refoulement obligation is outlined, among other treaties, in Article 33 of the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 33 of the Convention states that ‘no 
contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened’. I will examine the non-refoulement 
obligation more closely in the next chapter. 
124 Of course, the proposed system of claimability would in all likelihood lead to an extremely unfair 
distribution of burdens between duty-bearers. Therefore, it would not be the best of all possible 
systems of claimability. But the resulting unfairness in burden-bearing does not have to be seen as 
directly undermining the current argument. What the argument on unfair burden-bearing between 
duty-bearers suggests is that there are moral reasons to institutionalise the proposed system of 
claimability to a form in which the overall burdens of refugee protection would be distributed fairly. 
But as such it does not invalidate the argument that a system of claimability for the right to asylum is 
imaginable in the absence of global mediating institutions comparable to those existing in welfare 
states. 
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the sense O’Neill formulates it constitutes a necessary condition for the existence of 
a right? As has been noted already, claimability in the sense that O’Neill is referring 
to requires that particular duty-bearers responsible for the violation or the 
unfulfilment of a person’s rights are identifiable. The exact identification of the 
particular agent responsible is surely a central condition for establishing 
blameworthiness. After all, rights do confer to their bearers a status that one may not 
be violated in certain ways, and when a person’s rights are violated the person can be 
said to have a claim to remedy. But following John Tasioulas it may be reasonably 
asked why we should hold the identification of the particular responsible duty-
bearers as a necessary condition for the existence of a right?125  
 
Here, O’Neill’s own argument on prior questions regarding rights may be turned 
against her. As was noted earlier, O’Neill argues that we should focus on the pre-
institutional circumstances of rights violations. But we may just as well ask from her 
why we should be focusing on the violations or the unfilfillment of rights instead of 
the prior question regarding their existence. The allocation of duties may be 
understood as a further question of strategy that follows the moral question regarding 
the existence of a right, and it can be argued that the deontic implications of a right 
are essentially dynamic. This approach to the concept of right differs noticeably from 
O’Neill’s approach. 126  It starts by examining what exactly can constitute a 
sufficiently weighty reason to hold others under a duty of justice. 127  The right 
functions as a justificatory foundation for obligations to make the corresponding 
imperfect duties perfect.128 Then, the vindication of a universal right to asylum is not 
dependent on its pre-institutional claimability, but instead primarily on whether or 
not the need for asylum under certain circumstances of deprivation is sufficiently 
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125 In the words of John Tasioulas: ’Why should this indeterminacy – which, in any case, reflects the 
existence of a healthy plurality of mechanisms for securing the right rather than uncertainty as to 
whether there is any realistically available means of doing so – undermine the very existence of such 
rights prior to their institutional embodiment?’. John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, 
in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 94.  
126 As Waldron points out, it may be the case that the phrase ‘moral right’ does not have a single 
correct meaning. Waldron, Liberal Rights, 206. 
127 See Joseph Raz, ‘On the Nature of Rights’, Mind, 93 (1984), 194-214; James W. Nickel, ‘How 
Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide’, Human Rights Quarterly, 15 (1993), 77-86. 
128  Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 52. 
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weighty to ground obligations of justice in others. The universal right to asylum, 
which was argued in the second chapter to be grounded in the more fundamental 
right to necessities, generates binding moral obligations for the creation of 
circumstances under which it becomes a realisable right to all right-bearers.129 In 
other words, there are indirect duties corresponding to the right to asylum to create, 
maintain, and enhance global mediating institutions that directly fulfil the right.130 
Joel Feinberg argues that universal welfare rights that correspond to imperfect duties 
constitute ‘permanent possibilities of right, the natural seed from which rights 
grow’.131 But if it is correct that the need to asylum constitutes a sufficiently weighty 
reason to ground duties of justice in others, it may be considered as something more 
than simply a ‘possibility of right’. It is then a possibility with the weight of justice 
attached to it. 
 
At this point it might be responded that the argument overlooks the fact that 
imperfect duties are unenforceable. From a moral point of view, to say that a duty is 
enforceable is to argue that agents can be externally coerced, if needed, to comply 
with the demands of the duty. The practical enforcement then means at the very least 
threatening those who fail to comply with their duties with legal or social sanctions. 
In other words, the enforcement of duties extends beyond moral condemnation to the 
sphere of threats and external coercion. The argument regarding the unenforceability 
of imperfect duties may be understood either as a claim that imperfect duties are such 
that they cannot be enforced or as a claim that they should not be enforced.  
 
But there is nothing in the concept of imperfect duty to support either of these 
objections. The concept refers to latitude, which has already been suggested to be 
perfectible with the occurrence of circumstances that constitute special relationships 
and with the establishment of mediating institutions. There is also nothing in the 
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129 Amartya Sen argues that there can be a metaright to have policies p (x) that genuinely pursue the 
objective of making the right to x realisable. Amartya Sen, ‘Rights and Metarights’, The right to 
Food, eds. Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski (Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 70.  
130 Henry Shue, ‘Mediating Duties’, Ethics, 98 (1988), 696. 
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concept about normative justification against enforcement. 132  While clearly 
enforceability requires that the duties are specifiable, this constitutes only a practical 
epistemic condition for enforcement. It does not undermine the justification of the 
enforcement of duties of assistance, and it carries no moral weight in the argument.  
 
To simply claim that imperfect duties should not be enforced because they are 
imperfect duties is to beg the question regarding the legitimacy of enforcement 
altogether. Before it can be concluded that imperfect duties should not be enforced it 
needs to be shown that a particular right that corresponds to imperfect duties is not 
sufficiently weighty to function as a justificatory concept for the enforcement of 
duties. As Kok-Chor Tan rightly points out, ‘although charity is unassignable and 
unenforceable, it does not follow that all that is unassignable and unenforceable is 
charity. The imperfect duties corresponding to various rights are not charitable acts 
but duties, even if it means that we need to first assign and specify them before they 
can be fully enforced.’133  
 
Thus, one available reply to the criticism according to which the right to asylum 
amounts to a ‘manifesto right’ is: ‘so what?’ Whether we in the end call the 
unrealisable right to asylum as ‘metaright’, ‘manifesto right’, ‘a possibility of rights’, 
‘claim to’, or as a ‘genuine right’ is a matter of indifference. The right to asylum 
grounds binding moral demands for the structuring of all territorial political 
communities. The fact that a universal normative standard is not in the current global 
circumstances fully realised, and the fact that there exists no systematic non-arbitrary 
mechanisms for the allocation of duties of beneficence prior to its global 
institutionalisation, do not warrant the conclusion that the standard itself should be 
abandoned.  
 
To give up on the idea of the right to asylum before genuine attempts to establish 
global mediating institutions have been made is to overlook the moral weight of the 
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132 See also Waldron, Liberal Rights, 17. Waldron argues that nothing in the concept of imperfect duty 
justifies the complaint that it is wrong to enforce an imperfect duty, ’for the difference between 
perfect and imperfect duty has to do with the occasions for performance, not issues of moral 
importance and not issues of enforceability’. 
133 Tan, Justice without Borders, 52. 
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claim to asylum and the fact that there are perfectible duties corresponding it. The 
excuse of inadequate institutions that is used to defend the abandonment of universal 
welfare rights such as the right to asylum is, in the words of Shue, ‘not simply 
misguided, but perverse. The absence of the means for fulfilling a goal is being used 
as the excuse for not fulfilling it, when, if we seriously had the goal, we would be 
working on the creation of the necessary bridges from here to there.’134 
 
3.4 Guidelines for the institutionalisation of the right to asylum 
So far I have considered three alternative ways to vindicate the right to asylum from 
O’Neill’s criticism. In this final section, I will consider whether there are any 
guidelines for institutionalising the general right to asylum. If there are no guidelines 
at all for establishing mediating institutions that function to perfect imperfect duties, 
there is a somewhat hollow ring to the argument that institutions should be 
established. In the end, however, it is not the case that there are no guidelines at all 
for establishing institutions that perfect imperfect duties in efforts to protect the right 
to asylum. 
 
Before turning to examine what general guidelines there are for the establishment of 
institutions perfecting imperfect duties, it is important to recognise that there are two 
different levels on which imperfect duties corresponding to the general right to 
asylum need to be perfected. As was pointed out earlier in the current chapter, one 
mediating institution that can perfect the duties corresponding the right to asylum is 
the state. The state may be understood to constitute a ‘clearinghouse’ that can help to 
perfect the imperfect duties of its citizens by – among other things – taxing them and 
by using the taxes to make collective provisions for asylum seeking right-bearers. 
But the issue of perfecting imperfect duties does not occur strictly on the individual 
level. In addition to the individual level, there is a need to perfect duties also on the 
interstate level. Unless there are some kind of perfecting arrangements between 
states, each particular state is practically in identical situation as individual duty-
bearers whose duties are not being perfected by mediating institutions: it remains 
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unclear which state should do what in the global efforts to protect the right to 
asylum.  
 
The two levels are interconnected to each other. In fact, the perfection of duties on 
the interstate level may be understood as an essential step in further efforts to perfect 
individual duty-bearers’ imperfect duties. This is centrally because states cannot 
satisfactorily perfect their citizens’ duties unless it is clear what citizens of each state 
should collectively do in the global protection of the right to asylum. Put differently, 
clarifying collective action on the interstate level helps also to solve unclarities 
regarding action on the individual level. Once it is clearer what a state should do for 
particular right-bearers, the state can move to implement specific intra-state 
institutions that perfect the imperfect duties of its citizens.   
 
The right to asylum can give us guidance on efforts to perfect imperfect duties both 
on the interstate level and within states. Apart from constituting a justificatory 
foundation for the obligation to establish mediating institutions, the right to asylum 
serves as a normative standard for the evaluation of different specific institutional 
models. Following Ashford, it may be argued that in global institution-building the 
right to asylum can function ‘as a test of whether existing institutions are minimally 
just: as long as they fail to guarantee the right for every human being, and such 
failure is reasonably avoidable, they are judged to be unjust’.135 Or in the words of 
John Rawls, existing institutions can be judged in the light of an ideal, and they can 
be ‘held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient 
reason’.136 In other words, the right to asylum allows us to morally condemn the 
existing institutions as unjust if they fail to provide to all right-bearers access to its 
substance when such failure is reasonably avoidable. 
 
There is also a second evaluative function that the right to asylum has as a normative 
standard. Different alternative institutional proposals may be ranked as to how they 
realise the protection of the right to asylum. The effective realisation of the aim of 

135 Ashford, ‘Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’, 216-217. 
136 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999a), 216. See also John A. 
Simmons, ‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 38 (2010), esp. 12-18. 
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rights protection is morally desirable, and institutions can be evaluated on the 
grounds of how they are designed to realise this end. Put differently, the right to 
asylum provides a guideline for choosing between different institutional schemes in 
which the obligations of duty-bearers take a particular more tangible form. An 
institutional proposal may be said to be more appealing, ceteris paribus, the more 
extensively it is able to provide for bearers of the right to asylum access to asylum.137 
In other words, the right to asylum serves a dual function as an evaluative standard. It 
allows us to normatively evaluate whether the currently existing institutions are just 
or unjust as well as to evaluate the comparative moral appeal of different still 
unrealised institutional models. 
 
In addition, the perfection of imperfect duties through the establishment of mediating 
institutions is limited by the existence of other requirements of justice, both negative 
and positive. This means that the specific proposals of mediating institutions and 
responsibility roles of particular duty-bearers need to be such that they are 
compatible with the more general idea of justice. Put differently, other considerations 
of justice constitute the framework within which mediating institutions are to be 
accommodated. There are, of course, many particular ways in which mediating 
institutions aiming to provide secure access to the substance of the right to asylum 
may be unjust. Consider three such possibilities. Firstly, an institutional proposal is 
unjust if the proposed institutions are designed to enforce assistance beyond the point 
to which duties of justice extend. The mediating institutions should be constructed in 
such a way that they do not unjustly enforce assistance, and this general position can 
function as a guideline for perfecting imperfect duties with mediating institutions. 
Secondly, an institutional proposal is unjust if it arbitrarily singles out and enforces 
duties of only a particular sub-group of duty-bearers. For example, if the interstate 
institutions were biasedly designed to enforce duties of citizens in the developing 
countries but not in the developed countries, the existing institutional regime would 
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clearly be unjust. Finally, a proposal on mediating institutions is unjust if providing 
persons secure access to the substance of the right to asylum leads to the violation of 
their other rights, such as their right to dignity.138 If this is found to be the case, the 
proposal should be abandoned for other proposals in which these kinds of unjust 
mechanisms remain absent.  
 
The specific institutions implemented to perfect the imperfect duties of particular 
duty-bearers depend, of course, on the unique characteristics of the context. 
Therefore, there cannot be a comprehensive context-independent guideline on how 
exactly the mediating institutions should be established, and who should do what. 
Yet, the above guidelines offer us assistance in institutionalising the right to asylum. 
Admittedly the guidelines that I have presented here are still incomplete as they 
include unanswered moral questions. But this does not have to be understood as an 
insurmountable problem for the theory of the right to asylum. The proposed 
‘incomplete’ guidelines move the debate from the question regarding the 
genuineness of the right to asylum to questions regarding the moral nature of existing 
institutions and the possible institutional alternatives. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have claimed that O’Neill’s criticism of universal welfare rights 
does not prove to be detrimental to the right to asylum. I have outlined three separate 
lines of argument each of which supports the same conclusion from a different 
perspective. The first argument suggested that once we look at rights in the 
institutional context of protecting rights rather than having rights, both liberty rights 
and welfare rights face issues of claimability. The second argument suggested that 
the right to asylum can be claimable regardless of the absence of global mediating 
institutions. The state constitutes a territorial institutional unit in principle capable of 
protecting the right to asylum, and the right-bearers can claim the right by entering 
the territory of a state. The third line of response pointed out that the account of 
rights O’Neill outlines is not the only account available. An alternative way to 
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138 In chapter five, where I will consider the moral appeal of the tradable refugee quota scheme, I will 
examine more closely the issue of institutions that may be said to be violating right-bearers’ dignity. 
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understand rights is to consider them as ‘normative resource bases’ that can ground 
not only direct duties of respect, but also indirect duties requiring the duty-bearers to 
establish protective mediating institutions. In the chapter I have also suggested that 
the perfection of imperfect duties with mediating institutions is not a moral project 
for which there are no guidelines. I concluded the chapter by claiming that the right 



























4. The existing global refugee regime and its moral 
dimensions 
 
So far I have outlined an account of the general moral right to asylum. I have also 
defended the right to asylum against the objection according to which it does not 
constitute a genuine right. In the current chapter, I will examine the existing global 
institutional framework by using the general moral right to asylum as a normative 
evaluative standard. The central question that I will focus on in the chapter is: taking 
into consideration the normative theory outlined in the previous chapters, what 
should we make of the existing institutions dedicated to assisting persons fleeing 
their home countries, i.e., do the existing global institutional arrangements 
adequately take into consideration the moral right to asylum, or should they be 
restructured? In the chapter I will conclude that the existing institutional 
arrangements are morally unsatisfactory and that they should be restructured. 
 
I will proceed with the chapter in the following way. In the first section, I will outline 
a historical overview of the emergence of the currently existing ‘global refugee 
regime’, i.e., interstate instruments protecting a range of persons fleeing their home 
states due to the violence and other forms of severe harm. In the second section, I 
will move to examine the ‘refugee status’, which makes a person eligible for asylum 
in the current refugee regime. In the section I will conclude that the ‘prescriptive 
refugee status’ outlined in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees is morally unsatisfactory, and that the global refugee regime should be 
dedicated to protect all persons with the moral right to asylum. In the final section, I 
will focus on examining another central element of the global refugee regime, the 
non-refoulement principle, more closely. In the current world, the principle of state 
sovereignty overrides the requirement to grant asylum to any needy non-citizens, and 
the only meaningful mechanism protecting persons fleeing their home countries is 
the non-refoulement principle. This principle requires that states abstain from 
expelling or returning persons to the frontiers of territories where their life or 
freedom would be threatened. I will claim that if the conclusion regarding the 
existence of a moral right to asylum outlined in the previous chapters is valid, the 
non-refoulement principle should be given up as the central mechanism of refugee 
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protection. This is for two central reasons. Firstly, the protective institutions founded 
on the non-refoulement principle do not adequately recognise that some of the 
asylum seekers can have binding claims of justice against all states with capacities to 
assist them. Secondly, the non-refoulement principle distributes the burdens of 
protection primarily on the grounds of proximity instead of considerations of justice. 
 
4.1 The historical emergence of the existing global refugee regime 
Humans have migrated throughout history, but never before have such systematic 
migration controls been in place as in the contemporary world. The modern world is 
a world of exclusive territorial states, and citizen, refugee, asylum seeker, non-
national, resident, and illegal immigrant are all assigned statuses with which states 
control movement across borders, residency, and access to goods within their 
jurisdictional territories. States have come to establish an elaborate institutional 
migration structure that restricts immigration to a great degree. The currently existing 
physical migration structure connects states to each other with roads, railroads, 
airports, and harbours, and due to its form the physical obstacles of migration to 
nearly anywhere in the world are fairly low. But the institutional migration structure 
has a decisive role in the final opportunity of migrants to enter other countries. The 
institutional migration structure consists of institutional rules and interactive routines 
existing between states. States provide passports to their members, engage in border 
control, and recognise certain international obligations on the treatment of non-
members within their territories. 
 
Currently, the institutional rules in the global migration structure are asymmetrical 
by their general form. While in international law there is a general right to exit from 
any state outlined, international law stops short of recognising a general right of 
entry to countries other than a person’s home country. The United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 13(1), for example, recognises the 
right to freedom of movement, but only within each particular state. The Article 
declares that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state’. Article 13(2), in turn, recognises the right of exit without a 
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corresponding right of entrance to any other state.139 It declares that ‘everyone has 
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country’.140  In 
the words of Phillip Cole, in the current global migration structure the ‘freedom of 
movement for citizens of the state is symmetrical, in that they have rights of both 
arrival and departure; but it is asymmetrical for non-citizens, who only have rights of 
departure’.141  
 
Although affluent democratic countries are making multilateral commitments for 
freer movement – developments of intra-EU freedom of movement being an example 
of this – there are no similar developments towards freedom of migratory movement 
between developed and developing countries. Restrictive migration controls towards 
immigrants from developing countries remain firmly in place. In fact, many 
developed countries are engaging in efforts to control the emigratory movement in 
the departure countries.142 What cements this institutionalised asymmetry is public 
opinion, which in several countries has strongly turned towards supporting stricter 
immigration controls. In many European countries – including The Netherlands, 
Austria, France, and Finland – right wing political parties have seen a rise in their 
support, and they have found that anti-immigration appeals to national security, to 

139 The first famous document on rights that explicitly recognises individuals’ right to emigrate was 
Magna Carta (1215), which states that ‘it is allowed henceforth to any one to go out from our 
kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land and by water, saving their fidelity to us, except in 
time of war for some short time, for the common good of the kingdom […]’. Quoted in Frederik G. 
Whelan, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Leave’, The American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 
640. The limited right of free movement recognised in the first version of the Magna Carta was, 
however, short-lived, as it was omitted from all following versions of the document by the English 
Kings who reasserted their prerogative to control travel abroad. The doctrine of ‘perpetual allegiance’ 
started to emerge, which bound the individuals’ allegiance to the Crown by birth instead of contractual 
‘voluntarism’. Whelan, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Leave’, 640-641. 
140  Ann Dummett argues that ‘it is an absurdity to assert a right of emigration without a 
complementary right of immigration’ if there does not exist ‘a number of states which permit free 
entry’. She concludes that under the current framework of transnational migration there exists no such 
states, and the right of emigration is therefore not ‘a general human right exercisable in practice’. Ann 
Dummett, ‘Natural Law and Transnational Migration’, in Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin (eds.), 
Free Movement – Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 173. 
141 Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion – Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 45. 
142 A clear example of this type of advocacy is the proposal suggested at the highest level of EU 
politics for the maintenance of ‘The Fortress Europe’. In 2002 Tony Blair and José Maríe Aznar 
proposed in a European Council meeting that the European Union withdraw aid from countries that 
did not take effective steps to control the flow of illegal emigrants to the EU. Jagdish Bhagwati, 
‘Borders beyond Control’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), 98. 
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the maintenance of the welfare system for compatriots, and to a common societal 
ethos can be cultivated and cashed as political capital. 
 
The asymmetrical nature of the global migration structure complicates the position of 
those who flee their home countries due to violence and other forms of severe harms. 
In recent decades, civil conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have displaced a large number of persons. In 2008 
there were altogether around 42 million persons worldwide who the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognised as ‘forcibly displaced’.143 In 
the currently existing global migration structure those who flee violence and other 
forms of severe harm are not entitled to freely enter any other territorial state. This 
means that those attempting to exit their home countries may be faced with 
protracted circumstances of severe deprivation. Their prospects for a decent life in 
their home country may be non-existent, but they still do not enjoy the right to 
rebuild their life in any other country. In a world with asymmetrical migration 
controls and statuses non-members are essentially, as Michael Walzer points out, 
‘vulnerable and unprotected in the marketplace’, they face a constant threat of 
expulsion, and ‘statelessness is a condition of infinite danger’ for them.144 
 
Within the existing exclusive global system states have come to recognise that some 
persons are in desperate need of shelter in other countries, and they have taken steps 
to address the issue with the establishment of what may be called the ‘global refugee 
regime’. The global refugee regime can be understood as a set of international 
institutions aiming to provide protection and assistance to a range of persons 
escaping circumstances of severe deprivation in their home countries. The global 
refugee regime is comprised of international legal treaties, state practices, norms, and 
supranational mediating institutions. States constitute the fundamental units of the 
global refugee regime, but the regime effectively exists ‘between’ states. The 
currently existing refugee regime has gradually evolved into its particular form, and 

143  UNHCR, Global Trends 2008, 3. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html 
(accessed 19.07.11). 
144 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983), 31-32. 
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its emergence is closely attached to the emergence of the asymmetrical institutional 
migration structure.  
 
In the early modern Europe, those migrants who were escaping their home countries 
due to violence or other forms of severe harm were still not distinguished from other 
prospective immigrants. These groups were relatively small at the time, and many of 
them migrated to newly found territories.145 Historically the first group to whom the 
term ‘refugee’ was assigned was the Huguenots.146 By the time the French revolution 
of 1789 took place, refugee protection had already emerged as an international 
political issue. Some countries were willing to assist fleeing French aristocrats by 
providing them with a safe haven, as they saw it as an opportunity to protect the 
balance of power in Europe. But during this early modern era there was no refugee 
regime to speak of, as states acted in a fully ad hoc fashion when dealing with 
persons escaping from their home countries.147 
 
The freedom of immigration those escaping their home countries had enjoyed in the 
early modern centuries was systematically curtailed towards the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The 19th century constituted an era of experimentation in migration 
controls, and it saw the emergence of practices that became a central part of the 
asymmetrical migration controls existing in the contemporary world. Probably the 
most distinctive historical developments that contributed to the eventual emergence 
of the currently existing asymmetrical institutional migration structure were the 
democratic revolutions and industrialisation.148  
 
Towards the end of the 19th century, democratic Western countries started to drop 
limitations on their citizens’ expatriation, and the right to leave was quickly 

145  James C. Hathaway, ‘The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’, 
International Comparative Law Quarterly, 33 (1984), 348. 
146 The mass flight of Huguenots was caused by King of France Louis XIV after the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes, and more than 200,000 Huguenots fled France to The Netherlands, England, 
Switzerland, Germany, and The United States. Dowty, Closed Borders, 34-35; Laura Barnett, ‘Global 
Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime’, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 14 (2002), 239. 
147 Barnett, ‘Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime’, 240. 
148 Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies’, International Migration 
Review, 38 (2004), 856. 
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becoming a general characteristic of a democratic state.149 But this era should not be 
interpreted as a laissez-faire era of migration. States took an active interest in those 
who crossed the border in either direction, and classifications of ‘desirable’ and 
‘undesirable’ migrants were widely implemented.150 New bureaucratic regulations on 
immigration started to emerge, and these regulations primarily targeted persons 
entering from particular countries. Often the regulations were racially and culturally 
limited, and they effectively amounted to institutionalised racism.151  
 
During the 20th Century, the institutional migration structure gradually became a 
complex system that recognised status-based movement between territorial 
jurisdictions.152 After the outbreak of the World War I, migration between countries 
became heavily regulated. Passports, which had not been required prior to the war in 
many countries, became a permanent feature of the institutional migration structure. 
Also, during the first half of the 20th century restrictive Marxist-Leninist countries 
arose, and started to curb migration extensively both outwards and inwards. The 
collectivist Marxist-Leninist countries were centrally concerned with homogeneity 
within the states and mobilisation of the public behind the ruling power.153 During 
this era greater numbers of people was confined behind their national territorial 
boundaries than during any previous period in history.  
 
The Soviet Union led the example of the collectivist states, effectively restricting free 
movement out of the country of most of its citizens by requiring practically 
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149 In 1870, Britain successfully voted for the right of citizens to expatriate, and it was implemented in 
general apart from those skilled workers heading for the United States. Thus, in Britain the 19th 
century marked a shift from the doctrine of ‘perpetual allegiance’ to the Crown, which had been in 
place since the feudal times. Following Britain, other European countries started to dismantle exit 
restrictions. By the end of the century, it was possible to exit relatively freely from almost any 
European or American country and enter another. Dowty, Closed Borders, 45-46.  
150 Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies’, 856. 
151 Such may be considered to be the case for example with the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United 
States (1882), The Chinese Immigration Act in Canada (1885), and the Australia’s Immigration 
Restriction Act (1901), which is more famously – or rather infamously – known as the ‘White 
Australia Policy’. Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion, 30.  
152  This complexity is well exemplified by the Britain’s 1981 Nationality Act, which recognises 
British citizenship, British Dependent Territories Citizenship, British Overseas Citizenship, British 
National, British Subject, British Protected Person, Commonwealth Citizen, and Citizens Eire. Only 
the first category enjoys an automatic right of entry to the UK and full citizenship rights, and all the 
other classifications are more or less hierarchical in their degree of belonging to Britain. Cole, 
Philosophies of Exclusion, 35. 
153 Dowty, Closed Borders, 61-62.  
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unattainable exit visas, by applying technological innovations to control its borders, 
and by requiring that the relatives of an illegally exiting person renounced the person 
and pledged their allegiance to the country.154 While exit visas were often impossible 
to get, a person caught attempting an illegal exit to a capitalist state was usually 
charged with treason, and in the worst case received the death penalty. Exit permits 
were considered primarily as a concession by the state instead of a right, and their 
central function was to serve foreign policy ends and to get rid of individuals who 
were seen as problems or threats to the state.155 
 
At the turn of the 21st century, after the collapse of most Marxist-Leninist states, the 
restrictions on migratory movement have become increasingly one-sided and 
asymmetrical. In the current transnational migration framework the democratic 
understanding of migration controls that started to develop in the late 18th century 
and throughout the 19th century has become more dominant and recognised 
worldwide. While there still remains Communist countries, such as Cuba and North 
Korea, which heavily restrict the exit of their citizens, the tendency to extensively 
control and limit immigration while leaving doors open for exit has cemented itself 
in modern transnational practices of migration as well as to rights documents and 
international law.156  
 
Within the currently existing ‘asymmetrical’ migration framework states have 
attempted to address the circumstances of some of those persons who are escaping 
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154 In line with the perception of exit as a state-authorised privilege instead of a fundamental natural 
right, the Soviet Union refused to accept the language of the UDHR signed in 1948. The Soviet Union 
proposed additional language of its own to be included in Article 13(2) of the UDHR, which outlines 
the right of each individual to exit the countries of their nationality. The proposal was to integrate the 
sentence ‘in accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of that country’ in the Article. The 
Soviet argument in defence of the proposed sentence was that states should not be asked to change 
their existing laws, as this would amount to interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. 
Dowty, Closed Borders, 72, 111-112. 
155 Dowty, Closed Borders, 74-76. While in philosophical enquiries defences of exit restrictions are 
not very common, attempts at their justification can be traced back to Plato. In Laws and in Crito, 
Plato recognises severe restrictions on individuals’ travels abroad. On his account, the right to travel 
outside Athens is a privilege accorded to those older citizens who have proved their loyalty to the city-
state, and even then, these travels must be permitted and supervised by the government. Whelan, 
‘Citizenship and the Right to Leave’, 643-644. 
156  The right of exit has become, as Rainer Bauböck notes, ‘firmly anchored in the canon of 
democratic liberalism’ and it has been ‘elevated beyond citizenship to the level of universal human 
rights, which ought also to be respected by non-liberal regimes’. Rainer Bauböck, Transnational 
Citizenship (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994), 142. 
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their home countries due to threats of severe harm. The founding of the League of 
Nations at the end of the First World War marks the first genuine step towards the 
existing global refugee regime. The League of Nations led to the creation of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) in 1921. The HCR was set up as a temporary 
agency to deal with persons fleeing the 1917 Russian revolution. This was the first 
time ‘the refugee problem’ was recognised as an international problem requiring an 
international solution, and the first time instruments of international scope were 
adopted to protect persons fleeing from their home countries.157 But the HCR did not 
outline a systematic general account of the conditions under which a person ought to 
be considered as refugee eligible for asylum, and instead assigned the status of 
refugee according to group affiliation and origin.158 In other words, the protection of 
persons by the HCR was still ‘particularist’ in that it did not expand to cover all those 
who were in an equally severe position.  
 
The global refugee regime started to receive its current universalised form in the 
aftermath of the Second World War with the establishment of the United Nations. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) marks the first time that a right 
pertaining to asylum (Article 14) was articulated in an international treaty. The 
displacement of millions of persons during and after the war prompted states also to 
draft the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951).159 A central 
reason for the attempts to ratify an international treaty on refugee protection was the 
existing problem of forced migration in Europe. The final form of the Convention 
was restricted in that it addressed the situation of only those who had been displaced 
prior to January 1st 1951, and due to ‘events occurring in Europe’. These limitations 
were included because states taking part in the Convention did not want to sign a 
‘blank check’ on refugee protection. The regional program was eventually 
universalised when the European restrictions existing in the Convention were 
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157 Hathaway, ‘The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’, 351. According to 
Hathaway, The International Red Cross Committee appealed to the council of the League of Nations 
to assist Russian refugees, and they characterised the need for action as an ‘an obligation of 
international justice’ instead of a ‘humanitarian duty’. 
158 Barnett, ‘Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime’, 242. 
159 The Convention was drafted between 1948 and 1951 by UN organs and ad hoc committees, and 
eventually delegates from 26 countries deliberated on it for more than three weeks. James C. 
Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Vancouver: Butterworths, 1991), 6.  
 ?@
abandoned with the implementation of the 1967 Refugee Protocol. With the Protocol 
the existing obligations were no longer limited to the pre-1951 events. 160  The 
Convention may be understood as the cornerstone of the existing global refugee 
regime, as it is the most broadly ratified instrument of refugee protection. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War it constituted an important step towards the 
universalised protection of persons escaping their home countries due to severe 
harms.  
 
4.2 Whom should the global refugee regime protect? 
The underlying humanitarian ideals in the Convention are clear enough. Although 
our world may not be a perfect one, and although there may occur such horrors as the 
Second World War, it should at the very least be ensured that those who are 
displaced from their home states are treated by other states with dignity, and that 
conditions of decency are provided for them by the international community.161 But 
while there may have existed truly altruistic humanitarian motives in the efforts to 
establish a functioning global refugee regime with the drafting of the Convention, in 
the end political reality and the national interests of states heavily affected the 
specific form the Convention eventually received. This effectively means that the 
existing global refugee regime falls short of the humanitarian ideals that partly 
prompted the systematic construction of institutions that aim to protect those in need 
in the first place. In the words of Satvinder Singh Juss, the foundation for the current 
global refugee regime was laid by political attempts to ‘reconcile between two 
irreconcilables: humanitarian need on the one hand, and sovereign state control on 
the other’. It is essentially founded on a compromise, and ‘even as a compromise, it 
was a partial compromise’.162 One of the elements of the global refugee regime to 
which the national interests of states have impacted is the definition of refugee. In a 
descriptive sense the term refugee may be used synonymously with the term ‘forced 
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160 The words ‘as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951’ were omitted from Article 1 of 
the Convention, which outlines the definition of refugee. 
161 See also Ivor C. Jackson, ‘The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal 
Basis for Protection’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 3 (1991), 403-405.  
162 Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 201.  
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migrant’.163 But the term is also used in a prescriptive sense. In this latter sense, the 
term refugee may be understood to denote a status that makes a person eligible for 
certain entitlements that the status accords, i.e., eligibility for asylum.164 
 
According to the Convention, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to 
qualify for the status of refugee and therefore to be eligible for protection under the 
Convention are that the person has ‘a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.’165  
 
Politicians, academics, judges, legal experts, and human rights activists have 
interpreted the prescriptive concept of refugee outlined in the Convention in several 
incompatible ways. Some have followed ‘the accountability approach’. 166  This 
approach suggests that infliction of severe harm needs to be linkable to state agents 
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163 For example, the Oxford English Dictionary provides a descriptive account of the term ‘refugee’, 
stating that the term denotes a ‘person who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape 
war, persecution, or natural disaster’. 
164 See also Aristide R. Zolberg & Astri Suhrke & Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and 
the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3. 
165  The requirement that persecution has to occur due to the five categories mentioned in the 
Convention is commonly known as ‘the nexus clause’. According to Hathaway, the initial rationale 
for incorporating the nexus clause in the Convention was not that persons cannot be persecuted for 
other reasons and therefore be facing an equally severe risk of harm, but rather that in the historical 
context when the Convention was drafted ‘persons affected by these forms of fundamental socio-
political disfranchisement were less likely to be in a position to seek effective redress from within the 
state’. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 136. 
166 Matthew E. Price is one of the proponents of the view that the infliction of severe harm needs to be 
linkable to a government of a state for persecution to occur. On his view, persecution should be 
‘defined as serious harm inflicted or condoned by official agents for illegitimate reasons’. Matthew E. 
Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 106-107, 135. This approach accepts that if a state takes reasonable steps to protect one group 
of citizens from severe harms inflicted by some other group of citizens, but for one or another 
unexpected reason it fails to sufficiently protect them, no persecution can be said to occur. In his 
analysis, Price refers to Rawls’ distinction between burdened societies and outlaw states, and suggests 
that persons facing severe harms from other agents in burdened societies are not persecuted. He argues 
that the term persecution is inapposite to describe the situation of those needing assistance in burdened 
societies. This, on his view, is essentially because to grant asylum in such cases would be to issue a 
condemnation where none is warranted. Price, Rethinking Asylum, 72-73. 
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in order for the harms to amount to persecution. The ‘statist’ approach to the concept 
of refugee has been fairly common in the aftermath of the Second World War.167 
Many states have interpreted the Convention in a narrow sense, and for example the 
German law on asylum that predates 1st of January 2005 recognises as persecution 
only acts that either emanate from the state, are attributable to the state, or emanate 
from a quasi/state-like organisation.168  One reason why within the framework of 
refugee jurisprudence there has been a prolonged debate on the appropriate 
interpretation of the term persecution is that the concept is not substantively clarified 
in the Convention. The notion of persecution in the Convention is qualified only by 
the existing motives, and there is no expressed limitation on what is its appropriate 
source.169 The term persecution was transferred to the Convention from previous 
international refugee documents without discussion on its substantive meaning.170  
 
The prescriptive definition of the refugee outlined in the Convention can be 
understood as being ‘narrow’ on the hand and ‘broad’ on the other hand. While it 
limits the eligibility for asylum to those facing a well-founded fear of persecution for 
the reasons outlined in the Convention, it does not specify more closely what exactly 
are the circumstances under which persecution can occur. During the Cold War the 
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167 It should be pointed out, however, that this approach is not compatible with the approach taken by 
the UNHCR handbook, which is presented as a guideline to interpreting the Convention. The existing 
UNHCR handbook states that while ‘persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a 
country’, it can also ‘emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the standards 
established by the laws of the country concerned’. The handbook recognises that ‘where serious 
discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as 
persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove 
unable, to offer effective protection’. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
1979, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1.   
168 Juss, International Migration and Global Justice, 117; Reinhard Marx, ‘The Notion of Persecution 
by Non-State Agents in German Jurisprudence’, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 417 (2000), 
447-462. 
169 The non-refoulement requirement outlined in Article 33 (1) of the Convention may be argued to 
support the conclusion that within the Convention paradigm persecution can occur in societies in 
which the infliction of severe harms are not linkable to an existing government. There is no mention 
of the role of state in the non-refoulement requirement, only of the ‘territories’ where persons may be 
persecuted. Walter Kälin, ‘Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect’, 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 415 (2000), 418. 
170  Jackson, ‘The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis for 
Protection’, 405-406. Some legal theorists, for example Jacqueline Bhabha, have argued that 
‘persecution’ does not constitute a well-circumscribed legal concept at all. Jacqueline Bhabha, 
‘International Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights’, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, 15 (2002), 168. 
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Convention definition of refugee provided to Western states a convenient and 
sufficiently flexible political instrument that allowed them to selectively grant 
asylum to persons of their choice. Many Western governments have strongly held on 
to the stance that the institution of asylum should express political values, 
communicate condemnation of certain governments, and serve as an instrument of a 
broader political program aiming to reform the condemned governments.171  This 
view has also had an impact on determining the scope of those who are eligible for 
asylum. States have resorted to ideological interpretations of the Convention 
definition, and the instrumental requirements of states have constituted a procrustean 
bed for its more specific interpretation. Put differently, the substantive interpretation 
of the prescriptive account of refugee has been formulated by many states to fit a 
desired ideological function.  
 
The prescriptive definition of refugee outlined in the Convention was broad enough 
to cover the victims of Nazism, and it also allowed the Western states to take a 
‘moral high-ground’ against the existing Communist regimes by offering protection 
to persons whose flight from Communist countries was motivated by pro-Western 
political values.172 Western states systematically interpreted asylum applicants from 
Communist countries as being persecuted by their governments, and they used the 
institution of asylum for political purposes. While considering asylum as an 
instrument of humanitarian assistance, they effectively limited its use to cases in 
which the humanitarian aim could simultaneously serve a foreign policy aim.173 The 
intention was to use asylum as an instrument in the long-term political goal of 
overthrowing governments the Western states considered as their political 
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171 Price, Rethinking Asylum, ch. 2. 
172 Juss, International Migration and Global Justice, 202.  
173 The United States’ asylum policies during the Cold War provide a clear example of foreign policy 
aims and the politicised nature of asylum in the post-Second World War era. In 1952 the US Attorney 
General was granted the power to ‘parole’ non-citizens temporarily to the country ‘for emergency 
reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest’. The statistical data from the time shows 
that the primary reason for paroling a non-citizen was ‘public interest’, and that the parole was used 
almost exclusively to grant entry to those arriving from the Communist countries. Between the years 
1952 and 1968 of the 232,111 persons paroled into the United States only 925 came from non-
Communist countries, and the rest came from countries such as the USSR, Cuba, and Hungary. See 
Arthur C. Helton, ‘Political Asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act: An unfulfilled Promise’, University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 17 (1984), 245-246. 
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enemies.174 Simultaneously, the Convention definition was carefully drafted in such 
a way that it could not be turned to the political advantage of the Soviet bloc.175 In 
the post-Second World War context, a broader definition of refugee would not only 
have meant the expansion of the scope of obligations to foreign nationals, but it 
would also have threatened the use of the Convention as an instrument of Western 
countries’ foreign policy aims. 
 
After the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly questionable whether the 
institution of asylum the function of which is to condemn other regimes serves as an 
important instrument for any existing state. There seems to be no longer a direct 
foreign policy rationale for holding on to such approach, as the ideological struggles 
existing during the Cold War have been replaced with other pressing issues, 
including the threat of terrorism and increasingly unstable national governments in 
countries with important natural resources. Many have argued that instead of 
manifesting political values asylum should be kept as a politically neutral 
institution.176 James Hathaway, among others, claims that there is an urgent need to 
reinterpret the Convention in order for it to amount to more than a ‘mere 
anachronism’ of the post-Second World War circumstances where ideological battles 
heavily influenced the form of the emerging international institutions.177 On his view, 
the Convention should be reinterpreted in such a way that it is ‘consonant with 
modern political realities’.178 Hathaway suggests that we should abandon the foreign 
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174 Price, Rethinking Asylum, 86. 
175 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 6-8.  
176 In words of Michael Dummett, ‘if people are justifiably in fear of their lives, they deserve to be 
offered safety, whether those they are afraid will kill them are Algerian police or Islamic rebels, the 
Sri Lankan army or Tamil Tigers’. Michael Dummett, On Migration and Refugees (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 37.  
177 In The Law of Refugee Status Hathaway argues that all humanly caused severe harm that is within 
the scope of the basic duty of protection owed by a state to its citizens should be considered as part of 
‘persecution’. He argues that ‘persecution may be defined as the sustained or systemic violation of 
basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection’. James C. Hathaway, The Law of 
Refugee Status (Vancouver: Butterworths, 1991), 104-105. 
178 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 101-104. In many burdened societies there are groups that 
are hostile to each other, these groups are of asymmetrical power, and the more dominant groups have 
found ways to create a general climate of fear among the less powerful groups and have effectively 
caused severe harm to persons within the group they have singled out. This all has taken place without 
any existing and functioning government condoning the actions of the dominant group. We do not 
have to go further than Afghanistan and Somalia to recognise this reality. In the countryside of 
Afghanistan, which is beyond the control of the weak central government in Kabul, many women and 
gays are facing gruesome treatment without the involvement or oversight of state agents. The same is 
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policy approach to asylum, and argues that the Convention definition should be 
interpreted in such a way that it allows ‘governments to conceive refugee protection 
as a humanitarian act which ought not to be a cause of tension between states’.179 
 
Subsequent regional treaties have moved to outline alternative prescriptive accounts 
of the refugee, and they have suggested that the Convention definition is not 
representative of the de facto problem of forced migration.180 One regional treaty that 
includes a more extensive prescriptive account of refugee than the Convention is the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration) crafted by ten Latin 
American States in 1985. The state parties involved expanded with the Cartagena 
Declaration the definition of refugee to all persons who have fled their country 
because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, 
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.  
 
An even broader definition of refugee can be found in The Organisation of African 
Unity’s (OAU) regional refugee treaty.181 Following the Convention, in 1969 the 
OAU outlined its own complementary regional treaty on refugee protection. The 
OAU treaty, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, includes a definition of refugee that applies to all persons who are compelled 
to leave their home in order to seek refuge outside their country of nationality ‘owing 
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
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the case also for example with many Christians in Somalia, who desperately seek shelter in the 
neighbouring countries from the non-governmental Islamic militants specifically targeting them 
because of their faith. 
179 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 101.  
180 In addition to the Cartagena Declaration and the OAU convention, many countries have drafted 
their national law in such a way that it includes a commitment to the protection of foreign persons 
beyond those covered by the Convention definition. For examples of national law extending 
protection of persons beyond the Convention, see Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 22. 
181 One of the central ways in which the OAU convention extends beyond the Cartagena Declaration 
is that it recognises the disturbances of public order ‘in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality’. On this view, a person may be considered as refugee even if in principle there might be 
protection available in some other part of the person’s home country. This view recognises the reality 
that underdeveloped infrastructure and the limited resources of the fleeing persons may limit the 
meaningful options for seeking humanitarian protection. As well, it reflects the reality that while at the 
moment some other part of the country may be safe, it may not necessarily be safe tomorrow. 
Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 18-19.  
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public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality’.182 As 
with the Cartagena Declaration, the OAU definition leaves the cause of the harm 
indeterminate, and it is focused primarily on the gravity of disturbances in the public 
order rather than on the motives of the flight.183  
 
In other words, there exists a political controversy regarding the prescriptive 
definition of the refugee, and the Convention definition has not been accepted 
unquestionably as an element of the global refugee regime. Many additional 
international instruments that recognise a broader scope of persons eligible for 
protection than the Convention have since been ratified.  
 
Political philosophy offers us one way to cut through the political controversies in 
the analysis of the prescriptive concept of refugee. When framed as an issue of 
political philosophy, the question regarding the prescriptive concept of refugee is 
centrally about whether there is a universal entitlement to be provided protection by 
the international community in other states in certain circumstances of deprivation, 
and about the specific conditions under which a person may be said to bear this 
entitlement. Put differently, the fact that it may have been politically expedient for 
Western states to exclude socioeconomic reasons, civil wars, generalised violence, 
and other severe disturbances of public order from the reasons why a person can be 
eligible for asylum does not directly validate the prescriptive concept of refugee from 
the perspective of justice. The politically controversial question regarding the final 
scope of persons who should be considered to be eligible for asylum is linked to an 
underlying more fundamental moral question: ‘under what circumstances of 
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182  OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted 
September 10, 1969 (UNTS no. 14691), Art. 1(2).  
183 In addition, the current mandate of the UNHCR extends beyond the Convention refugees. The 
UNHCR, which had already been established before the Convention was drafted, was initially given a 
three-year mandate to oversee the implementation of the Convention. It was expected to disband once 
the European refugee problem was solved, but its mandate was eventually extended. The UNHCR has 
gradually become an indispensable instrument of protection in the existing global refugee regime. 
Currently, the UNHCR has the authority to act on behalf of all ‘persons of concern’. This category 
includes refugees under the 1951 Convention, persons who have been forced to leave their countries 
as a result of conflict or events seriously disturbing public order, returnees, stateless persons, and, in 
some situations, internally displaced persons. In other words, it may be said that the central mediating 
institution that was originally set up in the global refugee regime to monitor the implementation of the 
Convention has ‘grown beyond’ the Convention. 
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deprivation – if any – do citizens of one state have an obligation of justice to provide 
asylum to citizens of other states?’  
 
The legitimacy of the global refugee regime is dependent on the validity of the moral 
underpinnings of the regime, and the underpinnings need to be examined separately 
from the political and historical processes that have led to the regime to receiving its 
particular form. In the first two chapters of the work, I outlined an account of the 
moral right to asylum. I suggested that all persons whose right to necessities is 
insufficiently protected in their home states have the right to asylum when they 
cannot be assisted with other remedial instruments by the international community 
within a reasonable timeframe. I argued that this right may be understood as a 
universal entitlement of all persons, and that it can ground obligation of justice in 
persons with the capacity to assist. The moral right to asylum allows us to propose a 
prescriptive account of refugee that is not dependent on such ‘non-moral’ factors as 
political power, i.e., it offers a justification for a particular definition of refugee on 
universalist moral grounds. On this universalist moral approach, the prescriptive 
account of the refugee is co-extensive with the group of persons with the right to 
asylum: all persons who have the moral right to asylum should be considered as 
‘refugees eligible for asylum’. 
 
On the grounds of the right to asylum it can be argued that the prescriptive definition 
of refugee offered by the Convention is insufficiently broad. The Convention 
definition fails to recognise adequately the myriad of circumstances beyond ‘a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ where a person’s right 
to necessities is threatened in the right-bearer’s home country, and where asylum 
offers the only meaningful remedy. There is a need to go beyond the particular 
reasons why the right to necessities is insufficiently protected, and to examine the 
broader context in which a person is in need of assistance from the international 
community. Whether the bearers of the right to necessities are in need of asylum or 
not is heavily dependent on the surrounding circumstances, and all the possible 
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contextual circumstances in which this can be the case are not satisfactorily covered 
by the Convention definition. 
 
Furthermore, on the grounds of the moral right to asylum it can be argued that the 
existing institutional framework of refugee protection should be replaced with a 
morally satisfactory alternative, i.e., the existing refugee regime, which is the result 
of realpolitik, should be replaced with a ‘moral refugee regime’. A moral refugee 
regime may be understood as an institutional alternative that grounds itself into 
demands of justice instead of political influence and national interests. In the existing 
refugee regime a central reason for the reluctance to extend protection beyond those 
with a well-founded fear of persecution is the political rift between self-interested 
states. From the perspective of justice this does not constitute a satisfactory reason 
for the form of the current refugee regime.  
 
The replacement of the current ‘political refugee regime’ with a moral refugee 
regime is a requirement of justice that imposes obligations on citizens of all states. 
One central aspect of a moral refugee regime is that it assigns the prescriptive status 
of refugee to all persons with the moral right to asylum. Put differently, the moral 
refugee regime recognises explicitly the plurality of reasons why persons may be in 
need of asylum, and it does not limit protection to those with a well-founded fear of 
persecution.184 In order for the global refugee regime to be a just regime, genuine 
steps need to be taken to extend protection to all bearers of the right to asylum. It is 
not enough for states to appeal to their national interests when considering what 
exactly should be the particular form of the global refugee regime.  
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184 This conclusion does not necessarily mean that those with a well-founded fear of persecution could 
not necessarily be recognised as a distinct class of persons in a moral refugee regime. As Joseph 
Carens rightly points out, ‘it could be justifiable to have two or more legally relevant definitions’ of 
the term ‘refugee’. This is the case centrally because from a moral perspective, a line might be drawn 
to ‘separate those with stronger moral claims to asylum from those with weaker moral claims’. See 
also Joseph Carens, ‘The Philosopher and the Policymaker: Two Perspectives on the Ethics of 
Immigration with Special Attention to the Problem of Restricting Asylum’, in Martin Hailbronner, 
David A. Martin and Hiroshi Motomura (eds.), Immigration Admissions (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1997), 14-17. It does mean, however, that in a moral refugee regime those with well-founded 
fear of persecution do not have exclusive entitlement to asylum. 
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For the remainder of the current study, I will use the term ‘refugee’ synonymously 
with the term ‘bearers of the moral right to asylum’, and the term ‘Convention 
refugee’ to refer to the group of persons eligible for protection under the Convention. 
In other words, the term ‘refugee’ is used in the following enquiry in a moral sense 
rather than in a political sense. Refugees are bearers of the right to necessities who 
are facing insufficient protection of their right in their home country and who cannot 
be helped by the international community with any other remedial instrument than 
asylum within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
4.3 The non-refoulement principle as the central mechanism of 
protection 
Apart from recognising a limited prescriptive account of refugee, another central 
characteristic of the existing global refugee regime is the absence of positive 
obligations on states to provide asylum. The existing global refugee regime does not 
recognise binding obligations on any state to grant asylum to any persons, regardless 
of the severity of the harms to which they are seeking remedy. The drafting process 
of Article 14 exemplifies how the global refugee regime has received its present non-
binding form. When Article 14 of the UDHR was drafted, many states rejected the 
position that there is a moral obligation to grant asylum to any persons, let alone that 
any possible moral obligation should be formulated into a legal obligation. The 
original draft of Article 14 included the language ‘be granted asylum’, but it was 
finally settled into the form ‘seek and to enjoy asylum’. In the drafting process there 
were tensions between representatives defending state sovereignty and those who 
argued for stronger obligations towards Convention refugees. Eventually the 
advocates of state sovereignty prevailed, and the UDHR right to asylum received the 
form of a ‘right of states to grant asylum’.185  
 
In other words, as with the prescriptive definition of refugee, also the form of 
protection offered is strongly dictated by self-interested states worrying about the 
erosion of their sovereignty. This entails that the instruments of protection 
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185  Jane MacAdam, ‘Asylum and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, 27 (2008), 4-5. 
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established in the existing global refugee regime have primarily received their 
current form due to national interests rather than moral requirements following the 
moral right to asylum. The current global refugee regime accepts as overriding the 
state sovereignty principle of customary international law, according to which states 
are free to decide on their own matters as long as they do not violate rights of other 
states. In the words of Emma Haddad, in international law ‘the right of states to grant 
asylum takes precedence over the right of individuals’ to receive it.186 International 
refugee law allows states to consider autonomously whether or not (and to what 
extent) they will provide assistance and protection to Convention refugees and to 
persons who do not satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of the Convention 
definition. If the claims of a person seeking asylum are deemed valid by a state, and 
if the state holds that it ought to assist the needy foreigner, the state may grant 
asylum to the applicant.  
 
The absence of direct positive obligations to grant asylum does not mean that there 
are no meaningful protective instruments at all in the current global refugee regime. 
The central legal instrument with any teeth is the non-refoulement principle. In 
philosophical terms, the non-refoulement obligation is founded on the moral 
imperative ‘one should not actively cause harm to others’.187 The non-refoulement 
principle sets minimum standards of justice in the expulsion of non-citizens from the 
territory of a state, and one of the international treaties it is outlined in is the 
Convention. Article 33 of the Convention states that ‘no contracting state shall expel 
or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened’. Put differently, the non-
refoulement principle is supposed to guarantee de facto protection to persons facing 




186  Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society – Between Sovereigns (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 79. 
187 The negative duty not to harm is often considered as the most stringent moral duty. In his enquiry 
on asylum, Walzer gives a historical example of a flagrant violation of this duty in the context of 
international migration. He argues that after the Second World War the Allies violated the duty not to 
harm by sending thousands of Russians that had been captured by the Nazis back to Russia where they 
were immediately shot or sent on to die in labour camps. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 51.    
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When the Convention was drafted, the original intention was to formulate an 
absolute non-refoulement requirement for states, but the participating states were 
afraid that such a principle would excessively undermine their sovereignty. The final 
version of the Convention principle of non-refoulement was watered down, as 
eventually a second paragraph that contains a national security and public safety 
proviso was included. This proviso recognises that the non-refoulement benefit may 
not be claimed by a person whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is. Apart from the right to refouler 
persons when they, for one reason or another, impose a danger to national security or 
to the public safety of a country, there are other controversies with regard to the 
obligation of non-refoulement. For example, as the issue is not specified further in 
the Convention, there is a debate on what exactly constitutes circumstances of being 
‘inside’ a state, i.e., whether the non-refoulement obligation allows that states may 
return those persons encountered in such places as for example on the seas.188  
 
In addition to the Convention, there are also other treaties of international law that 
set obligations of non-refoulement to states. For example, the 1984 United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms each recognise the non-refoulement obligation of states to 
persons who upon arrival are in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.189  
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188 Also, there remains a controversy on whether the obligation of non-refoulement extends only to 
those who are eligible for assistance and protection under the Convention. Some legal theorists 
suggest that the non-refoulement principle has emerged to be a principle of customary international 
law that extends beyond the Convention refugees. Others, however, reject this conclusion as ‘wishful 
legal thinking’. For a defence of an extended legal non-refoulement obligation see Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers’, Virginia Journal of international Law, 26 
(1986), 901-902. For criticism of this position, see Kay Hailbronner, ‘Non-Refoulement and 
“Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?’, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 26 (1986), 858. 
189  Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection 
in International Law – UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 92.  
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But as the legal duties of non-refoulement arise only when persons have been able to 
successfully access a state’s jurisdiction, the non-refoulement principle has a limited 
function as an instrument of protection. Some migration experts have suggested that 
the convergence of interest between asylum seekers and the developed Western 
countries has disappeared after the end of Cold War, and as a consequence these 
countries are increasingly seeking to avoid the arrival of asylum seekers by adopting 
policies of external deterrence. 190  A common strategy to avoid becoming the 
assigned bearer of responsibility towards non-citizens’ protection is the 
implementation of non-entrée practices. Many states have, among other things, 
implemented strict visa requirements, penalised carriers of unauthorised asylum 
seekers, created ‘international zones’ to airports, and pressured governments in the 
countries of departure to limit the flow of asylum seekers towards their territories. 
The only constraint imposed on this rationalising strategy is the pressure mounted 
from domestic advocates, international human rights organisations such as the 
UNHCR and Amnesty International, and other states.191 
 
Furthermore, even if a bona fide refugee manages to enter a state’s jurisdiction, in 
the current institutional framework the state may still resort to actions other than 
processing asylum claims and providing protection. Consider three examples. Firstly, 
within the European Union, states may return asylum applicants to the ‘first country 
of arrival’ in accordance with The European Union’s Dublin II regulation. The 
Dublin II regulation recognises countries that are primarily responsible for 
considering the validity of asylum claimants’ application, and generally these 
countries are the first countries of arrival within the European Union. This means 
that if persons are applying for asylum in a country other than the country they first 
entered when arriving in the Union, they can be sent back to the first-entrance 
country for processing. Secondly, states may attempt to avoid having to grant asylum 
to persons to whom the non-refoulement obligation applies by transferring them to 
what is determined by the state as a ‘safe third country’. This practice is aggressively 
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190 James C. Hathaway & Alexander Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10 
(1997), 119-120. 
191 Peter H. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’, Yale Journal of International 
Law, 22 (1997), 253. 
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pursued for example by Australia.192 The policy of returning asylum seekers to safe 
third countries has been criticised as dubious due to the possibility of indirect 
refoulement. If the safe third country is not a party to the Convention, this raises 
questions about the possible outsourcing of human rights violations.193 Finally, states 
may coercively attempt to get asylum seekers to accept ‘voluntary repatriation’, 
which de facto can amount to refoulement, but nevertheless may be interpreted to 
stop short of constituting a violation of the Convention obligation of non-
refoulement. States may intentionally arrange the circumstances for arriving asylum 
seekers in such a way that they have no other meaningful choice but to return to their 
state of origin or to some other state where the circumstances are no better. Such 
practices have been used for example by Turkey, Rwanda, Uganda, and India, which 
have withheld food and other essentials to ‘incentivise’ the repatriation of asylum 
seekers after their initial arrival.194  
 
What should we make of the non-refoulement principle as the central mechanism of 
protecting refugees? From the perspective of the theory of asylum outlined in the 
previous chapters, there are two central problems with the non-refoulement principle. 
Firstly, the application of the non-refoulement principle as the primary mechanism of 
protection entails that access to asylum is excessively dependent on luck and the 
benevolence of the territorial states persons seek to enter. Lucky asylum applicants 
are able to break through the many obstacles set by states aiming to prevent asylum 
seekers from entering their jurisdictional territories. But even the lucky applicants 
who manage to access a state and file a claim for asylum have only managed to 
come half way in their aim to remedy the harms they are fleeing from. Once a person 
is in a position to file a claim for asylum, it is still centrally up to the state to decide 
autonomously how to respond to the claim. 
 
The moral right to asylum allows us to argue that non-entrée practices and coercive 
repatriation of asylum seekers existing in the current global refugee regime are 
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192 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 327-328.  
193 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 328. 
194 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 318. 
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unjust. States resorting to these practices fail to consider that asylum seekers may be 
legitimate refugees with the right to asylum. States attempting to keep asylum 
seekers away or repatriate them before the legitimacy of their claims have been 
examined are effectively failing to take reasonable steps to find out whether they do 
or do not have binding obligations of justice towards the persons they encounter. 
These policies may be attractive to the policy-maker because they are inexpensive, 
but this does not change the fact that the policies are unjust. Furthermore, the 
existing refugee regime fails to adequately recognise that the non-refoulement 
principle can leave the right-bearers in an extremely weak position with regard to the 
claimability of their rights, and that the right to asylum can ground not only duties of 
respect but also binding duties of assistance and duties of establishing interstate 
mediating institutions that enforce compliance in its protection. Put differently, the 
moral right to asylum constitutes a justificatory ground for a global refugee regime 
that extends beyond the non-refoulement principle and enforces positive obligations 
on citizens of all states with the capacity to assist the right-bearers. In such a regime 
the role of luck and the benevolence of states as reasons why persons have or do not 
have access to their universal entitlements are minimised. 
 
The second central problem in a global refugee regime in which the non-refoulement 
principle constitutes the central mechanism of protection is burden-distribution 
between duty-bearers. In the current refugee regime the protection of persons fleeing 
their home states and the distribution of burdens between the recipient states is 
centrally organised in the following way: there is a set of maxims (international law) 
that assigns a responsibility role (non-refoulement) to each state in the global 
collective of states. As long as states follow the non-refoulement obligation they 
satisfactorily comply with the existing maxims of protection. This entails that in the 
existing refugee regime asylum claims filed on the territory of one state effectively 
release other states from obligations of protection. States only have non-refoulement 
obligations to asylum seekers, but no obligation to share burdens of protection with 
other states regardless of the relative levels of refugee accommodation. This means 
that the first-asylum states may find themselves in situations where no other state is 
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willing to share their burdens, and where they cannot deport persons back to their 
home countries due to the existing non-refoulement obligation. 
 
In recent decades, there has been an increasing political debate on the distribution of 
burdens in the protection of foreign nationals. Especially in the European Union, 
burden-sharing has been given serious consideration. The issue started to emerge in 
the 1990s during the Yugoslavian crisis, and it was further facilitated by the adoption 
of the European Union’s Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The treaty explicitly recognised 
the need to adopt measures ‘promoting a balance of effort between EU Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced 
persons’. 195  The next decade, however, brought with it an atmosphere of 
disappointment. While some measures advancing burden-sharing were introduced, 
simultaneously such counter-productive measures as the Dublin II regulation were 
implemented. Additionally, regardless of the emerging political debate on the topic 
within EU, there are currently no meaningful efforts to establish a global or even a 
regional burden-sharing scheme. The non-refoulement principle still maintains its 
position as the central mechanism for distributing burdens of protection between 
countries. 
 
In a global regime founded on the non-refoulement principle, apart from lucky and 
unlucky bearers of the right to asylum there can be unlucky states that face floods of 
right-bearers seeking entry. These unlucky states can end up being forced by 
circumstances to protect a great number of needy foreigners. In addition, there can be 
‘lucky’ states which are able to avoid circumstances in which they are forced to 
provide protection to foreign nationals, or they are able to avoid coming under a non-
refoulement obligation in the first place. As Matthew Gibney rightly notes, the 
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195 Eiko Thielemann, ‘Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European 
Union’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (2003), 261. This commitment was reaffirmed for example in 
the European council meeting in 2004. In the meeting EU leaders declared their commitment to 
common asylum policies that ‘should be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
including its financial implications and closer practical co-operation between member states’. 




central distributive logic in the non-refoulement principle is proximity.196 Migratory 
movement of substantial magnitude during humanitarian crises suggests that the 
initial aim of those fleeing from harm is to exit from their home country to any place 
of safety, and often the first country of arrival is a neighbouring country. In such 
humanitarian crises as the Rwandan crisis or the Afghan crisis the neighbouring 
countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria have 
encountered a vast amount of asylum seekers on their borders.197  In the current 
world, many of the unlucky states are primarily developing countries located next to 
other developing countries. In 2009, the developing countries were hosting 8.3 
million Convention refugees, amounting to 80 per cent of all the Convention 
refugees.198 
 
The existing global refugee regime may be argued to be unjust because self-
interested states have pushed for the adoption of the non-refoulement principle as the 
central mechanism of burden distribution. The regime does not guarantee in any way 
that the distribution of burdens in the protection of refugees follows considerations of 
justice. Duty-bearing citizens in states neighbouring humanitarian crises can 
reasonably ask: ‘is it fair that we are obligated to bear all the burdens in the 
protection of the right-bearers?’ After all, as in many cases bearers of the right to 
asylum can migrate to other states from the first-asylum state, and as compensations 
can be made between states, it is not inevitable that all the burdens of protection fall 
on the citizens of the first-asylum state. Shouldn’t the global refugee regime that is 
perfecting imperfect duties be such that it distributes burdens in such a way that the 

196  Matthew Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered regionalism, and Justice between States’, in 
Susan Kneebone & Felicity Rawlings-Sanei (eds.), New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges 
Ahead (Oxford: Berghahn Press, 2008), 67. 
197 In 2009, the country hosting most Convention refugees was Pakistan with 1.7 million refugees. The 
next two were Iran with 1.1 million and Syria with 1.05 million refugees. Tanzania was the largest 
refugee hosting country between 1997 and 2007. Overall, figures in the United Republic of Tanzania 
have gone down by 83 per cent since 2002, when the country was host to close to 700,000 refugees. 
This decrease is due to both naturalisation and repatriation of refugees. UNHCR, Global Trends 2009, 
7-8. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html (accessed 19.07.11).  
198  UNHCR, Global Trends 2009, 6. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html 
(accessed 19.07.11). Some states can be unlucky also in the sense that they are considered by asylum 
seekers as more appealing places than other states. For example, the wealthy Western countries are 
considered by many as appealing places for asylum due to the general living standards and 
opportunities build one’s life. Yet, as the previous statistical facts regarding the distribution of 
Convention refugees between developed and developing countries show, this is far less decisive factor 
in the distribution of burdens than proximity to humanitarian crises.  
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influence geographical location and the capacity to divert refugee flows to other 
states is minimised? If this conclusion is correct, it allows us to call for the 
replacement of the existing refugee protective institutions on moral grounds. There is 
a need to restructure the existing refugee protective institutions in such a way that the 
burdens are distributed on the grounds of justice rather than with the application of 
the non-refoulement principle. A convenient location and capacities to divert refugee 
flows to other countries should not have – if possible – any practical impact on the 
amount of burdens a state comprising bearers of imperfect duties is required to bear 
in global protection of the right to asylum. 
 
Conclusion 
In the current chapter, I have focused on examining the existing global refugee 
regime from the perspective of the theory of asylum outlined in the previous 
chapters. The central argument of the chapter was that the existing refugee regime is 
morally unsatisfactory on several grounds, and it needs to be restructured. I started 
by explaining the historical process that led the global refugee regime to receive its 
current form. Then, I focused on the controversies regarding the scope of persons 
who should be considered as refugees eligible for asylum. I claimed that in a moral 
refugee regime the prescriptive definition of refugee is coextensive with the scope of 
persons with the moral claim to asylum. Put differently, a call can be made for 
restructuring the existing refugee regime in such a way that it extends protection to 
all persons with the right to asylum. I also examined the non-refoulement principle 
more closely. The non-refoulment principle constitutes not only the primary 
mechanism of protection in the existing global refugee regime, but also the primary 
mechanism of burden distribution. I argued that if the theory outlined in the previous 
chapters is correct, the non-refoulement principle should be abandoned as the central 
mechanism of refugee protection and burden distribution. This is due to two central 
reasons. The non-refoulement principle does not adequately recognise that citizens of 
all states with the capacity to assist have binding moral obligations to assist refugees, 
and it distributes the burdens of physical accommodation centrally in accordance to 
geographical proximity to humanitarian crises rather than on the grounds of justice. 
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5. The ethics of tradable refugee quotas 
 
So far I have argued that under certain circumstances of deprivation citizens of all 
states can have the moral right to asylum, and that the current global refugee regime 
dedicated to the protection of Convention refugees recognises this right 
unsatisfactorily. At this point, it is time to move to examine institutional alternatives 
to the existing global refugee regime. What kind of mediating institutions dedicated 
to the protection of the right to asylum should be established between territorial 
states? Put differently, what should be the more tangible form of the ‘moral refugee 
regime’, and how should the imperfect duties corresponding the right to asylum be 
perfected between states comprising bearers of imperfect duties? In the current 
chapter, I will focus on examining more closely a policy proposal that may be said to 
offer an alternative to the existing unsatisfactory refugee regime. The policy proposal 
I will focus on is called the ‘tradable quota scheme’. Many migration experts have 
taken a strongly critical stance towards the idea of tradable quotas in the context of 
refugee protection. There have been two separate lines of criticism that have been 
outlined against the scheme. The first is related to its practical dimensions. Some 
critics have suggested that there is no realistic chance of implementing a tradable 
quota scheme.199  Apart from the practical criticism, critics have argued that the 
establishment of the tradable quota scheme faces several insurmountable moral 
problems, and that we are better off looking elsewhere for institutionalising the right 
to asylum. Here, I will focus on the second line of criticism against the scheme.  
 
I will proceed with the chapter in the following way. Firstly, I will provide an 
account of the general characteristics of the tradable quota scheme. I will suggest that 
the scheme may be understood as a synthesis of two stand-alone institutional 
schemes. Then, I will proceed to examine three moral objections against the scheme. 
I will claim that none of the examined objections constitute an insurmountable moral 

199 See for example, Deborah Anker, & James Fitzpatrick & Andrew Schacknove, ‘Crisis and Cure:  
A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 11 (1998), 295-310. It 
should be pointed out that a preliminary regional market scheme existed to resettle Convention 
refugees displaced by the Vietnam War. From 1979 until 1989 over 1.7 million Indochinese 
Convention refugees were resettled under the process. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 254-259. 
See also Suhrke, ‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies’, 405-406. 
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obstacle to the tradable quota scheme. Finally, I will turn to examine briefly the 
tradable quota scheme from a comparative moral perspective. Although I will stop 
short of conclusively defending the tradable quota scheme as comparatively the most 
appealing institutional alternative to the existing global refugee regime, I will suggest 
that there is strong evidence that comparatively the scheme is at the very least as 
morally appealing if not morally superior to the schemes it derives from. 
 
5.1 Tradable quota scheme – a synthesis 
Peter H. Schuck was the first to introduce the idea of a tradable quota scheme in the 
context of refugee protection.200 Since Schuck’s seminal article – titled ‘Refugee 
Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’ – other academics have slowly started to pay 
attention to the idea and to examine whether a tradable migration quota scheme could 
function as a means for global poverty reduction.201 The initial introduction of the 
scheme is closely related to an emerging academic interest in finding alternatives to 
the current refugee regime that would more effectively protect Convention refugees 
and simultaneously distribute the burdens of protection between states in a fairer way 
than the non-refoulement principle. During the 1990s, migration experts increasingly 
started to call for the replacement of the existing framework of individuated state 
responsibilities in the protection of Convention refugees with a regime of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibility’.202 The tradable quota scheme was outlined as one 

200 Peter H. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’, Yale Journal of International 
Law, 22 (1997), 243-297. 
201 The idea of tradable migration quotas as a mean for global poverty reduction has been considered 
in David De la Croix & Axel Gosseries, ‘Procreation, Migration, and Tradable Quotas’, in Robert L. 
Clark & Andrew Mason & Naohiro Ogawa (eds.), Population Aging, Intergenerational Transfers and 
the Macroeconomy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007); Jesús Fernandez-Huertas Mortaga 
& Hillel Rapoport, ‘Tradable Immigration Quotas’, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion 
Papers. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1867034 (visited 
11.08.2011) 
202 James C. Hathaway & Alexander Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10 
(1997), 145. In their well-known study on restructuring the existing global refugee regime, Hathaway 
and Neve defend a collectivised solution-oriented refugee regime. Under a collectivised refugee 
regime, all states ‘agree in advance to contribute to protect refugees who arrive at the territory of any 
state member of the group’. While Hathaway’s and Neve’s proposal was framed as a legal proposal, it 
is broadly compatible with the moral arguments outlined in the current study. For analyses on asylum 
as a public good see Astri Suhrke, ‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of 
Collective versus National Action’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11 (1998), 399-403; Alexander Betts, 
‘Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the Joint-Product Model 
in Burden-Sharing Theory’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (2003), 275-277. 
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specific account of a collectivised protection regime. In his article, Schuck focuses 
on criticising the current refugee regime as outdated and unable to effectively 
manage flows of Convention refugees, and he outlines the tradable quota scheme as a 
solution to the existing problems.203 
 
Schuck formulates his account of the tradable quota scheme essentially as a 
‘political’ instead of moral proposal, and considers that state participation in it should 
be voluntary.204 This means that his approach to restructuring the existing global 
refugee regime differs from the approach taken in the current study. As I have argued 
in the previous chapters, there is a binding obligation of justice on all capable parties 
to participate in the institutionalisation of the right to asylum. In his work, Schuck 
formulates a general framework for more specific accounts of tradable quota 
schemes. Although Schuck calls his proposal ‘modest’, he is in fact suggesting a 
fairly radical restructuring of the current refugee regime. There are, of course, many 
different specific ways to organise a tradable quota scheme, and its final form is 
partly dependent on the contextual settings to which it has to be accommodated. But 
there is a set of requirements that may be understood as context-independent 
common internal components of each more particular scheme. The establishment of 
a tradable quota scheme requires: 1) a process for determining the number of those in 
need of protection; 2) an international administrative authority; 3) a market for 
buying and selling quotas.205 
 
The first two characteristics of the tradable quota scheme constitute a central part of 
any more comprehensive scheme dedicated to distributing burdens of protecting the 
right to asylum between states comprising bearers of imperfect duties. In any 
interstate burden-sharing scheme there is a need to establish a system that determines 
the status of bona fide refugees. There are many more specific ways to establish a 
system of status determination processes, and it can be either the responsibility of 

203 Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 244-246; 270-289. 
204 Schuck argues that ‘no state should be obliged to participate in the burden-sharing scheme unless it 
voluntarily undertakes to do so’. He considers that states have an incentive to enter a tradable quota 
scheme voluntarily, as it provides an ‘insurance policy’ for each member state against flows of asylum 
seekers. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 273, 276.  
205 Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 271. 
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each state participating in the burden-sharing scheme, or of a global mediating 
institution. Secondly, without an international overseeing authority that functions 
between states it is not possible to establish an effectively functioning burden-sharing 
scheme. An international authority is necessary for the advancement of 
accountability, compliance, and transparency between states participating in the 
scheme.206 
 
In his article, Schuck suggests that an international agency similar to the UNHCR 
might be established to oversee the tradable quota scheme. While the UNHCR 
currently functions as an agency that assigns refugee status to a number of asylum 
applicants and also helps to distribute these recognised Convention refugees to what 
are sometimes called ‘the quota countries’ (being the countries that accept a quota of 
the UNHCR recognised refugees), its functions could be expanded in the tradable 
burden-sharing scheme. The established international mediating institution may be 
said to have four central functions in the implementation of the tradable quota 
scheme. The first role of the agency is to oversee the refugee status determination 
processes. There is a need for advancing transparency and trust within the status 
determination process of each member country through international oversight.207 
The second role of the international agency is to oversee that the market functions as 
it is supposed to. This means at least disseminating information about market 
transactions.208 The third role of the agency is to oversee that each participating state 
complies with the requirements of refugee protection that the assigned quota sets for 
the state, and the fourth role is to function as the mediator in cases of conflict 
between the member states. 
 
It is centrally the third characteristic – the market for buying and selling quotas – that 
separates the tradable quota scheme from other burden-sharing schemes. The idea of 
a tradable quota scheme can be understood as a synthesis of two stand-alone burden-

206 There are, of course, issues of legitimacy that need to be answered in the establishment of an 
international overseeing authority. But this is an issue that is faced in any comprehensive burden-
sharing scheme, and it is in no particular way related to the tradable quota scheme. Thus, I will leave 
here aside its closer examination. 
207 In fact, a case might be made for letting the international agency have control over the status 
determination processes altogether. 
208 Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 288. 
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sharing schemes. The first scheme it includes elements from is called the ‘physical 
burden-sharing scheme’. 209  In the physical burden-sharing scheme refugees are 
distributed between territorial states in such a way that each state capable of 
accommodating refugees will have to bear their fair share of the overall physical 
burden.210 Put differently, in the physical burden-sharing scheme fair accommodation 
quotas are established for each state capable of protecting bearers of the right to 
asylum. How exactly the quotas should be established in such a way that it is fair for 
all states capable of accommodating refugees is a fairly complex question. For the 
purposes of the current chapter, I will assume that fair physical accommodation 
quotas can be established for each state participating the scheme.211 
 
The implementation of a physical burden-sharing scheme also requires a 
collectivised status-determination process. The collectivised status determination 
process is essentially a system in which asylum seekers apply for asylum from the 
collective of states constituting the burden-sharing scheme. When an asylum seeker 
arrives in a particular state and enters the status determination process, she is 
claiming to be recognised in one of the eventually distributable quotas, and to be one 
of the persons provided asylum in one of the states that is a member of the scheme.212 
 

209 Physical burden-sharing efforts were made for example during the Yugoslavian war in Europe. See 
Suhrke, ‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies’, 408-412.  
210 It should be pointed out that there is also a possibility that some states comprising bearers of 
imperfect duties are not capable of physically accommodating bearers of the right to asylum, but they 
are nevertheless capable of assisting in the protection of the right-bearers in other ways, say by 
offering monetary assistance. This entails that in some cases it may be necessary to complement a 
physical burden-sharing scheme with a compensatory scheme. The complementary compensatory 
scheme can take a fair amount of resources from the states capable of assisting but not 
accommodating refugees, and these resources can be used to bring down the overall costs of the 
physical burden-sharing scheme in a way that is fair to all member states in the scheme. 
211 Many migration experts have suggested that the establishment of fair physical quotas between 
countries starts from such criteria as national wealth and population density. On the establishment of 
physical accommodation quotas, see also Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 279-282; Suhrke, 
‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies’, 397. Suhrke notes that legal scholars started to outline 
proposals for burden-sharing in refugee protection during the late 1970’s, and in these proposals 
population density and national wealth constitutes the central criteria with which shares of burden are 
determined. It should be pointed out, however, that it seems that also such things as prospective 
population growth, naturally occurring resources within a territory, landscape, and general climatic 
conditions are among additional factors that should be taken into consideration in a fair establishment 
of physical accommodation quotas.  
212 On the establishment of a collectivised status determination process, see Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-
Sharing’, 277-279. 
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States engaging in the status-determination of asylum seekers on their territories are 
not trying to determine whether or not asylum seekers have a valid claim to asylum 
in that particular country, but instead whether the asylum seekers have a valid claim 
to be recognised in one of the eventually distributable quotas. In other words, each 
state is engaging in the refugee status-determination processes on behalf of the 
collective of states they represent. The implementation of collectivised status-
determination processes and the establishment of fair quotas of refugees to each state 
entails that whatever the outcome of a status determination process in a particular 
state, the state is not required to physically accommodate all bona fide refugees.213 
The physical burden-sharing scheme entails a noticeable shift from the current 
refugee protection regime, as it means the abandonment of the non-refoulement 
principle as the central mechanism with which refugees are distributed between 
states. While the non-refoulement obligation still applies to each state in the physical 
burden-sharing scheme, it is not the primary mechanism for distributing refugees to 
their final places of asylum. 
 
The tradable quota scheme takes as its starting-point the physical burden-sharing 
scheme. The tradable quota scheme aims to provide a comprehensive alternative to 
the current refugee regime just as the physical burden-sharing scheme does. As in the 
physical burden-sharing scheme, in the tradable quota scheme states are allocated 
(fairly established) quotas of refugees which they are obligated to accommodate. 
Thus, as in the physical burden-sharing scheme also in the tradable quota scheme the 
country of first asylum is not necessarily the final place for asylum. Instead, refugees 
claim asylum from the broader collective, and become part of the physical quotas 
that are allocated between the member states. But there are also important differences 
in the two schemes. The tradable quota scheme expands from the ‘rigid’ physical 
burden-sharing scheme, which leaves no options beyond the allocation of refugee 
quotas. In contrast to the physical burden-sharing scheme, in the tradable quota 

213 In order for a quota system to be fair to the recipient states, there is a need to distinguish between 
temporary and permanent needs of protection. In other words, quotas of refugees who in all likelihood 
will need a permanent asylum are recognised as one category and the temporary quotas as another 
category. It should be pointed out that this is not, in the end, an uncomplicated task, as an accurate 
establishment of the two categories will require not only determining the temporal point after which it 
is unjust to repatriate an asylum claimant, but also the prospects of a change in circumstances at the 
country of departure. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 277-278.   
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scheme the obligations to accommodate refugee quotas may be renegotiated between 
states after their initial allocation. 
 
This brings us to the second scheme from which the tradable quota scheme contains 
elements, the ‘compensatory scheme’. As a stand-alone scheme the compensatory 
scheme includes a more modest shift from the current refugee protection paradigm 
than the physical burden-sharing scheme or the tradable quota scheme. In the 
compensatory scheme the primary mechanism of allocating refugees to their final 
places of asylum is still the non-refoulement principle, and the scheme proposes only 
financial compensations to first asylum states. By its generic structure, the tradable 
quota scheme may be understood as a ‘compensatory extension’ of the physical 
burden-sharing scheme. Like the compensatory scheme, the tradable quota scheme 
allows the possibility of compensation between states. The renegotiation of refugee 
quotas in the tradable quota scheme essentially means that states can engage with 
each other in a designated market, and deliberate on the final form of discharging 
their citizens’ duties. In other words, contrary to the physical burden-sharing scheme, 
the tradable quota scheme allows states to buy and sell refugee quotas between each 
other after their initial allocation.214 This effectively means that some states can – if 
willing – accommodate more than the share of refugees they are assigned to under 
the initial fair allocation. But contrary to the compensatory scheme, a failure to come 
into an agreement on compensations does not entail a requirement for any state to 
physically accommodate more than their fair share of refugees. If the trade 
negotiations do not result in mutual agreements between states, then each 
participating state is obligated to accommodate the refugee quota that was initially 






214 On Schuck’s account the payments in the market take the form of cash, but he also recognises the 
possibility of expanding the payment options to ‘credit, development assistance, technical advice, 
weapons, political support, or some combination of these’. Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing’, 283-
284. The form of payment is in itself a moral issue, which I will not engage with further here.  
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5.2 The moral dimensions of the tradable quota scheme 
But is the attempt to combine the two stand-alone schemes successful from the 
perspective of justice? Should we accept that the tradable quota scheme constitutes 
an appealing proposal on the institutionalisation of the moral right to asylum? There 
are two possible ways to approach the ethical dimensions of the tradable quota 
scheme. Firstly, the scheme may be examined with respect to its internal 
components. Whether the scheme can be considered as an appealing burden-sharing 
proposal depends partly on whether or not some of its internal components are 
directly at odds with other considerations of justice. If the tradable quota scheme 
violates some requirements of justice then the proposal is intrinsically flawed and 
should be abandoned. Some critics of the tradable quota scheme have suggested that 
this is in fact the case, and that there is no need to look beyond the intrinsic elements 
of the scheme for its rejection. Apart from the intrinsic qualities of its components, 
the moral nature of the scheme may be examined from a comparative perspective. 
On this approach, the final moral appeal of the tradable quota scheme depends on 
how we rank it in relation to other potential institutional schemes. If we conclude that 
other schemes are morally more appealing alternatives, this can lead us to reject the 
tradable quota scheme as the institutional framework of the moral refugee regime.  
 
In the current chapter I will centrally focus on the first approach and proceed in the 
following way. I will examine three moral objections against the internal components 
of the scheme. These objections may be called the ‘preference objection’, the 
‘dignity objection’, and the ‘exploitation objection’. The first objection suggests that 
the tradable quota scheme is problematic as it gives insufficient attention to refugees’ 
desires regarding the final country in which asylum is provided. The second 
objection claims that the scheme demeans refugees and violates their dignity. The 
final objection asserts that the scheme will lead to exploitation of the developing 
countries by the more affluent developed countries. Each of these objections consists 
of an attempt to show that there is no need to turn to comparative evaluation of the 
tradable quota scheme as it collapses due to problems in its intrinsic components. I 
will suggest that none of these objections proves to be detrimental to the scheme. 
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Finally, I will turn to some considerations regarding the comparative moral appeal of 
the tradable quota scheme. 
 
5.2.1 The preference objection 
One immediate concern that arises in the tradable quota scheme is the attention, or 
rather the lack of attention, the scheme gives to refugees’ desires regarding their final 
place of asylum. This concern may be formulated into a moral objection against the 
scheme in the following way: ‘As the tradable quota scheme indifferently distributes 
refugees through market mechanisms to different countries, the scheme treats 
refugees unjustly’. The preference objection correctly claims that the tradable quota 
scheme does not give refugees the power of decision over their final locations of 
asylum. Instead, this will be decided by the initial distribution of physical quotas and 
the market transactions that may possibly follow. But does this constitute a problem 
for the scheme? Should we conclude that the scheme treats refugees unjustly when 
accommodating them into states where they do not necessarily desire to be 
accommodated? 
 
In the end the preference objection fails to provide sufficiently strong reasons for 
abandoning the tradable quota scheme. It does not directly follow from the fact that 
refugees have a desire to be accommodated in particular states that the international 
community has an obligation of justice to arrange the global refugee regime in such a 
way that it takes into consideration refugees’ desires. The central problem in the 
preference objection is that it fails to take into consideration exactly what kind of 
claim the claim to asylum is. As was pointed out in the second chapter, the moral 
claim to asylum may be understood as a derivative claim which all persons have 
against the international community at large instead of against any state in particular, 
and it receives its moral weight from the more fundamental idea of basic needs. In 
the establishment of the global refugee regime states, which function as 
representatives of their duty-bearing citizens, may deliberate on how exactly to 
organise the institutions for the protection the general claim to asylum. All persons 
with the capacity to assist hold the responsibility of refugee protection jointly and 
they are collectively entitled to organise the efforts of assistance as they wish on the 
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condition that the joint effort effectively remedies the existing deprivations of basic 
needs, and that no other requirements of justice are violated in the process. 
 
A desire-satisfaction may simultaneously entail the satisfaction of a basic need, but 
does not necessarily do so. Conversely, the satisfaction of a basic need may entail a 
desire-satisfaction, but this does not necessarily have to be the case.215  In other 
words, while desires and basic needs may coincide, desires can also be 
manifestations of something less fundamental than basic needs.216 The idea of basic 
needs carries with it much greater general normative force than the idea of desires, as 
it represents urgent needs of a person regardless of the person’s background culture. 
It is these urgent needs which constitute the justificatory foundation for the moral 
right to asylum. When refugees have a desire to be accommodated into a particular 
country, but this desire is not backed with basic needs, it may not be said that they 
have a claim to be accommodated in their preferred countries.  
 
Desires alone are insufficiently weighty to create a special claim to be 
accommodated in a particular country. Refugee protection is essentially about 
satisfying claims to a certain threshold level of well-being, i.e., the level of basic 
needs, and in this aim desires qua desires do not constitute an overriding 
consideration of justice. If this conclusion is correct, the preference objection fails to 
show that there is something intrinsically problematic in the components of the 
tradable quota scheme. Put differently, in order to defend a claim according to which 
refugees have a moral right to be accommodated in the countries of their preference 
there is a need to expand the justificatory foundation of the right to asylum to less 
urgent desires. It would require showing that there is not only a right to the 

215 See Peter Jones, Rights (London: MacMillan, 1994), 149. 
216 It is worth noting that the disregard of refugees’ preferences is not strictly limited to the physical 
burden-sharing scheme and the tradable quota scheme. In the compensatory scheme, the asylum will 
be provided by the state which right-bearing asylum seekers are able to reach within the limits of the 
application of the non-refoulement principle. The right-bearers may not be able to reach the state 
ranking highest on their personal preference, but instead the first-asylum state may be only second-
best, third-best, or rank extremely low on the ordering of preference. 
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protection of basic needs, but also a right to preference satisfaction more 
generally.217 
 
What about the issue of family unification more specifically? Should we consider 
that bearers of the right to asylum have a claim to be accommodated in a particular 
country due to the fact that they have immediate family in the country?218 The desire 
to be unified with one’s immediate family is surely an important one, but it has not 
been accepted unquestionably that the need for family unity is fundamental enough 
to amount to a basic need. A desire to be unified with one’s immediate family surely 
represents a need that may even be considered to be universal, but for example 
Matthew Gibney claims that any moral claim of a person aiming to be united with 
their families ‘lacks the force – the necessity – that lies behind the claim for entry of 
the refugee’.219  
 
One possible way of tackling the issue of family unification is by attempting to show 
that it does not fall within the scope of basic needs, and that it therefore does not 
constitute a problem to the tradable quota scheme. Here, however, I will not try to 
follow this router of argumentation, as I wish to outline a stronger defence of the 
tradable quota scheme. For the sake of argument, let us assume that family unity is in 
fact a basic need, and that there is a strong moral claim for all refugees to be united 
with their families wherever they are. How would this affect the tradable quota 
scheme? 
 
To an extent, the matter of family unification can be addressed in the tradable quota 
scheme. This is the case especially when family members seek to be united within a 
limited timeframe after the first asylum application, or the initially accommodated 

217 See also Joseph Carens, ‘The Philosopher and the Policymaker: Two Perspectives on the Ethics of 
Immigration with Special Attention to the Problem of Restricting Asylum’, in Martin Hailbronner, 
David A. Martin and Hiroshi Motomura (eds.), Immigration Admissions (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1997), 37. Carens rightly points out that ‘from a moral perspective, refugees are entitled to 
safety and basic provisions for their well-being, not a choice of where these needs will be met’. 
218 Bernard Williams, for example, calls close relationships to others as ‘ground projects’ that are 
central to a person’s character, integrity, and a flourishing life. Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character 
and Morality’, in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-19.  
219 Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum – Liberal Democracy and the Response to 
Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 243. 
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family members have not been accommodated in a country of asylum for a long 
period of time. It does not seem to be an insurmountable obstacle in the tradable 
quota scheme to take into consideration in many cases the refugees’ desire to be 
granted asylum in the same state as his or her core family. Core families may be 
treated in the scheme as unbreakable units that are included in a particular larger 
quota that is allocated to a particular state. When this is not a possibility, the tradable 
quota scheme can be complemented with a compensatory scheme. A complementary 
compensatory scheme can address the circumstances of those persons who cannot be 
integrated as unbreakable units to a particular larger quota. But it is important to 
recognise that this concession towards the compensatory scheme does not prove to 
be detrimental to the tradable quota scheme as a whole. The narrowing of the scope 
of the tradable quota scheme does not directly show that the scheme’s internal 
components are somehow morally problematic. It only shows that the scope of the 
scheme has to be limited to particular cases. The tradable quota scheme may still 
serve as a mediating institution dedicated to advance the protection of the right to 
asylum.  
 
5.2.2 The dignity objection 
The second moral objection against the tradable quota scheme examined here may be 
called the ‘dignity objection’. Matthew Gibney sketches this line of criticism, 
claiming that the scheme violates refugees’ dignity, and therefore it should be 
rejected as the more specific institutional model of the refugee regime.220 The idea of 
dignity has received much focus in debates on human rights, and its historical origins 
can be traced back to religious debates on the status of man as a creation of God. 
Some theorists hold that dignity constitutes a source of human rights, whereas others 
appeal to it as a telos of human rights.221 The concept of dignity has also a visible 
role in many international human rights documents. The UDHR Preamble famously 
begins with the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 

220  Matthew Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered regionalism, and Justice between States’, in 
Susan Kneebone & Felicity Rawlings-Sanei (eds.), New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges 
Ahead (Oxford: Berghahn Press, 2008), 72-74. 
221 On the ‘dual’ idea of dignity, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights’, Tanner Lectures 
(2009), 5. Available online:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461220#%23 
(accessed 19.07.11) 
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rights of all members of the human family’, and the Preamble of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the rights recognised in the 
Covenant ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.  
 
The other side of the coin is that there is no a single agreed-upon conception of 
dignity. It is often used as a vague term without further explanation of what exactly it 
means and whence exactly it derives its value. If appeals to dignity are made without 
specifying further the idea of ‘inherent dignity of human persons’, it seems that the 
more specific moral arguments derived from this foundation remain hollow. One 
way to counter the dignity objection against the tradable quota scheme is to follow 
the critics who claim that the concept of dignity is too vague to carry any moral 
weight with it. If the concept on which the objection is founded can be shown to be 
problematic, then the whole objection may be said to fail. The criticism of dignity as 
an excessively vague concept is already apparent in Schopenhauer’s writings. In his 
criticism of Kant’s account of dignity Schopenhauer claims:  
 
‘But that expression, dignity of man, once uttered by Kant, afterward 
became the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists who 
concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of any real basis of 
moral, or at any rate, of one that had any meaning.222 
 
Modern critics of the concept have been most vocal in the context of medical ethics. 
The central targets of these critics have been the Catholics who appeal to the moral 
value of dignity when arguing against abortion and stem-cell research. One critic of 
the moral concept of dignity, Stephen Pinker, contends that ‘dignity is a squishy, 
subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it’.223 
Another critic, Ruth Mackie, suggests similarly that dignity is a ‘useless’ and 
‘hopelessly vague’ concept. 224  While this line of defence of the tradable quota 
scheme against the dignity objection seems appealing, I will not rely on it being 
successful. Instead, I wish to outline a stronger defence of the scheme, and claim that 

222 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basic of Morality, (transl.) E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
1995), 100. The same passage also appears in Christopher MacCrudden’s enquiry on the concept of 
dignity. Christopher MacCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, The 
European Journal of International Law, 19 (2008), 661. 
223 Stephen Pinker, ‘Stupidity of Dignity’, The New Republic, 238 (2008), 28-31.  
224 Ruth Mackie, ‘Dignity is a useless concept’, British Medical Journal, 327 (2003), 1419-1420. 
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even if we hold that the concept of dignity adds something valuable to the moral 
debate, the objection nevertheless fails to undermine the moral appeal of the tradable 
quota scheme. 
 
This way of answering the dignity objection requires clarifying more closely the 
content of the elusive concept at hand. How should we understand the concept of 
dignity? Different theorists have outlined numerous competing conceptions of it, and 
it would be excessively burdensome to examine the normative dimensions of the 
tradable quota scheme from the perspective of each different conception. In order to 
tackle the dignity objection on its own terms, I will rely on some generalisations of 
the concept. Centrally, the idea of ‘inherent dignity of persons’ refers to something 
that is not acquired through one’s action, but instead is already within a person by 
virtue of his or her humanity. In other words, a person’s dignity is not dependent on 
social standing or individual merit.  
 
In a more specific sense dignity might be understood for example as a ‘status’ or 
‘rank’. Jeremy Waldron has outlined this type of interpretation of the concept of 
dignity. In ancient Rome the concept dignitas referred to the ‘elevated’ position of a 
small ruling class. But on Waldron’s view, the ‘rank of dignity’ is something 
attached intrinsically to each human person: ‘every man is a duke or a queen’, and 
‘everyone’s person and body is sacrosanct, in the way that nobles were entitled to 
deference or in the way that an assault upon the body or the person of a king was 
regarded as a sacrilege’.225 Another specific way of understanding the general idea of 
inherent dignity of persons is to see persons as something ‘non-fungible’. This is for 
example how dignity seems to appear in Kant’s famous view of it. 226  In The 




225 Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights’, 30.  
226 On this ‘standard’ interpretation of Kant’s idea of dignity, the concept of dignity refers to a non-
relational value of persons. Some theorists, however, are sceptical of this interpretation of Kant, and 
argue instead that Kant’s concept of dignity should be understood as a ‘relational property’. See 
Oliver Sensen, ‘Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity’, Kant-Studien, 100 (2009), 309-331.  
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‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What 
has a price can be replaced by something else as equivalent. Whatever by 
contrast is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent has a 
dignity.’227 
 
With regard to the concept of dignity, Gibney seems to have in mind something 
similar to the conceptions suggested by Kant and Waldron. Refugees should be 
accorded a dignified rank of persons, and they should not be treated as commodities. 
Gibney starts off with a claim according to which the tradable quota scheme is 
morally objectionable because it attaches negative value to refugees. He contends 
that trading of refugees entails that they are treated akin to ‘toxic waste’, i.e., as 
unwanted burden that some states may attempt to avoid by offering monetary 
compensation to other states. Gibney argues that in the case of waste as well as in the 
case of tradable refugee quotas ‘the good in question is really a ‘bad’, something 
possessing a negative value’.228 This can be interpreted as a claim that the tradable 
quota scheme treats refugees as something less than their inherent status or rank. 
Therefore, the scheme violates refugees’ inherent dignity as persons. 
 
It is questionable in the first place that the implementation of the tradable quota 
scheme entails that refugees are considered to be of negative value. The question 
here is about the institutionalisation of rights protection, and to recognise refugees as 
right-bearers means that they are accepted to have certain positive inherent value. 
But for the sake of argument, let us accept Gibney’s claim, and grant that the tradable 
quota scheme in fact attaches negative value to refugees. Regardless of this 
concession, there are strong reasons to be sceptical of the conclusion that the 
negative valuation of refugees somehow proves to be detrimental to the tradable 
quota scheme in particular. As far as the claim about negative valuation of refugees 
is concerned, all burden-sharing schemes stand or fall together. The tradable quota 
scheme assigns a particular starting quota for each state, and this quota depends on 
the proportional requirements set for each state. But all burden-sharing schemes start 
from a similar position. The compensatory scheme as well as the physical burden-
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227 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, (transl.) Arnulf Zweig, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 235. 
228 Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered regionalism, and Justice between States’, 72. 
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sharing scheme recognises that there is a ‘burden’ to be shared by the states, and a 
moral requirement for each state to bear their proportional share of it. In burden-
sharing the question is about obligations, and in contrast to rights more often than not 
it is the case that they are considered as something that an agent would rather be 
exempted from. 
 
This response does not, however, yet fully vindicate the tradable quota scheme from 
the dignity objection. It might still be argued that even if we leave aside the question 
of negative valuation of refugees, there is something particularly sinister about the 
tradable quota scheme as it involves ‘trading of refugees’. This seems to be one of 
Gibney’s worries in his criticism of the scheme. As the passage quoted above from 
Kant clearly suggests, setting a price on a person violates the person’s dignity. On 
these grounds, it might be argued that the tradable quota scheme violates refugees’ 
dignity. What should we make of this argument?  
 
Even if there is a price attached to refugees in the scheme, we should be sceptical of 
the conclusion that this violates refugees’ dignity. In the end it is not evident that the 
‘price’ Kant refers to denotes a similar idea of price as that in the tradable quota 
scheme. One interpretation of Kant’s idea of dignity is that it entails a requirement 
not to trade persons against each other. If this interpretation, which is suggested by 
Waldron among others, is correct, it is not the case that the scheme violates refugees’ 
dignity. Waldron suggests that the Kantian idea of dignity should be understood 
primarily as a reference to the ‘simple conception of human worth precluding trade-
offs’. He refers to an often-cited German Constitutional Court case as an example of 
the rejection of such trade-offs. In a well-known case, the German court rejected the 
permissability of the military to shoot down airliners hijacked by terrorists. In its 
decision the court appealed to the concept of human dignity, which is outlined in 
Article 1 of the German Basic Law, and stated that ‘human dignity enjoys the same 
constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the physical existence of the 
individual human being’.229  
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229 Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights’, 18. Also Jürgen Habermas gives the German Constitutional 
Court case as an example of Kantian dignity. He notes that ‘an echo of Kant’s categorical imperative 
is unmistakable in these words of the Court. The respect for the dignity of every person forbids the 
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The court decision may be interpreted as a claim that human dignity prevents the 
utilitarian calculus which would set a price on those on board a hijacked plane and 
lead to a possibility of evaluating whether they can be traded against other lives on 
the ground. The price in the tradable quota scheme differs from this idea of price, as 
it does not represent a currency with which individuals can be traded against each 
other. The organisation of states for a remedial response through the trading scheme 
has no impact on the quality of protection accorded to each refugee, and this applies 
regardless of the price that will eventually be set on a particular traded quota. 
Regardless of whether a quota to which a refugee belongs is traded between two 
countries, the refugee will be entitled to the same minimum level of well-being. This 
argument supports the conclusion that quota trading does not undermine the value of 
refugees as Kantian ends. By virtue of their humanity refugees have a claim to be 
provided with certain protections by the international community and not to be 
traded against each other. In other words, instead of understanding the scheme as 
something that aims to treat refugees as simply means, we should rather interpret it 
as an effort by all member states to restore for each person circumstances where they 
can be in a position of an end. 
 
Gibney outlines one more argument against the tradable quota scheme on the 
grounds of dignity, and this argument refers to the idea of dignity as a rank or status 
of each person regardless of their race, religion, gender, or nationality. Gibney claims 
that when one state considers some groups of refugees as less desirable than other 
groups, and as a consequence attempts to purchase the physical accommodation of 
these refugee groups from other states, the ‘traded’ refugees are humiliated as a 
consequence. He gives the examples of U.S. and France, both of which might be 
willing to pay other states to accept asylum claimants with certain characteristics in 
the tradable quota scheme. While the U.S. might be willing to accept its allocation of 
Cuban refugees, it might also attempt to buy its way out of accommodating refugees 
from Haiti. France may similarly want to pay other countries to take in Muslim 
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state to dispose of any individual merely as a means to another end’. Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept 
of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’, Metaphilosophy, 41 (2010), 465. 
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refugees, and prefer to accommodate Christian refugees.230 Gibney argues that ‘there 
is something uniquely dubious about a market that registers in price terms how much 
states don’t want particular groups of refugees’, and concludes that negative 
valuations of particular refugees can go ‘to the core of personal identity’ and may 
result in ‘long-lasting feelings of resentment and humiliation’.231 The absence of 
humiliation is an important matter, and if the internal components of the tradable 
quota scheme may be said to humiliate particular groups of refugees, it can also be 
said to be morally problematic.232  
 
One way to respond to Gibney’s objection is by showing that his concerns can be 
addressed in the initial quota formation. This reply suggests that the quotas should be 
formulated in such a way that they are representative of the plurality of refugee 
backgrounds. The world’s refugees come from many different countries, represent 
many different religions, and are forced to seek asylum for a variety of reasons. To 
quell Gibney’s concerns, attempts could be made to compose the quotas in such a 
way that they consisted proportionally of Cuban, Haitian, Muslim, and Christian 
refugees. But apart from being a fairly complicated system of quota establishment in 
practice, there is always a possibility that these types of ‘adjusted quotas’ cannot be 
established. There may be circumstances in which the quotas will have to be 
composed disproportionately or completely of refugees with a particular background. 
Therefore, this reply does not fully address the concerns Gibney raises. 
 
Another possible answer to Gibney’s objection is the introduction of a non-
discrimination clause requiring states to refrain from engaging in discriminatory 
trading practices. In other words, the tradable quota scheme could be established in 
such a way that the more particular regulations are designed to take into 
consideration the possibility of discriminatory trading practices. As was pointed out 
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230 Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered regionalism, and Justice between States’, 73. 
231 Ibid. 
232 It is worth noting that some theorists question the close link between the concept of humiliation 
and the concept of dignity. Daniel Statman, for example, argues that ‘tying the concept of humiliation 
to that of human dignity makes the former too philosophical and too detached from psychological 
research and theory’. Daniel Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity, and Self-Respect’, in David Kretzmer 
and Eckart Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 209. This separation of concepts, if considered as valid, does not in any way 
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earlier, in order for any burden-sharing scheme to function effectively there is a need 
to establish administrative institutions that advance transparency, accountability, and 
compliance. The institutions established to administer the trading between states 
could also be dedicated to oversee compliance with the non-discrimination clause. 
One practical way to operate a trading regime dedicated to uphold non-
discrimination clause would be to establish the quotas as ‘blind’ quotas, and then 
allow states to trade quotas of refugees the background of whom they do not know. 
 
But in the end, it is questionable whether there is a need to rely on the introduction of 
the non-discrimination clause at all to address Gibney’s objection. In his account of 
humiliation – to which Gibney also refers – Avishai Margalit suggests that in the 
normative sense we should understand humiliation as ‘any sort of behavior or 
condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-
respect injured’.233 Then the question becomes, what constitutes a sound reason for a 
person to consider his or her self-respect injured. One reason might be that a person 
be subjected to treatment in which the inherent rank or status accorded to all persons 
regardless of their background is not recognised.234 
 
But does it amount to humiliation of refugees if a state ranks a particular group of 
refugees as less desirable than some other group and attempts to purchase the 
accommodation of its quota from some other state?235 What is it specifically in a 
preference-ranked trading that amounts to humiliation? Surely it is not the very 
existence of preference-rankings. If this were the case, it would entail that all social 
groups that are not considered to be of equal value by other social groups would have 
a sound reason to be humiliated.236 What is important to recognise here is that the 
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233 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 9.  
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existence of a preference-ranking regarding the desirability of different refugee 
groups does not have any practical impact on the protection they are entitled to by 
the virtue of being bearers of the right to asylum. When entering the scheme each 
complying state recognises the inherent dignity of each refugee as a person 
regardless of her country of origin, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation, 
and they are committed to providing – in one state or another – asylum to all 
refugees assigned to their quotas.  
 
Put differently, equal respect is embodied in the commitment of each state to provide 
protection of the right to asylum to all eligible persons regardless of their 
background. It is not as if countries are committed to lesser protection of those 
refugees who they may consider less desirable than other refugee groups whose 
accommodation they may wish to purchase from other countries. There is no 
institutionalised bias against refugees with particular backgrounds in the tradable 
quota scheme. As the scheme guarantees equal protection of the right to asylum to all 
right-bearers, and as there is a common acceptance within the scheme that the 
preference-rankings of each particular country regarding the desirability of particular 
refugee groups ought not to have impact on global refugee protection, it may 
reasonably be asked whether refugees have a sound reason to be humiliated by 
preference-ranked trading practices. Regardless of their background, refugees can 
unapologetically make demands from each state in the scheme, and insist without 
embarrassment or shame on their equal claim to asylum.237 They stand in the scheme 
as persons with a recognised equal rank, and the preference-rankings of particular 
states regarding the relative appeal of different refugee groups does not undermine 
this rank of dignity in any way. 
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 5.2.3 The exploitation objection 
The first two objections focused on the position refugees have in the tradable quota 
scheme. The final moral objection against the scheme examined here focuses on the 
interrelations between the trading states. This objection claims that although aiming 
towards burden-sharing between states, the tradable quota scheme leads to the 
exploitation of the less affluent countries by the more affluent states. In his analysis 
Gibney suggests that this objection might prove to be insurmountable to the tradable 
quota scheme, but in the end he stops short of examining it in more detailed way.238 
Here, I will try to fill in the blanks for Gibney, and see whether this type of objection 
provides sufficiently strong moral reason to abandon the tradable quota scheme. 
 
The objection might be formulated in the following way: due to their affluence and 
superior purchasing power the affluent states are in a strong position to buy their way 
out of obligations to physically accommodate refugees within a tradable quota 
scheme. As the actual costs of providing asylum in the developing countries are a 
fraction of what they are in the more developed countries, this means that it would be 
less costly for the affluent states to pay for the same absolute level of well-being for 
their quota of refugees in the developing countries than it would be for them to 
physically accommodate their quotas. Conversely, due to their weak bargaining 
positions and low general levels of well-being developing countries are in a 
desperate situation to accept any even seemingly beneficial trading of quotas. 
Therefore, the argument goes, the affluent states are able to effectively opt out of the 
provision of asylum by exploiting developing countries as ‘refugee accommodating 
factories’. 
 
This objection does not suggest that the trading of quotas per se is problematic, but 
rather that the trading between countries is problematic when it involves the moral 
wrong of exploitation. In order for us to be in a position to conclude whether or not 
this objection is actually valid, and whether or not the tradable quota scheme in fact 
leads to exploitation of some countries, there is a need to consider the concept of 
exploitation more closely. Without a clearer idea of exploitation it is not possible to 
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conclude the argument either way. So what exactly does it mean to say that someone 
is exploited by someone else? As was the case with the concept of dignity examined 
in the previous section, the concept of exploitation is likewise a controversial and 
elusive one. One general way to understand exploitation is to hold that exploitation 
happens when ‘an agent A is taking advantage of agent B unfairly’. But from this 
general definition it is hard to conclude with greater clarity what it means for an 
agent to be exploited. After all, there is an appeal to another famously elusive 
concept in this general definition: fairness. Richard Arneson’s depiction captures 
well the burdensome nature of the analysis of the concept of exploitation: there will 
‘be as many competing conceptions of exploitation as theories of what persons owe 
to each other by way of fair treatment’.239 
 
As the question here is primarily about whether the developed countries take unfair 
advantage of the developing countries when engaging in quota trading with them, the 
enquiry into exploitation can be limited to the question of transactions that occur 
between the parties when the trading of quotas takes place. Under what 
circumstances can the quota transactions be said to be exploitative? The first element 
of any exploitative transaction is the occurring of benefits. If a transaction between 
two agents harms one agent, and does not benefit the other agent at all, we might call 
the transaction ‘oppressive’ or ‘coercive’, but it does not seem to constitute the same 
kind of moral wrong as exploitation. So the question about unfair transactions is 
related to the possible benefits received by the developed countries in the trading of 
quotas. As it can be the case that some states are able to purchase the quota 
accommodation from other countries for an amount less than the comparable costs of 
physical accommodation, it may be argued that at the very least the first condition of 
exploitation is met in the tradable quota scheme: the developed countries would seem 
to be gaining some benefit.  
 
But to benefit from a transaction is not the same as engaging in an exploitative 
transaction. In an exploitative transaction the exploiter benefits unfairly from the 

239  Richard Arneson, ‘Exploitation’, in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Ethics (London: Routledge, 2001), 350.  
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transaction. Then the question becomes, how can we conclude whether quota 
transactions unfairly benefit a developed country? There seem to be two more 
general ways to approach the issue. The first way is to focus on the fairness of the 
transaction process. If it is concluded that the transaction process between countries 
is somehow unfair, then it can also be concluded that the outcome of the quota 
transaction process is exploitative. One central way in which the process may be said 
to be unfair is if it involves coercion.240 If a developed country makes a coercive 
offer to a developing country with respect to a refugee quota and benefits from the 
following transaction, this process amounts to ‘taking advantage of a weaker country 
unfairly’. 
 
But once we look at what is at stake for states if they fail to come into agreement 
regarding quota trading, it is not directly clear that in the scheme the less affluent 
countries are in a position to be subjected to coercive trading offers. One generally 
recognised feature of a coercive offer is the level of desperation of the party to which 
the offer is made.241 But the quota system evades the issue of severely desperate 
trading partners, as states are obligated to participate in the scheme only if they have 
not sufficiently discharged their citizens’ duties of assistance. Even if we accept that 
the duties of assistance corresponding the right to asylum are extremely stringent242, 
it is still the case that there would be no obligation for those states to participate in 
the scheme that are not able to sufficiently protect their citizens’ basic needs. As I 
argued in chapter two, there is no obligation of justice to satisfy a person’s basic 
need if the efforts require harming the basic needs of other agents. The separateness 

240 What exactly it means to be ‘coerced’ is a broadly debated philosophical issue. On the coercion 
debate more closely see for example Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick 
Suppes and Morton White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1969); Virginia Held, ‘Coercion and Coercive Offers’, in Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman 
(eds.), Nomos XIV: Coercion (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972); Harry Frankfurt, ‘Coercion and 
Moral Responsibility”, in Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on the Freedom of Action (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd, 1973); Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
Here, I will stop short of providing a comprehensive account of coercion. This is centrally because, as 
I will shortly suggest, the international institutions overseeing the trade may be established in such a 
way that they invalidate the trade whenever there may be said to be ‘coercion’ involved. 
241 For example, in a life-threatening situation a potential rescuer may demand 99 per cent of the 
rescued person’s assets as compensation for nearly costless rescue. While the rescued person may be 
said to benefit from the transaction, it seems reasonable to suggest nevertheless that the rescuer 
wrongly exploited the unfortunate situation of a person and in fact made a ‘coercive offer’.  
242 In chapter six I will look more closely the question whether the duties corresponding to the right to 
asylum are extremely stringent.  
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of persons has to be taken into account when establishing the final scope of basic 
needs that matter from the perspective of justice. In other words, in the possible trade 
agreements it is not the basic needs of the citizens of any trading country that would 
be at stake. The states engaging in trading would be countries aiming to gain some 
benefits for their citizens beyond their basic needs, and to take advantage of other 
states’ desire to compensate for the accommodation of their quotas. 
 
It seems that it is in fact the developing countries rather than the developed countries 
that would be in a strong bargaining position in the quota trading market. The 
starting-position in the tradable quota scheme is physical burden-sharing, i.e., the 
failure to come into trade agreements entails that all states would be required to 
accommodate the physical quotas that were assigned to them in the initial allocation. 
The developing countries would be well aware that the failed negotiations entail that 
the developed countries would have to bear the burdens of physical accommodation 
– a scenario which many developed countries may desperately wish to avoid. The 
existing developed countries would presumably wish to trade quotas allocated to 
them which comprise persons with distinctively different cultural backgrounds and 
persons belonging to certain religions. Also, the developed countries would 
acknowledge that any successful trading at a cost lower than the cost of physical 
accommodation would benefit them. The developing countries, whose basic needs 
are not at stake, would be well aware of these factors, and they could use them as 
leverage in the negotiations. They could effectively sit back in the market 
negotiations and let the affluent countries compete with each other and offer trade 
proposals. If a developing country deemed that all of the proposed trade agreements 
offered insufficient benefits, by doing nothing it would only forgo the proposed 
benefits. On these grounds it may be reasonably asked which countries exactly would 
have the upper hand in the quota trading negotiations. 
 
At this point it might be replied that these observations do not form a sufficient 
guarantee against exploitation in the form of coercive trade agreements. In other 
words, it might be argued that this is all presumptive talk relying on empirical 
contingencies, and that there is still a possibility of cases where exploitation between 
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trading countries occur. But there is no need to rely strictly on the validity of 
previous arguments in order to vindicate the tradable quota scheme from the 
exploitation objection. There is a further consideration due to which we should be 
sceptical of the claim that the exploitation objection focusing on coercive offers 
succeeds to undermine the tradable quota scheme. This is centrally because the issue 
of coercive trading process may be addressed with the mediating institutions that 
would be part of the trading market. As was pointed out in the first section of the 
chapter, the implementation of any comprehensive burden-sharing scheme should be 
coupled with the establishment of an international authority overseeing 
accountability, compliance, and transparency. In the context of a tradable quota 
scheme this overseeing authority can be dedicated to consider also whether the quota 
trading is linked to coercive offers between countries. In cases where the offer is 
deemed coercive, the mediating institution could be authorised to invalidate the 
occurring trades. The authority of the administrative institution may be extended in 
such a way that it also considers trade agreements ex post, and takes into 
consideration the broader context of where the agreement has taken place. In other 
words, the overseeing authority could be set up to manage the trading in such a way 
that the issue of unfair trading processes may be precluded or remedied. 
 
Apart from the focus on the unfairness of the trading process, the exploitation 
objection might also be fleshed out by focusing on the unfairness of outcomes in the 
trade agreements. A critic taking this position might draw an analogy between 
sweatshops and the tradable quota scheme, and argue that the developed countries 
could exploit the developing countries by using their bargaining position to gain 
more than their fair share of benefits from the trading of quotas.243 On this account 
the occurring unfairness would consist of insufficient compensation being paid to the 
developing countries in the scheme.244 What is the force of this formulation of the 
exploitation objection?  

243  On sweatshops and exploitation, see for example Chris Meyers, ‘Wrongful Beneficence: 
Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 35 (2004); Robert Mayer, 
‘Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (2007a).   
244 Robert Mayer claims that in every form of exploitation the question is essentially about ‘a failure 
to benefit others as some norm of fairness requires’. He distinguishes between three classes of failure 
to benefit other agents: (1) not benefiting the victims at all, (2) not benefiting them sufficiently, and 
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The objection suggests that in order for the quota transaction to be non-exploitative, 
there is a requirement that all countries receive sufficient compensation for 
accommodation of other countries’ physical quotas. It is not, of course, an 
uncomplicated question what level of compensation allows us to conclude that no 
exploitation occurs in the outcome of quota trading. There are many ways to 
understand the concept of sufficient compensation, and in the end it is a highly 
politicised one.245  There are also many ways to approach the issue of sufficient 
compensation. 246  But in the end, the question of the appropriate framework for 
establishing an account of sufficient compensation does not have to be solved in 
order for us to be able to address the second formulation of the exploitation 
objection. 
 
The second formulation of the exploitation objection can be addressed in a similar 
fashion as the first formulation. The question of compensation does not have to be 
strictly a matter between two states, but rather it can be a matter of a larger global 
market system that includes regulatory mechanisms. Thus, whichever more specific 
account of sufficient compensation is accepted, the mechanisms of the tradable quota 
scheme may be arranged in such a way that it integrates the requirements of fair 
compensation in it. This requirement could be then overseen by the mediating trading 
authority, which can declare null all trade agreements that do not satisfy the 
requirement of fair compensation.  
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(3) not benefiting them authentically. The first class refers to free-riding, the second class for example 
to sweatshops, and the third class to prima facie benefits that are in fact harms, e.g., selling drugs to a 
junkie. See Robert Mayer, ‘What’s Wrong with Exploitation’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27 
(2007b), 142.  
245 Among possible theories on the grounds of which an account of sufficient compensation might be 
established are; a neoclassical view, which determines sufficient compensation in relation to market 
equilibrium; ‘a fair trade view’, which focuses on a particular outcome in relation to the trading 
agent’s well-being; a Marxist view, which requires that the compensation should be set to such a level 
that it leaves no benefit for the capitalist. 
246 One possible way to examine the level of fair compensation is with the veil of ignorance. We can 
imagine a deliberation behind the veil of ignorance on the general rules of compensation. Then, on 
this approach, a fair compensation would be one which all reasonable parties, without knowing 
whether their home country is a developing country or a developed country, would agree upon. See 
John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999a), 118-123. 
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Even Marxist concerns about sufficient compensation – if considered valid – could 
be accommodated into the tradable quota scheme. On Marxist grounds it might be 
argued that any trading below the costs of accommodation to the developed country 
would be exploitative to the developing country because it can be equated with 
‘working for a capitalist’. 247  Even if we accepted that this claim represents an 
appropriate analogy, which in itself is questionable, there is no principled reason why 
we could not conclude that the trade may be limited to a price that would reflect the 
burdens of accommodation for the country to which the quota has been initially 
allocated. The central point for our current purposes is that the concerns of 
insufficient compensation are not something that could not be addressed in the 
framework of tradable quota scheme. There are no intrinsic components in the 
scheme that would be at odds with any potential set of market regulations that aimed 
to guarantee that parties are sufficiently compensated in the trading.  
 
It is of course the case that when established as a laissez-faire system the tradable 
quota scheme can lead to exploitation in either of the forms examined here. Free 
market trading system does not adequately take into consideration the possibility that 
a quota trading between countries may be the result of coercive offers or that it does 
not involve sufficient compensation. In such a form, the scheme would be morally 
objectionable. But this does not entail that the scheme could not possibly be 
established in a form in which the issue of exploitation is avoided. Once appropriate 
institutional safeguards are introduced, the trade between states can be done in a 
market place that protects against coercive offers and guarantees that each quota 
transaction follows the requirements of sufficient compensation. In sum, the 
exploitation objection does not constitute an insurmountable moral obstacle for the 




247 For a Marxist view of exploitation, see for example G. A Cohen, ‘The Labor Theory of Value and 
the Concept of Exploitation’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8 (1979), 356. Cohen argues that the 
Marxist idea of exploitation should be understood in the following way: The labourer is the only 
person who creates the product which has value. If the capitalist receives some of the value of the 
product, the labourer receives less value than the value of what he creates. Therefore, the labourer is 
exploited by the capitalist. 
 9:;
5.3 The comparative moral appeal of the tradable quota scheme  
So far I have examined three moral objections against the internal components of the 
tradable quota scheme. I have argued that either the objections fail due to one reason 
or another or the more specific implemented scheme may be structured in such a way 
that it accommodates the concerns that were raised in the objections. As I suggested 
in the earlier sections, apart from examining the scheme in relation to its 
components, there is also another way to evaluate the moral appeal of the tradable 
quota scheme: comparative evaluation. In other words, even if we accept that the 
scheme is not internally problematic with regard to its components, this brings us 
only half way in showing that the tradable quota scheme constitutes a morally 
desirable institutional proposal for burden-sharing in the context of refugee 
protection.  
 
The central alternatives to which the tradable quota scheme should be compared are 
the two stand-alone schemes it derives from, the compensatory scheme and the 
physical burden-sharing scheme. How does the tradable quota scheme morally 
compare to these schemes? First, consider the compensatory scheme. While it may 
be the case that the compensatory scheme could be implemented without introducing 
radical changes to the current refugee regime, from a moral perspective there are 
strong reasons to resist the implementation of the compensatory scheme as the 
primary burden-sharing scheme. There are three central reasons that support this 
conclusion. Firstly, the compensatory scheme distributes physical burdens with the 
non-refoulement principle. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, to accept the 
non-refoulement principle as the mechanism of distributing refugees is to fully 
overlook the fact that some states are ‘unlucky’ in the sense that they either share 
borders with countries facing refugee crises. These states can reasonably ask of other 
states in a similar position to accommodate refugees: ‘why should we bear all the 
physical burdens of refugee protection?’  
 
Secondly, in more practical terms the scheme seems least capable of addressing the 
currently existing problem of incentives for states to engage in non-entrée policies. 
To put it differently, of the three proposals it is only in the compensatory scheme that 
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the success of a state in practicing non-entrée policies has a direct effect on the 
responsibility to physically accommodate refugees. In the scheme there are no 
recognised binding obligations to share the physical burdens of refugee protection 
between states. States also know that by implementing strategic policies they may 
unilaterally influence the amount of physical burden they will eventually have to 
bear. Considering these factors, states can engage in self-interested calculation and 
end up applying the same evasive tactics as in the current refugee protection regime 
in order to not to have refugees filing asylum claims on their territories. Apart from 
leading to disproportionate distributions of physical burdens between states, this can 
undermine the effectiveness of refugee protection and lead to refugees’ prolonged 
search for a benevolent country that will not turn them away at the border. In other 
words, the irony is that while the non-refoulement principle may lead to more 
extensive accommodation of refugees according to their preferences than the 
distributive mechanisms in the two alternative schemes, it simultaneously provides 
states with an incentive to attempt to divert the flows of refugees to other countries 
that remains absent in the alternative schemes.  
 
Finally, one practical advantage both the tradable quota scheme and the physical 
burden-sharing scheme have over the compensatory scheme is that they can deter 
false asylum applications to a greater degree. Those who are not in actual need of 
protection may attempt to exploit the asylum system to gain entry to a particular 
country. But if the applicants are not certain that they will eventually be 
accommodated in the country where they have applied for asylum, those without 
genuine need might be more hesitant to claim asylum in other countries.248 
 
In a nutshell, both the physical burden-sharing scheme and the tradable quota scheme 
recognise the nature of the claim to asylum better than the compensatory scheme, 
and they seem to be more capable of addressing the problem of the incentives for 
non-entrée policies and false asylum applications. Due to the implementation of 

248 See also Joseph Carens, ‘The Philosopher and the Policymaker: Two Perspectives on the Ethics of 
Immigration with Special Attention to the Problem of Restricting Asylum’, in Martin Hailbronner, 
David A. Martin and Hiroshi Motomura (eds.), Immigration Admissions (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1997), 37.  
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collective status determination processes, states can let in refugees knowing that 
other states have an obligation to bear only part of the physical burdens. These 
grounds provide strong reasons to conclude that of the three schemes examined here 
the compensatory scheme constitutes the least morally appealing comprehensive 
institutional scheme. 
 
What about the comparative appeal of the tradable quota scheme in relation to the 
physical burden-sharing scheme? I believe that in the end, the tradable quota scheme 
constitutes at the very least an as appealing if not more appealing institutional 
scheme as the physical scheme. The appealing aspect of the tradable quota schemes 
is that it leaves open to states a broader range of possible ways to discharge their 
obligations in global refugee protection than the rigid physical burden-sharing 
scheme. Then, the question is essentially whether or not the establishment of the 
market for trading the initially allocated physical quotas constitutes ‘one step too far’ 
in the institutionalisation of the right to asylum, or whether it amounts to a valuable 
extension of the physical burden-sharing scheme. Are there strong enough reasons 
not to take the step from the physical burden-sharing scheme to the tradable quota 
scheme? The objections considered in the previous sections are among the possible 
reasons for not extending the physical burden-sharing scheme to the tradable quota 
scheme. The right to trade should be rejected if the trade would violate some other 
requirements of justice, such as the obligation to treat refugees in a dignified way or 
the obligation not to exploit others. But as I have suggested in the analysis above, 
these concerns can be laid to rest. These conclusions give us strong evidence that the 
additional step from the physical burden-sharing scheme is not morally problematic. 
 
Conclusion 
In the current chapter, I have examined the moral dimensions of the tradable quota 
scheme. The scheme can be understood as one institutional proposal for replacing the 
existing global refugee regime and for perfecting imperfect duties corresponding the 
moral right to asylum on the interstate level. I suggested that the tradable quota 
scheme is a synthesis of two separate stand-alone institutional schemes, the 
compensatory scheme and the physical burden-sharing scheme. I also examined three 
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moral objections against the tradable quota scheme, and claimed that the concerns 
raised in these objections can be either rejected or they can be accommodated in the 
institutional arrangements of the scheme. Finally, while I stopped short of 
conclusively showing that from the comparative moral perspective the tradable quota 
scheme constitutes the best possible scheme for institutionalising the right to asylum, 
there is nevertheless an indication that it is at the very least as morally appealing if 



























6. Protection of the right to asylum and partial 
compliance 
 
In 2001, after Australia had turned away a group of asylum seekers arriving on a 
Norwegian cargo ship ‘Tampa’, General Pervez Musharraf, who at the time served as 
the President of Pakistan, questioned the duty of Pakistan to grant asylum to any 
additional applicants. He pointed out that if a wealthy country like Australia refused 
to open its borders to a handful of boat people, why should a poor and unstable 
country like Pakistan (which was already accommodating a relatively 
disproportionate number of Convention refugees when compared to national wealth) 
continue granting asylum to arriving applicants.249 Musharraf was correct in pointing 
out that there is an enormous difference in the Convention refugee intake between 
Pakistan and Australia. In 2009 Pakistan was hosting the most Convention refugees 
in the world (1.7 million). It also hosted the largest number of Convention refugees 
in relation to its economic capacity, with 733 refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per 
capita.250 In contrast, Australia ranked 77th on the list, hosting only 0.6 Convention 
refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita. Musharraf’s argument is also related to 
important moral questions regarding partial compliance in the protection of the right 
to asylum. If some duty-bearers with the capacity to assist bearers of the right to 
asylum unjustly default, are the complying duty-bearers obligated to ‘take up the 
slack’ and bear the non-compliers’ burdens? 
 
The current chapter focuses on what may be called the ‘partial compliance theory’ in 
the context of refugee protection.251 In the first section of the chapter, I will outline 
an argument suggesting that citizens of complying states are not obligated to bear 
non-complying states’ burdens in the global protection of the right to asylum. In the 
second section, I will examine whether this argument provides a satisfactory account 

249 Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 233. 
250 It was followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (496 refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per 
capita) and the United Republic of Tanzania (262). The first developed country on the list is Germany 
in the 26th place with 16 refugees per 1$ GDP (PPP) per capita. UNHCR, Global Trends 2008, 3. 
Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html (accessed 19.07.11). 
251 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls suggests that partial compliance theory is dedicated to study those 
‘principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice’. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1999a), 8. 
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of obligations of the citizens of complying states in circumstances of partial 
compliance. I will suggest several reasons in support of a conclusion according to 
which the citizens of complying states can have an obligation to assist the bearers of 
the right to asylum who should have been assisted by citizens in the non-complying 
states. In the final section of the chapter, I will turn to consider the stringency of 
obligations in global refugee protection more closely. In the section I will argue that 
the complying states should be understood to have at the very least moderately 
stringent obligations towards right-bearing refugees regardless of the compliance and 
non-compliance of other states. 
 
6.1 Full and partial compliance in global refugee protection 
Let us start with preliminaries. As the right to asylum is against the international 
community at large, citizens of all states with the capacity to assist may be said to 
collectively share the responsibility in protecting the right to asylum.252 If we are 
asked how exactly the burdens of refugee protection should be distributed among the 
duty-bearers with the capacity to assist, the obvious answer is that each duty-bearer 
should have to bear only their ‘fair share’ of the overall burdens in global protection 
of the right to asylum. For the time being, let us leave aside the more practical 
question of what exactly constitutes a fair share of burden for each duty-bearer, and 
simply assume that an ideal account of fair distribution of burdens between duty-
bearers can be outlined.253  
 
To keep the analysis simple, let us also leave aside the more specific issues of 
distributing burdens within states, and focus on partial compliance on ‘statist 
level’.254 As was pointed out in chapter three, states may be understood to function as 
‘clearinghouses’ that can – and should – perfect and enforce the imperfect duties of 

252 See also David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 225-226. 
253 Note, however, that the identification of fair shares of burdens does not necessarily require political 
agreements and the existence of a de facto burden-sharing scheme. In the determination of fair shares 
of burden, such devices as the ’veil of ignorance’ may be useful. Here, I will stop short of examining 
the best possible way to establish the fair shares of burden for each duty-bearer with the capacity to 
assist bearers of the right to asylum.  
254 For a legal enquiry into states’ collective responsibility in the protection of refugees see Agnés 
Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), ch. 4. And 5. 
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their duty-bearing citizens in the protection of universal entitlements. On the 
simplified statist approach accepted in the current chapter, states may be divided into 
complying and non-complying states. 255  The complying states are those states 
satisfactorily mediating and enforcing their citizens’ duties of assistance, therefore 
obediently bearing their fair share, however arrived at, of the overall burden of global 
refugee protection. In turn, the non-complying states are those states that choose not 
to bear the burdens of refugee protection at all or choose to bear only some burden 
but not their full share.  
 
In circumstances of full compliance the right-bearers’ access to asylum depends on 
the magnitude of the occurring humanitarian crises, i.e., the need for asylum, the 
stringency of obligations of citizens of states with capacities to assist, and the actual 
overall capacities to assist. What about in circumstances of partial compliance?256 
What happens when some states unjustly default, and unilaterally decide against 
bearing their fair share of burdens? Do the burdens of assistance transfer to citizens 
of other states? This constitutes an important moral issue, as the complying states 
need guidelines for non-ideal circumstances under which other states disregard their 
obligations. 
 
Some theorists have suggested that obligations on complying duty-bearers in a group 
of duty-bearers do not change in non-ideal circumstances where other duty-bearers 
choose not to comply with morality’s demands. Jonathan Cohen and Liam Murphy, 
for example, have defended this type of view. Cohen asks us to imagine a distant 
island with two small communities, one poor and the other affluent due to existing 
climate differences. While according to Cohen members of the affluent community 
each may have a duty to give food to the members of the poor community so that 
they can avoid starvation and malnutrition, the complying members of the rich 
community are not obligated to step in on behalf of their non-complying fellows and 

255 The idea of full compliance can be understood as doubly ideal, as it assumes that all duty-bearers 
fully comply with the requirements of justice. In the realm of non-ideal, both of the ideals of full 
compliance can fail. See Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 57. 
256 On the relevance of moral analysis within the domain of partial compliance, see for example Zofia 
Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal About Ideal theory?’, Social Theory and Practice, 34 (2008), 331-332. 
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discharge more than what would be their share of duties towards the less affluent 
community under the circumstances of full compliance. 257  In his book Moral 
Demands in Nonideal Theory Liam Murphy outlines a very similar but more 
elaborate account of obligations in circumstances of partial compliance. He proposes 
‘the compliance condition’ as the central limiting factor for duties of assistance, and 
argues that ‘an agent-neutral moral principle should not increase its demands on 
agents as expected compliance with the principle by other agents decreases’.258  
 
Following Cohen’s and Murphy’s arguments, it might be claimed that in 
circumstances of partial compliance there is no obligation on complying states to 
bear those burdens in global refugee protection that belong to the non-complying 
states. On this approach, no state is required to take up the slack if other states 
wrongfully default. It is not hard to see why some may consider this argument 
appealing. After all, it is morally desirable in itself that all states have to bear strictly 
the burdens distributed for them under the presumption of full compliance. The 
approach recognising the level of overall compliance is designed to advance an 
important moral aim, and it does not ‘punish’ states for the non-compliance of other 
states. The non-compliance with the requirements of refugee protection clearly 
constitutes an injustice by the non-complying states. In such cases, non-complying 
states fail to sufficiently acknowledge that refugees have a binding claim of 
protection against them, and that they have a share of burdens they are under 
obligation of justice to bear.  
 
When complying states are obligated to bear the burdens that belong to non-
complying states, the direct benefit to non-compliers is that they are free to allocate 
the relevant resources elsewhere. As well, there can be indirect benefits for non-
complying states. If complying states are already disadvantaged compared to non-
complying states, the additional burden may affect their global competitive position 
detrimentally. Many countries struggle to succeed in the global trade market, and 
disproportionate burdens resulting from the moral requirements of refugee 

257 Jonathan L. Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’, Theoria, 47 (1981), 73.  
258 Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, 77. 
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accommodation can lead to even greater competitive disadvantage on this area. 
When other states choose not to comply with the requirements of refugee protection, 
the citizens of the complying states may ask: ‘why should we bear the burdens that 
belong to some other states? It is not us who have committed the unjust omission. 
Why should we be held accountable for the unjust omissions of other states?’  
 
What should we make of the argument of the citizens of the complying states? 
Should we accept that the accounts offered by Cohen and Murphy provide a 
satisfactory guideline for understanding obligations of states in global protection of 
the right to asylum in circumstances of partial compliance? Should we accept that 
when some states choose malevolently against discharging their citizens’ fair share 
of responsibilities, other states do not have to step in on their behalf and make up for 
the non-compliance? In the next section, I will turn to examine this question more 
closely. 
 
6.2 Are complying states obligated to bear burdens of non-complying 
states in refugee protection? 
In the current section, I will consider three responses to the argument outlined in the 
previous section. The responses suggest that the claim that states are obligated to 
bear only the burdens allocated to them under the presumption of full compliance 
offers an unsatisfactory account of obligations in the global protection of the right to 
asylum. 
 
Let us start with the strict interpretation of the argument. If followed to the letter, the 
argument outlined in the previous section entails a conclusion according to which the 
obligation will not transfer regardless how minor the additional burdens for the 
complying states would be in the absolute sense, how extensive absolute capacities 
there would be to bear the additional burden, and what would be at stake in the 
transferring of the burdens. In the end, I believe this is a questionable conclusion to 
arrive at. 259  Is it really unreasonable to claim that justice can demand that an 

259 Some critics have referred to the ‘drowning child scenario’ to exemplify this issue in the theories 
of moral obligation outlined by Murphy and Cohen. If there are two drowning children, and two 
passers-by in a suitable position to rescue the children, each passer-by may be considered to have an 
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extremely wealthy state already bearing its fair share of the collective burden is 
required to assist a handful of right-bearers if it could save their lives by bearing 
practically non-existent additional burdens? For example, if a boatload of refugees 
that had been unjustly rejected by some other state could be saved from imminent 
death by a complying rich state, it seems questionable whether the state could claim 
that it had no further obligations of assistance. After all, the additional contributions 
required would be practically non-existent for the citizens of the assisting state, and it 
would result in the prevention of imminent deaths. Once the burdens of assisting a 
small group of – say a group of 30 – right-bearers is distributed within a wealthy 
state between millions of citizens, there is no practical impact on any of the particular 
duty-bearers. It seems that at least in these types of cases it would be unreasonable 
for a state to deny assistance from the needy right-bearers. 
 
This response suggests that those states with extensive capacities to assist right-
bearers should bear more than their fair share of the collective burden at the very 
least in circumstances of partial compliance where the benefits of assistance are 
substantial and the additional burdens non-existent. The response, if valid, 
undermines the strict interpretation of the argument. But here I do not wish to rely 
solely on it. This is the case centrally because by itself it constitutes a fairly weak 
counter-claim against the position that states are obligated to bear the non-complying 
states’ burdens. It suggests only that there can be exceptional circumstances where it 
would be unreasonable for the states to refrain from assisting the needy right-bearers 
who have been left unjustly without assistance by other states. An advocate of the 
argument outlined in the previous section might simply reply that a clause can be 
introduced for exceptional circumstances where the benefits of assistance are 

obligation to rescue one of the children if they are able to do so within the limits of reasonable costs. 
However, if one of the passers-by decides to run away, according to the view outlined in the previous 
section the other passer-by still has an obligation to rescue only one child even if the second rescue 
would impose only very limited additional burden, and even if the complying rescuer would have 
substantial absolute capacities at his disposal. Bart Streumer, ‘Review of Liam B. Murphy, Moral 
Demands in Nonideal Theory’, Ratio, 17 (2004), 361. It is noteworthy to point out that there are also 
some philosophers, such as Jeffrie G. Murphy, who consider that there is no moral duty to rescue a 
drowning child even if a person is sitting by the pool and could do so simply by putting down one’s 
drink and reaching towards the child who is only few inches away. Jeffrie G. Murphy, ‘Blackmail: A 
preliminary Inquiry’, The Monist, 63 (1980), 168 n. 6. For a criticism of Murphy’s extreme position, 
see Joel Feinberg, ‘The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan’, Criminal Justice 
Ethics, 3 (1984), 57-58. 
 9;;
substantial and the additional costs to the burden-bearing state non-existent. Thus, 
even if the response outlined here is successful, most of the claim that states are 
obligated to bear only their fair share of the collective burdens still remains intact. 
 
Let us consider an alternative response that takes us beyond exceptional 
circumstances. The second line of response suggests that if states have, due to lack of 
political will, failed to establish a global system of accountability that would 
effectively advance compliance among the collective of states comprising duty-
bearers with the capacity to assist the right-bearers, the complying states can be said 
to have an obligations to bear the non-complying states’ burdens.260 This response 
focuses on the link between efforts to establish mechanisms that effectively promote 
compliance and the shifting of obligations in circumstances of partial compliance. 
While I believe that this line of response suggests a valid reason why the burdens can 
be shifted from non-complying states to complying states, it also has certain obvious 
limitations. If citizens of complying states have taken reasonable steps to advocate a 
system that advances compliance effectively, they cannot be held morally 
responsible for the failure of the establishment of institutions promoting compliance. 
In turn, if the complying states cannot be held morally responsible for the failure to 
establish a scheme that effectively advances compliance within the collective, then 
the response fails to provide reasons why the obligation can be shifted from the non-
compliers to the compliers. Thus, this response works only when the complying 
states are morally responsible for the failure to establish institutions that effectively 
advance compliance in global efforts of protecting the right to asylum. 
 
There is also a third line of response available. This response constitutes, I believe, 
the strongest objection considered in the current chapter. A central problem with 

260 On the duty of a random group to organise itself as a decision-making group and reach decisions 
regarding assistance, see Virginia Held, ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally 
Responsible?’, Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), 471-481. Held gives an example of three pedestrians 
witnessing an accident, and argues that the fact that they happen to be in a position to help imposes on 
them a collective responsibility to get organised and provide aid to the victim of the accident. Held 
contends that a random group may be ‘morally responsible for not constituting itself into a group 
capable of deciding upon action […] when it is obvious to the reasonable person that action rather 
than inaction by the collection is called for’ in the situation. On the issue of collective inaction and 
responsibility in more general terms see Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1992), ch. 6. 
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Murphy’s and Cohen’s views on the distribution of burdens within a group under 
circumstances of partial compliance is that the idea of ‘group’ is understood in a 
reductive way, i.e., the group obligation is considered as a sum of its individual 
members’ obligations. But when we are talking about group obligations, why could 
the obligation not amount to more than the total of all individual members’ 
obligations. Put differently, the fact that it would be morally appealing that within the 
group burdens are distributed fairly does not directly validate the claim that we 
should understand the group obligations strictly as the total of all of its members’ 
separate obligations. When considering group obligations there is not only a need to 
consider the distributions of burdens within the group, but also the collective duty of 
the collective to those on the outside. These two dimensions are separable from each 
other. Different allocations of responsibility within the collective can have an impact 
on the output of the collective, i.e., one form of distributing burdens within the group 
can more broadly provide the bearers of the right to asylum sufficiently secure access 
to the content of their right than some other form. 
 
There is a group of persons with a claim of justice to asylum, and this claim is 
directed collectively against all states with the capacity to assist. Those right-bearers 
left without asylum take no comfort in the knowledge that they would have had 
access to asylum if (and only if) all states had fully enforced compliance of their 
citizens, who as a consequence of enforcement would have satisfactorily borne their 
fair share of the collective burden. The right-bearers might say to the complying 
states with capacities to assist them: ‘what we care about is having access to asylum. 
We have a general claim to asylum against all states as a collective, and some of you 
have capacities to protect our rights. So you should protect our rights, and solve 
internal disputes of compliance and burden distribution amongst yourselves without 
letting us suffer further’. 
 
What I believe strengthens the conclusion that we should not understand obligations 
in a fully reductive way in the current context is that it is the basic needs of persons 
that are at stake in access to asylum. These needs constitute fundamentally important 
considerations of justice that are not easily overridden by other considerations. When 
 9;=
a state denies assistance from bearers of the right to asylum, it owes a satisfactory 
explanation for its omissions due to the existing right-bearer/duty-bearer relationship. 
It is not directly clear that it is sufficient for a state to refer to the fact that other states 
have failed to comply with the requirements of justice. After all, it is one thing to 
refer to the lack of absolute capacities as a reason for refusing to contribute to the 
protection of the right to asylum, and completely another thing to refer to the fact 
that other duty-bearers in other states have defaulted and that as a consequence 
citizens of the complying state have to bear ‘unfair’ burden.  
 
The argument on the requirement to bear only the shares of burden allocated under 
the presumption of full compliance essentially suggests that an unfair distribution of 
burdens constitutes a greater injustice than the injustice of some right-bearing 
refugees remaining without asylum. In the end, I believe this is a dubious claim to 
make. To assert that fairness in burden distribution overrides the fundamentally 
important right to asylum would be, in the words of Peter Singer, ‘taking fairness too 
far’.261 Why should the injustices in burden distribution be passed on to the bearers 
of the right to asylum? The injustice that occurs in burden distribution is surely an 
important issue, but taking into consideration what is at stake in the right-bearers’ 
access to asylum it seems reasonable to suggest that it constitutes the ‘lesser 
injustice’ in the current case. 
 
So far, I have examined three responses to the claim that states are obligated by 
justice to bear only their fair share of burdens in global refugee protection. I 
suggested that while each of the responses has some merit, the third response proves 
to be the strongest. The right to asylum constitutes a fundamentally weighty claim of 
justice, and we should be sceptical of the conclusion that it is enough for states to 
appeal to unfair burden distribution when declining assistance to refugees. Consider, 
then, a counter-argument against the position that citizens of a complying state are 
obligated to bear more than their fair share of burdens in protecting the right to 

261  Peter Singer, ‘The Singer Solution to World Poverty’, New York Times Sunday Magazine, 




asylum. In his analysis Cohen suggests that if there exists a requirement to bear 
others’ share of burdens in circumstances of partial compliance, each duty-bearer, 
‘even if otherwise he was inclined to contribute, could legitimately infer that, if he 
failed to do so, those with tenderer consciences than himself would make good the 
deficiency’.262 Put differently, Cohen is arguing that if we accept that obligations can 
transfer from the non-compliers to the compliers, there is a fear that this can 
reinforce the temptation to default for those who may already be considering 
inaction.263  Should we give up the position requiring states to bear other states’ 
burdens in non-ideal circumstances on the grounds that it offers incentives for non-
compliance? Consider four reasons why Cohen’s objection fails to be convincing. 
 
Firstly, it is a stretch to say, as Cohen does, that the non-complying duty-bearers can 
‘legitimately’ infer their conclusion. At most, the shifting of obligations constitutes 
one consideration in states’ self-interested reasoning. Secondly, even if we accepted 
that on the one hand there may be an incentive for some states to fail to comply if the 
obligations are transferable, on the other hand the requirement to bear other states’ 
burden in circumstances of partial compliance may offer incentives for the 
complying states to push for institutional reforms that advance compliance and 
burden-sharing.264  Thirdly, Cohen’s argument relies on an empirically contingent 
claim. An account of justice that requires states to bear the burdens of non-
complying states may not necessarily lead to lesser compliance and lesser protection 
of right-bearers than the account defended by Cohen. 
 
Finally, Cohen’s argument about incentives is not primarily targeting a theory of 
burden distribution, but rather the mechanisms of enforcing compliance. Whether 
states refrain from complying in the global domain depends on the overall 

262 Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’, 73. 
263 Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’, 74. 
264 For example, Germany, which is often suggested to bear a disproportionate share of burdens in 
refugee protection within EU, is also a strong advocate of institutional reforms that aim towards 
institutionalised burden-sharing among the EU states. Eiko Thielemann, ‘Between Interests and 
Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (2003), 
260-262.  As also Astri Suhrke points out, ’sharing proposals authored by states have typically come 
from governments trying to relieve what they perceive as a disproportionate influx on their own 
territory’. Astri Suhrke, ‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective 
versus National Action’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11 (1998), 397. 
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circumstances surrounding them instead of strictly what follows from a particular 
theory on the distribution of responsibilities. 265  Once there are sufficient 
counterweights against non-compliance in place within the global regime dedicated 
to the protection of the right to asylum, the issue of incentives does not constitute an 
insurmountable problem. The shifting of moral obligations surely constitutes one 
consideration when a state is reasoning whether or not to comply with the 
requirements of justice, but it is not the only reason. Apart from normative 
considerations, the final decision of a state regarding compliance depends on the 
calculation about the incentives for compliance and about the disincentives for non-
compliance. This essentially means that a state’s final decision to comply with the 
requirements of justice in global protection of the right to asylum can be strongly 
influenced by the particular form of the global institutional regime. 
 
6.3 The stringency of obligations in the protection of the right to asylum 
If the conclusion reached in the previous section is correct, this entails that in 
circumstances of partial compliance citizens of complying states with capacities to 
assist can have an obligation of justice to bear burdens of non-complying states. 
Then the question becomes, how stringent is the complying states’ obligation to 
assist refugees? How much does justice require that citizens of a complying state 
sacrifice for global refugee protection regardless of the sacrifices of citizens in other 
states? So far, I have refrained from examining this question more closely. In general 
terms, it may be said that there is an ‘absolute floor’ for each state in relation to its 
capacities to assist, and this floor marks the point after which the citizens of a 
complying state are no longer obligated to assist right-bearing refugees. Whether a 
state’s burden in refugee protection actually reaches the absolute floor is dependent 
primarily on three factors. Firstly, it depends on how much overall effort is required 
for all persons to have their right to asylum protected, i.e., on the magnitude of the 
refugee problem. The second relevant factor is the general level of compliance in the 
global efforts to realise the right to asylum. If the number of complying states is high, 

265  In the current global refugee regime, which does not include any meaningful enforcement 
mechanisms to advance refugee protection, states hold that it is beneficial for them not to become 
members of burden-sharing schemes. They hold that the same bundle of resources used to deal with 
the Convention refugees can be allocated ‘more wisely’ to promote national interests. 
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it is less likely that the absolute floor will be reached by each particular complying 
state. In turn, the lesser the general level of compliance, the more likely it is that the 
complying states would not have sufficient capacities to assist all the needy refugees. 
Thirdly, whether a state reaches the absolute floor is dependent on where exactly the 
absolute floor will be located. 
 
It is important to recognise that the establishment of an absolute floor is a central part 
of any account of obligations in global refugee protection.266 Put differently, the 
issue of the absolute floor is a general question in the theory of obligations in global 
refugee protection that requires answering, and any positive account faces the task of 
providing satisfactory reasons as to why exactly the absolute floor should be located 
in one place rather than some other place. As I argued in the second chapter, the right 
to asylum is essentially a right for the protection of basic needs, which in turn are of 
fundamental importance to the pursuit of comprehensive conceptions of the good. 
Put differently, basic needs, from which the right to asylum derives its moral weight, 
are of universal value due to the fact that these needs are not directly tied to any 
comprehensive doctrines, and morally weighty because their satisfaction is a central 
precondition for the existence of a moral agent. As the right to asylum may be 
considered as a fundamentally weighty normative resource base that can ground 
obligations of justice, it seems reasonable to conclude that the obligations of 
complying states with the capacity to assist are at the very least moderately stringent 
regardless of the compliance and non-compliance of other states.267 If this conclusion 
is correct, citizens of each state have a duty of justice to sacrifice at least a moderate 
range of their personal projects and collective national projects for the global 
protection of the right to asylum regardless of other states’ compliance and non-

266 This is the case even for an approach recognising that complying states are not obligated to bear 
non-complying states’ burdens. In his account of moral obligations under circumstances of partial 
compliance, Liam Murphy questions the possibility of establishing a fixed absolute floor on duties of 
assistance beyond a stringent absolute floor of the kind outlined by Peter Singer. Murphy, Moral 
Demands in Nonideal Theory, 64-70. See also Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1971), 229, 231. 
267 For an insightful account on moderately stringent duties of assistance, see Garrett Cullity, The 
Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. ch. 8 and ch. 9.  See also 
Samuel Scheffler, ‘Morality’s Demands and Their Limits’, The Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), 
531-537. 
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compliance.268 On this ‘moderate approach’ to the protection of the right to asylum, 
personal and national projects are understood to have certain universal value, and 
there is no obligation of justice on persons to give up all for the sake of protecting 
other persons’ fundamental rights. 
 
But should we go beyond this conclusion and accept that the obligations of justice on 
the complying states are more than moderately stringent? It might be argued that the 
absolute floor should instead be set at the level that only the right to necessities 
remains sufficiently protected to the citizens of a state assisting the right-bearers.269 
This stringent approach to the absolute floor effectively holds that the possible lack 
of opportunity for citizens of a state to pursue national and personal projects is 
secondary to the plight that the right-bearers are facing.270 In the current work, I will 
stop short of examining further the complex question regarding whether we should 
embrace a more stringent account of the absolute floor than the moderate account.271 

268 As Robert E. Goodin points out, ‘a morality that was never prepared to make any demands would 
be a pretty useless morality. The point of morality is to be action-guiding.’ Robert E. Goodin, 
‘Demandingness as a Virtue’, The Journal of Ethics, 13 (2009), 3. Similarly, Zofia Stemplowska notes 
that while we should be careful in formulating demands on people, we should not abstain from 
making them. ‘After all, abstaining from making demands is not a morally neutral position we can fall 
back on’. Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal About Ideal theory?’, 333-334.  
269 This interpretation of the absolute floor follows closely an argument outlined by Peter Singer in 
Famine, Affluence, and Morality, although it is formulated in the framework of rights protection. In 
his famous essay, Singer offers an extremely stringent interpretation of duties of assistance, claiming 
that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’. Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality, 229, 231.  
270  It should be noted that it is possible to imagine circumstances of partial compliance where 
requirements of refugee protection become excessive even if states are required to sacrifice their 
citizens’ well-being to the point of the right to necessities in refugee protection. For example, in the 
current world it most likely would constitute excessive burdens for a single complying Scandinavian 
state to attempt to accommodate all persons eligible for protection under the Convention. As well, we 
can imagine circumstances of full compliance among world’s states in which the overall burdens 
becomes excessive for the states to bear. For example, in a world at war the small collective of states 
able to remain outside the war would not in all likelihood have sufficient capacities to assist all the 
needy refugees fleeing from the war-ridden states even if they sacrificed their citizens’ well-being to 
the point of the right to necessities. 
271 One possible way to approach the question might be to focus on examining the point which duties 
of justice can be argued to be over-demanding. The over-demandingness objection was originally 
targeted against act-utilitarian moral accounts that can require persons to give up all their personal 
commitments and fully commit to assisting strangers. For a thorough enquiry on the idea of over-
demandingness, see Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, ch. 2. and 3. See also Scheffler, 
‘Morality’s Demands and Their Limits’, 531-537. Scheffler distinguishes four possible responses to 
the criticism of over-demandingness. 1) To abandon the theory for a less demanding one, 2) to restrict 
the scope of moral demands in human lives, 3) to argue that morality altogether deserves less respect 
than is generally given to it, or 4) to reject that over-demandingness constitutes any type of a criticism 
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Put differently, the argument outlined here suggests only that the obligations of the 
complying states are ‘at the very least moderately stringent’. 
 
It can be pointed out, however, that the stringent understanding of the location of 
absolute floor leaves a fairly broad gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. The stringent 
absolute floor can require that an unlucky complying state facing a massive refugee 
crisis on its every border becomes effectively a refugee camp, and that its citizens 
can be required to dedicate their full attention to the plight of the refugees perhaps 
for years if not decades to come. Prolonged civil wars can entail that the state needs 
to be maintained as a refugee camp for the foreseeable future, and the citizens of the 
state may have no meaningful opportunity to pursue their personal life and national 
projects. Put differently, in some instances the stringent absolute floor can demand 
that citizens of a state act akin to ‘moral saints’ who have no partialist commitments, 
and no shared national projects beyond the protection of the right to necessities.272 
Thus, a defender of the stringent account faces the task of showing that justice does 
not only require moderately stringent sacrifices in circumstances of partial 
compliance, but that at times it can also require that we act like moral saints. 
 
In practical terms, what can we make of the fairly general conclusion outlined here? 
Firstly, it entails that states’ responses to matters of global refugee protection should 
not be completely a matter of internal democratic decision-making. A central 
problem in leaving the judgment on the final extent of refugee protection to members 
of each state is the possibility of insidious judgments. It may be reasonably asked 
what stops members of a state from making insidious judgments regarding their 
obligations towards right-bearing refugees if the final judgment is left to democratic 
processes. The recent wave of political anti-refugee and anti-immigration rhetoric in 
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towards a moral theory. For an argument against the demandingness objection, see David Sobel, ‘The 
Impotence of the Demandingness objection’, Philosopher’s Imprint, 7 (2007), 1-17. 
272 On cultural objections as justificatory grounds for limiting immigration, see for example Michael 
Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 39. 
Walzer argues that ‘the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, 
cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life’. He claims that ‘at some level of political 
organization, something like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its 
own admission policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants’. For a more sceptical 
view on cultural claims as justification for limiting immigration, see Samuel Scheffler, ‘Immigration 
and the Significance of Culture’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35 (2007), 93-125.  
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many European countries provides strong evidence of insidious judgments. 
Regardless of how low the final number of refugees is that a state accommodates, 
many citizens maintain that their state is bearing excessive burden beyond moral 
duty.  
 
Finnish asylum policies and the current political climate may be considered as a real 
world example. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), which apart 
from per capita GDP takes into consideration also life expectancy and education, 
Finland has a ‘very high’ level of human development, ranking 16th of the 182 
countries in the Index listing.273 The country currently has 5.3 million inhabitants, 
and it has the lowest population density of the countries in the European Union 
with16 inhabitants/km2. Finland also has per capita GDP $44,491 (nominal).274 In 
other words, as it currently stands, Finland is not only one of the highest ranking 
country in the world with respect to human development, but also a very scarcely 
populated country. 
 
In the year 2009, there were altogether 5988 individual asylum claims filed in 
Finland. However, only 1373 of the applicants were finally granted asylum.275 This 
entails that the total increase in the country’s population due to Convention refugees 
in 2009 was minimal, around 0.02 per cent. Finland is also currently facing a populist 
anti-immigration and anti-refugee tide, and there is strong pressure on the 
government to reduce the number of asylums granted. A central political message of 
the right-wing party True Finns is that Finland should be open strictly to immigration 
that is either ‘neutral’ or ‘beneficial’ to it. Put differently, the True Finns are 
suggesting in their party manifesto that Finland should reject entry from all incoming 

273  Human Development Index (HDI) - 2010 Rankings. Available online: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed 19.07.11). 
274 In comparison, for example Haiti, which currently faces a humanitarian crisis of great urgency, has 
more than twenty times higher population density than Finland, with 361.5 inhabitants/km2. It is also 
the 145th most developed country according to the HDI, and has per capita GDP $733 (nominal). 
275  Finnish Refugee Centre Asylum Statistics 2010. Available online: 
http://www.pakolaisneuvonta.fi/index_html?lid=71&lang=eng (accessed 19.07.11). The number of 
granted asylum applications has actually increased in the past couple of years. In 2008, Finland 
granted asylum to 860 refugees, and in 2007 to 785 refugees. 
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migrants it considers as a ‘burden’.276 This political message of partiality caused a 
victory for the party in recent parliamentary elections, and it caused a great shock to 
the whole Finnish political landscape. 
 
The implications of the election seem to be that the future government has a strong 
political mandate from the constituency to reduce Finland’s intake of any refugees it 
considers as ‘burdens’ from the current minimal figures. But if the previous 
conclusion regarding obligations of assistance is correct, we should not accept that 
the current Finnish government has a justification to reduce its refugee intake.277 To 
let Finland decide democratically on its refugee policies is essentially to commit to a 
strongly relativistic view of refugee protection. To leave the final judgment on the 
extent of refugee protection to states’ democratic processes can mean that the most 
affluent scarcely populated countries in the world can legitimately conclude that they 
are currently bearing at the very least sufficient if not excessive burden, regardless of 
their actual assistance to right-bearing refugees. 
 
Secondly, on the grounds of the claim that states are obligated to sacrifice at the least 
a moderate range of their personal and national projects for the global protection of 
the right to asylum regardless of other states’ compliance and non-compliance it can 
be reasonably argued that not all states are adequately discharging their citizens’ 
duties. Again, consider Finland as an example. With its 1373 accepted asylum 
applicants and very high level of human development, it seems that Finland is far 
from sacrificing any national projects for the sake of global protection of the right to 
asylum. As well, once the burden is distributed to the country’s 5.3 million citizens, 
the practical impacts for the citizens’ personal projects are also non-existent.278 
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276  True Finns party manifesto 2011, 42. Available online (in Finnish): 
http://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/getfile.php?file=1536 (accessed 19.07.2011).  
277 On the link between democratic theory and border controls, see Arash Abizadeh, ‘Democratic 
Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders’, Political Theory, 
36 (2008), 37-65. For Miller’s critical response to Abizadeh, see David Miller, ‘Why Immigration 
Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh’, Political Theory, 38 (2010), 111-120. 
278 In turn, Pakistan seems to have discharged more than sufficiently its obligations in global refugee 
protection. This is centrally because Pakistan is at the moment unable to protect many of its citizens’ 
right to necessities sufficiently. As for example a UNHCR report in January 2011 pointed out, there 
are over a million ‘internally displaced persons’ in Pakistan. Available online: 
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In more general terms, in 2008 there were altogether around 42 million persons 
worldwide who were recognised by the UNHCR as ‘forcibly displaced’. 279 
Simultaneously, there was an estimate of 1.2 billion people living in countries the 
UN identifies as ‘more developed’. These countries comprise European and North 
American countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.280 A comparison with the 
Human Development Index shows that of the list of countries with ‘very high human 
development’, the first 20 are also on the UN list of more developed countries.281 If 
all those ‘forcibly displaced’ were provided asylum in one of the more developed 
countries, this would increase the total population in these countries by 3.5%. Even if 
in the current political climate it is unfeasible that all the forcibly displaced will be 
provided asylum in one of the more developed countries, the increase in population 




In the current chapter, I have examined obligations in the protection of the right to 
asylum in circumstances of partial compliance. I started by outlining an argument 
suggesting that citizens of complying states are not obligated to bear burdens of 
citizens in non-complying states in the global protection of the right to asylum. Then, 
I moved to outline three arguments against this view. In the last section, I examined 
more closely the complex question regarding stringency of obligations in the 
protection of the right to asylum. I claimed that we should consider the obligations of 
the complying states to be at the very least as moderately stringent regardless of the 
compliance or non-compliance of other states, and examined some practical 
implications of this general conclusion. 
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279  UNHRC, Global Trends 2008, 3. Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html 
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280  Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet 2008, 7, 15. Available online: 
http://www.prb.org/pdf08/08WPDS_Eng.pdf (accessed 19.07.11). 
281  Human Development Report 2007/2008, 229. Available online: 
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In the current work, I have examined the moral right to asylum. The central argument 
of the thesis has been the following: the right to asylum is a derivative right grounded 
in the more fundamental right to necessities, which can be understood as a universal 
entitlement to the satisfaction of basic needs. More specifically, I have argued that all 
persons whose right to necessities is insufficiently protected in their home state have 
the right to asylum – rather than the more general right to be assisted – when they 
cannot be assisted with other remedial instruments by the international community 
within a reasonable timeframe. The account of the right to asylum I have offered in 
the thesis follows a pragmatic understanding of rights. On this approach, when we 
are concerned about rights we should also be concerned about their protection, i.e., 
we should not strictly focus on pre-institutional circumstances of having rights but 
also on the institutionalisation of rights. Rights are practically useless for persons 
without institutions that provide a sufficiently secure access to their content. Apart 
from examining the right to asylum qua universal right, I have focused on examining 
the moral nature of the existing institutions of refugee protection, alternative 
institutional arrangements, and obligations citizens of complying states have towards 
refugees under the circumstances of partial compliance.  
 
In our current world states are reluctant to expand their legal obligations towards 
foreigners, and there is a genuine fear that any attempt to renegotiate the Convention 
would lead to even more limited global institutions of refugee protection that the 
ones currently existing.283 While states do continue to proclaim a willingness to assist 
non-citizens on humanitarian grounds, many states are nevertheless strongly 
committed to ‘a pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international legal 
responsibility toward involuntary migrants’. 284  If the conclusion outlined in the 

283 The UNHCR, for example, considers that any initiative to modify the Convention in the current 
political environment ‘could result in a lowering of protection standards for refugees and even 
undermine the international refugee protection regime altogether’. UNHCR, Climate change, natural 
disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective 2010, 9. Available online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html (accessed 19.07.11). 
284 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 998. 
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current work is correct, states’ reluctance to strengthen the refugee protective 
institutions deserves moral condemnation. Justice requires that states take 
meaningful steps to replace the currently existing global refugee regime with a moral 
refugee regime. If all persons may be said to have the right to asylum under certain 
circumstances of deprivation, this right functions as a foundation from which the 
obligation to establish effective and well-functioning moral refugee regime can be 
derived.  
 
The establishment of a moral refugee regime is an important diversion from the UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which constitutes the central 
foundation for the existing refugee regime. The existing global refugee regime, 
which was originally established to address displacement within Europe, may have 
served an important humanitarian as well as political function, but these functions do 
not constitute sufficient reasons to maintain the status quo. The recognition of the 
moral right to asylum essentially amounts to a call for restructuring the institution of 
asylum on the grounds of need, and to a call for broadening the definition of refugee 
beyond the Convention definition. The existing refugee regime does not adequately 
recognise, for example, that there can be persons facing environmental harms that 
not only threaten basic needs, but also that these harms cannot be effectively 
addressed with any other instrument than asylum.  
 
In addition, the shift to a moral refugee entails abandonment of many state practices 
towards asylum seekers, including non-entrée practices, coercive repatriation, and 
deportation to ‘safe countries’. As Joseph Carens rightly points out, ‘external 
deterrence is not significantly different, in moral terms, from denying an application 
for asylum. If we take steps to keep refugees from applying asylum in our state, we 
become morally responsible for their fates’.285 The recognition of ‘safe countries’ 
faces similar problems. Some states hold that if an asylum applicant is arriving from 
a ‘safe country’ the applicant becomes liable to return to that country. Some 
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285 Joseph Carens, ‘The Philosopher and the Policymaker: Two Perspectives on the Ethics of 
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David A. Martin and Hiroshi Motomura (eds.), Immigration Admissions (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1997), 33. 
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countries are considered as generally safe due to number of factors, including human 
rights record and political circumstances.286 The interpretation of certain countries as 
generally safe is problematic due to the fact that such generalisation overlooks the 
possibility that in instances of particular asylum seekers the country is not 
necessarily safe. In the words of Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘how can we be sufficiently sure 
that even the most respectable and reputable of regimes has not, just this once, 
produced a refugee?’287  From the moral perspective the general probability of a 
person being safe in her home country should not have impact on the prospects of the 
person to have access to asylum. Each asylum applicant’s eligibility for asylum 
should be considered on the merits of the individual cases rather than on the grounds 
of the general level of safety in the departure country. 
 
The establishment of a moral refugee regime entails also the abandonment of the 
institutional framework in which the principle of state sovereignty has an overriding 
position. Put differently, the establishment of a moral refugee regime entails the 
recognition of binding positive obligations on states to provide asylum, and the 
abandonment of the non-refoulement principle as the central mechanism of 
distributing refugees between states. While the non-refoulement principle clearly has 
an important role in a moral refugee regime, a moral refugee regime is also dedicated 
to fair distribution of burdens between the duty-bearers and the enforcement of the 
obligation to assist bearers of the right to asylum.  
 
In the thesis I also pointed out that while the global refugee regime is a second-best 
mechanism for the protection of the right to necessities, this does not mean that it 
does not have an important function. This is partly due to the fact that for the 
foreseeable future we are destined to live in a world where some states fail to 
satisfactorily protect their citizens’ right to necessities. But even if the best possible 
circumstances in the protection of the right to necessities were reached, there are still 
reasons to have a refugee regime in place. In circumstances where all persons’ right 
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286 See for example Nadine El-Enany, ’Who is the New European Refugee?’, European Law Review, 
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287 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ’Safe Country? Says Who?’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 4 
(1992), 248-250. 
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to necessities is sufficient protected in their home states the global refugee regime 
still might serve as a back-up safety-valve. It can be understood as ‘insurance policy’ 
that remains in its place for unforeseeable circumstances under which there is a need 
for alternative ways to access the content of the right to necessities. But in the end, 
this type of speculation regarding the relevance of the global refugee regime is 
premature. We are far from a point where we can even have a meaningful debate on 
whether or not the global refugee regime constitutes a redundant back-up mechanism 
for the protection of global entitlements. There are still millions of persons around 
the world who do not have sufficiently secure access to the content of the right to 
necessities, and for many of these persons asylum constitutes the only meaningful 
remedy. 
 
When examining more closely the institutionalisation of the right to asylum, I 
pointed out that the question of what exactly should be the more specific form of 
mediating institutions on the interstate level is a complex one, and that the answer 
depends partly on contextual considerations. As institutions need to be fitted to their 
circumstances, there is no one-size-fits-all model that can be applied in every 
possible context. Yet, this does not entail that we would be fully without guidelines 
in the establishment of a moral refugee regime in more practical terms. The right to 
asylum, other considerations of justice, and efficiency offer us context-independent 
guidelines on institution-building. In the thesis I focused on examining more closely 
a specific institutional scheme that could perfect imperfect duties in the protection of 
the moral right to asylum on the interstate level. I defended this scheme, called the 
tradable quota scheme, against moral criticism. I examined three objections against 
the tradable quota scheme, and suggested that these objections do not undermine the 
appeal of the scheme in any meaningful way. I also examined the appeal of the 
scheme in relation to other institutional proposals. While I stopped short of offering a 
conclusive comparative moral evaluation of the tradable quota scheme, I suggested 
nevertheless that there is strong support for the conclusion that the tradable quota 
scheme offers a policy proposal for institutionalising the right to asylum which is 
more appealing than the compensatory scheme and at the very least as appealing as 
the physical burden-sharing scheme. 
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While the establishment of a global institutional scheme dedicated to the protection 
of the moral right to asylum would be appealing, in the current circumstances the 
political climate is not favourable for a global burden-sharing scheme. Regional 
schemes are more likely to be established before any implementation of a global 
institutional scheme, and at the moment the only region where there is any likelihood 
for political agreement on an interstate burden-sharing system in the context of 
refugee protection is Europe.   
 
But it is important to recognise that states seem to systematically overlook the 
possible benefits of complying with demands of refugee protection and establishing 
comprehensive burden-sharing schemes.288 As a consequence of the establishment of 
a burden-sharing scheme the migratory movement of the destitute would become 
more predictable, and states would not have to have extensive unilateral contingency 
plans for humanitarian crises. Furthermore, the failure to establish a comprehensive 
interstate burden-sharing scheme that leads to more extensive protection of the right 
to asylum than the currently existing refugee protective institutions can feed 
bitterness in the destitute worldwide, which in turn provides a fertile ground for 
recruiting terrorists. If, as some projections suggests, by 2050 some 150 million 
people will be in need of asylum due to climate change, there are not only strong 
reasons of justice, but also strong reasons of national interest for all states to start 
working for cooperative solutions on refugee accommodation and burden-sharing.289 
 
In the current political climate, the compensatory scheme constitutes probably the 
most feasible policy proposal for burden-sharing scheme. It is currently implemented 
in a preliminary regional form. The European Refugee Fund, which has a budget of 
628 million Euros for the period 2008 – 2013, distributes funds for refugee 
protection among EU member states on the basis of ‘objective criteria relating to the 
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number of asylum seekers and integrating persons benefiting from international 
protection’.290 The Fund may be argued to constitute an institutional scheme that is 
perfecting the imperfect duties of citizens in European countries, and it aims to 
distribute burdens of refugee protection in a fairer way than the non-refoulement 
principle. The establishment of the Fund may be considered as a small step away 
from the existing morally unsatisfactory refugee regime.291 
 
In addition to The European Refugee Fund, in the current world also other modest 
perfecting mechanisms for imperfect duties may be argued to exist on the interstate 
level. The UNHCR, which receives its annual budget ($2,78 billion for the year 
2011) from the UN member states, may be considered as an institution that is 
currently perfecting the imperfect duties corresponding to the right to asylum.292 
Some UN member states have also committed to accommodating annual quotas of 
UNHCR refugees. In other words, by binding themselves to annual quota obligations 
some states have moved to perfect their imperfect duties towards bearers of the right 
to asylum. The UNHCR resettlement programme constitutes a preliminary 
institutionalised system of physical burden-sharing which could, with certain 
measures of redesign, provide a template for a more comprehensive institutional 
scheme. Every year with the help of UNHCR a number of vulnerable Convention 
refugees are resettled to a range of ‘quota countries’. Since 2008, the number of 
quota countries has doubled from 12 to 24, and in 2010 the 24 resettlement countries 
provided nearly 80,000 places for UNHCR resettlement submissions.293 
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Let us conclude the enquiry with some considerations regarding possible themes for 
future enquiries. In the current study I have covered a range of normative issues 
related to refugee protection, but there are still plenty of issues that are worth of 
further study. Firstly, it might be examined what kind of account of the right to 
asylum – if any – could be outlined on the grounds of a theory of global justice that 
recognises distributive obligations beyond the entitlement to a decent life. In the 
current work I offered a ‘sufficientarian’ account of the right to asylum. This way of 
deriving the normative weight of the right to asylum suggests that the final form of 
the global refugee regime is linked closely to global obligations of distributive 
justice. There is a requirement justice to establish a moral refugee regime due to the 
fact that citizens of all states have a universal entitlement to certain basic 
opportunities and goods. In the study, I did not consider whether the scope of 
distributive obligations between states extends beyond the right to necessities. In 
other words, the account of global justice that has been offered in the current study 
may be understood as an incomplete account, and there still remains unanswered 
questions on whether beyond the point of decent life in which basic needs are 
globally met goods should be distributed within and between political communities 
according to merit, desert, or some other principle of distribution. 
 
If there are in fact global distributive obligations beyond the protection of the right to 
necessities, then it can of course be asked whether a case might be made for a 
completely different type of universal right to asylum, i.e., a right to asylum that 
extends beyond the protection of basic needs. At least it is surely the case that a 
global refugee regime that is committed to the protection of those who are 
discriminated against and those who do not have their non-fundamental entitlements 
sufficiently protected in their home states is imaginable. Such a regime would follow 
strongly egalitarian principles, and would serve as an instrument of global equality.  
 
But it should be noted that even if a valid argument for a more extensive right to 
asylum would be successfully outlined, I believe there are still strong reasons to 
consider those whose basic needs are not sufficiently protected in their home 
 9=9
countries as a distinct category of persons in a moral refugee regime. The satisfaction 
of basic needs is a matter of moral urgency, and those who are deprived of their basic 
needs are not only denied the opportunity to pursue a flourishing life but altogether 
the opportunity to live a decent life. This view of the global refugee regime and its 
central functions may be said to follow the idea of ‘prioritarianism’, which 
essentially suggests that one ought as a matter of justice aid the unfortunate, ‘and the 
more badly off someone is, the more urgent is the moral imperative to aid’.294  
 
Another reason for recognising those whose basic needs are at stake as a separate 
category of persons is more practical. There will need to be a lot of changes in the 
global political climate before asylum as an institution can be expanded to cover the 
protection of non-fundamental entitlements as well. In fact, a lot of changes need to 
occur in the political climate before effective institutions for the protection of the 
kind of right to asylum outlined in the current study are established. While there exist 
political debates on the extent to which for example environmental harms should be 
taken into consideration when considering asylum applications, politically we are far 
from a point where the institution of asylum is restructured in such a way that it 
covers also non-persecuted persons. To recognise these practical limitations in the 
restructuring of the global refugee regime is not to say that it would not be desirable 
if we could realise egalitarian aims of global justice more comprehensively with the 
refugee regime. Rather, it is to say only that we should start the efforts of moving 
towards more just world from somewhere, and that somewhere is the most 
fundamental needs and the most feasible political advancements. 
 
Secondly, it would be worthwhile to examine more closely the issue of obligations in 
the protection of the universal right to asylum. One possibility is to examine the 
relationship between moral responsibility regarding the reasons of deprivation and 
obligations of assistance. For example, in the current global refugee regime founded 
on the Convention the provisions of protection do not apply to any persons who have 
committed ‘crimes against peace’, ‘war crimes’, ‘crimes against humanity’, or 
‘serious non-political crimes’. It could be examined more closely how the stringency 
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of obligations in the protection of the right to asylum is related to the more specific 
reasons why persons are in need of asylum. In the end, it does not seem unreasonable 
to suggest that there is at least some kind of link between the moral responsibility 
and the stringency of the obligations of others to assist. Closer examination of this 
link would complement the current research. 
 
Thirdly, one possibility is to focus more closely on the issue of compliance and non-
compliance. The moral refugee regime should obviously be established in such a way 
that it also advances compliance. In other words, appropriate deterrence against non-
compliance and incentives for compliance should be in place. While citizens of 
complying states can have the obligation to bear more than their fair share of burdens 
in global protection of the right to asylum, the aim nevertheless should be an 
institutional framework where there is no need to divert from fair of distribution of 
burdens. It could be examined what exactly are the more practical elements of a 
moral refugee regime that can advance compliance, and what are the legitimate limits 
of deterrence? What kind of deterrence the international community can impose on 
non-complying states, and who should decide and oversee their use?  
 
Finally, as I pointed out in the introduction, the possible special right to asylum that 
persons may have against particular agents due to past wrongdoings of other agents 
is an important topic of enquiry. An enquiry on the special right to asylum would 
strengthen further the moral case for obligations to protect non-citizens, and would 
also provide an additional guideline for the establishment of a moral refugee regime. 
All things considered the global refugee regime should of course be established in 
such a way that it not only takes into consideration the universal right to asylum 
persons have, but also the special remedial rights against particular agents. Those 
who are primarily responsible for persons’ plight should be held accountable for their 
wrongful actions. 
 
In more general terms, it cannot be emphasised enough that the examination of the 
moral dimensions of refugee protection is increasingly important, and philosophers 
should not shy away from introducing ‘realistic moral arguments’ that can be easily 
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accessed by persons without strong philosophical background. Real persons’ basic 
needs are at stake in access to asylum, and for them ideal conclusions regarding open 
borders are not much of consolation. Ideal theory has its place, but due to the 
urgency of needs in question philosophers should not shy away from moral enquiries 
that overlap with advocacy. Politics needs moral guidelines, and philosophers may 
assist in producing these guidelines by examining why particular policy proposals 
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